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Polityka „miękkiej siły” Bidena a dyplomacja przymusu i odpowiedź na inwazję Rosji na Ukrainę
Streszczenie w języku polskim
Autor w niniejszym artykule analizuje militarny atak Rosji na Ukrainę i proponuje działania zmierzające do zakończenia wojny. Rozpoczyna od analizy stosunków Ameryki z U krainą przed rokiem 2021–2022 i wyjaśnia główne przyczyny ciągłego zainteresowania Rosji inwazją Ukrainy. Na koniec autor analizuje politykę zagraniczną Bidena i określa, jakiego rodzaju strategię należy zastosować, aby przywrócić pokój i stabilność w regionie.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/teka.2022.17.1.7-21
Data publikacji: 2023-06-05 09:32:44
Data złożenia artykułu: 2022-03-03 14:07:41
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Prawa autorskie (c) 2023 Andrzej Marcin Demczuk
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