Biden’s Soft Power vs. Coercive Diplomacy and Responding to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Andrzej Marcin Demczuk

Abstract


The article examines Russia’s military attack on Ukraine, and proposes actions to solve the crisis. It starts with an analysis of America’s relations with Ukraine prior to 2021–2022, and explains why we have to deal with Ukraine case to begin with. Next, it describes the primary drivers of Russia’s continued interest in invading Ukrainian territory. Finally, the author analyses Biden’s foreign policies and determines what type of strategy should be executed to bring peace and stability back to the region.


Keywords


Joe Biden, Ukraine, Russia, military buildup, the United States of America, hard power, soft power, coercive diplomacy

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/teka.2022.17.1.7-21
Date of publication: 2023-06-05 09:32:44
Date of submission: 2022-03-03 14:07:41


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