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Email this article Actively Open-Minded Thinking – Introduction and an Attempt to Describe the Idea Behind
Abstract
The article introduces the concept of actively open-minded thinking to Polish literature on the subject matter as well as an attempt to translate the name into Polish in most adequate way. Actively open-minded thinking is a disposition typical for an individual or the strategy used to process information and make decisions. According to Baron it constitutes the base for rationality and critical thinking. It assumes a conscious and purposive looking for a diverse range of opinions and facts, despite individual preferences, in order to analyze the issue in an elaborate and unbiased way. The essence of such an analysis is to consider different perspectives in order to gain confidence that the selected option or inferences that were made are most adequate and reliable. The aim is to think reasonably and without biases. In addition to specifying what actively open-minded thinking is, the author compares this disposition with other features related to critical thinking present in the scientific discourse: reflexivity, the need for cognition, the need for cognitive closure, and a flexible mindset. In addition, the regulatory consequences of thinking in an open and flexible way, the sources of this disposition and methods of its measurement were discussed.
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NETOGRAFIA
Gürçay-Morris, B. (2016). The Use of Alternative Reasons in Probabilistic Judgment. PhD Dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania. Pobrane z: http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/theses/GurcayMorrisDissertation.pdf (dostęp: 30.05.2022).
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/j.2022.35.3.23-41
Date of publication: 2022-12-19 09:09:31
Date of submission: 2022-06-30 21:33:33
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