Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s St. Petersburg speech: conditions, content and consequences from the point of view of relations in the Triangle Russia–Kazakhstan–China

Michał Słowikowski, Michał Klonowski

Abstract


The aim of the article is to answer the question of how relations between Kazakhstan and the two key superpowers – Russia and China – involved in the policy of the Central Asian region have changed in the light of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The starting point for the discussion on the complex relations in the Russia-Kazakhstan-China triangle is the speech of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg in June 2022. It triggered an avalanche of comments indicating that Kazakhstan, in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, fears of sanctions from the West and concern for stable socio-economic development driven by revenues from the sale of natural resources, is not ready to support Russia in its confrontation with the West. On the other hand, it intends to follow the Chinese path, seeing Beijing as an influential patron who will stop Moscow from aggressive actions against Kazakhstan.

The theoretical basis of the article is the concept of omni-enmeshment. In the literature on the subject, it is assumed that its implementation provided Kazakhstan with stability, security and continuity of the existence of the political regime associated with the person of Nursultan Nazarbayev. The authors assume that this concept could have been realized as long as the powers involved in the region maintained a balance in mutual relations. The war with Ukraine and the confrontation with the West caused Russia to deliberately destroy the Kazakh model of international order in the region. It may take aggressive actions against Kazakhstan because it has not sufficiently taken care of the infrastructural security of its energy links with the West.

For many years, Kazakhstan has avoided clientelist obligations towards one of the superpowers, but facing Russia's actions, it is clearly inclined to seek protection from China, which is ready to accept the burden of responsibility for the security of the region, in the interest of the security and success of the Belt and Road Initiative.


Keywords


Kazakhstan, Russia, China, Central Asia, omni-enmeshment

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References


Piśmiennictwo:

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/we.2022.8.2.115-137
Date of publication: 2023-03-30 08:34:52
Date of submission: 2023-03-02 18:14:46


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