What if the Truth does not Exist... or the Role of Values in Historiography (in Defense of Historical Truth)

Abstract

In the article, I try to answer questions about the role/functions of values in historical writing, about their place in the narrative, and I wonder whether historiography free from (historical) truth is at all possible. I assume, referring primarily to the sociology of knowledge and tools offered by the constructivist model of cognition, that the position regarding truth/value in historical research is realised in three (at least) attitudes, namely conservative, liberal and pragmatic. The superstitions present in each of them determine the attitude to truth/values and their functions in cognitive processes. The observations presented in the article show that the truth/truths/values turn out to be essentially rhetorical arguments used in disputes between competing visions/images of the past/the world. Their functions come down to strengthening/creating the authority of the Historian and, consequently, to conducting a (proper) historical policy.