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What’s the Point of Silent Blame?
Abstract
In this article I thoroughly examine Miranda Fricker’s account of blame based on Communicative Blame as a paradigm explanation of the practice by focusing my attention on a non-central case: silent blame. I argue that this kind of instance has not been successfully connected with her selected paradigm case so I propose a different “focal meaning” or rationale to better accommodate it as part of the entire range of cases of the practice of blaming. I begin my argument drawing upon Herbert L.A. Hart’s methodology on central and borderline cases as a more accurate way to address the complex structure of the concept of blame, since this approach is sensitive to borderline cases as well. I also argue that, although marginal, silent blame fulfils a purpose which must too be vindicated. Thus, following Hart’s suggestion on the value of studying borderline cases, I propose a more accurate reframing of the general point of the practice of blame as a mechanism to secure respect for ourselves.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/k.2019.26.2.7-23
Date of publication: 2019-12-28 00:00:00
Date of submission: 2019-06-15 21:29:06
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