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## Participatory Democracy and the Disadvantaged Factors: The Taiwan and Czech Cases

Demokracja uczestnicząca i czynniki niekorzystne: przypadek Tajwanu i Czech

### INTRODUCTION

Civil society is being touted as the latest elixir for overthrowing authoritarian regimes and consolidating democracy. It came first as a powerful weapon to combat dictatorships and then transformed into an indispensable tool for the development and consolidation of new democracies. Though the concept of civil society is diversely defined, its few negative appraisals are miniscule when its contribution toward democracy is evaluated, regardless of subsequent democracy consolidation or further development. Democracy is simultaneously a mechanism of a constitutional institution and a way of life in modern society. That is, daily life is full of the workings of participatory democracy. Citizens read newspapers, take part in discussions with friends, express concerns by joining civic associations, and take actions such as demonstrations, rallies, donations, boycotts, etc. If it is true that representative democracy depends on a certain degree of political apathy, participatory democracy, on the other hand, must count on civic engagement. Low civic participation is likely to bring about social indifference, which in turn may negatively affect social cohesion.

I suggest that civic participation consist of at least three parts: traditional political participation (voting), participation in civic associations (NGOs, NPOs, or the third sector), and other political or social actions (demonstrations, rallies and meetings, boycotts, donations, internet forum, etc.). Despite the significance of civic participation for civil society and democracy, we still cannot rush into the equation of tautology, which concludes that civic participation alone can explain the nature of all civil societies and that it is a gauge with which to compare democratic depth among democracies. Civic participation itself is not equal to civil society and democracy. However, the question of whether civic participa-

tion is a good indicator when evaluating civil society and democracy needs to be examined in more detail, especially regarding the related knowledge of modern civil society and democracy. Additionally, the value of civic participation should be measured not only by the extent of engagement, but also by the type of engagement, for both are essential for gaining a meaningful understanding of the specific characteristics of various civil societies. Civil society should not be considered a utopian ideal or something similarly unattainable. It is not a single entity; it refers to a plural form. Civil society is an academic product of the Western knowledge system context, so its suitability for export to non-Western societies must be explored. Many new democracies were, in the past, the colonies of Western imperialists or were influenced directly from the West by means of industrialization, modernization, and globalization. Therefore, the Western-born idea has been transformed into a variety of 'localized' models. In the meantime, this situation has enriched the context of civil society.

On the whole, civic participation also characterizes civil society by its extent and forms, in which historical effects typically play a noteworthy role. Historical effects contain specialized political and societal components which are gradually constructed from the past, especially relating to prior regimes. Totalitarian or authoritarian governments never or seldom provide people with full political rights to participate in politics, or full citizenship to organize civic associations, or even the freedom to take any political or social actions. Governing measures of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes differ and therefore lead to a variety of civic participation levels and forms during democratization. In general, the legacy of prior regimes affects the extent and forms of civic participation. In addition, cultural backgrounds, especially religion, supply the framework of reference when describing forms of civic participation and civil society. New democracies often tend to have lower civic participation than older, more established democracies, and the causes of such low participation result partly from the legacy of prior regimes and cultural backgrounds. The legacy of prior regimes adversely influences people's attitudes toward civic participation because in these regimes, citizens were directly or indirectly encouraged to mind their own business rather than concern themselves with social issues. Such attitudes and habits are detrimental to the development of civil society because they crush citizens' enthusiasm to contribute to the public sphere. Civil society encourages civic participation on the grassroots level. The open and public nature of civic participation acts as a form of collective social morality because it is the public that reaps its benefits, not individuals.

Although civic participation is emphasized in the context of civil society and democracy, social indifference still exists as the most prominent negative factor that affects the development of civil society and democracy in the new democracies. Social indifference determines the extent of civic participation and often is the result of historical effects in the new democracies. How much time will be

needed to do away with the negative effect of social indifference, that is, does a generational effect exist in relation to social indifference or civic participation? In addition, the legacy of prior regimes seemingly still influences the development of civil society and democracy, so what is the state of the new democracies' civil society under the influence of different prior regimes (the authoritarian and totalitarian)? Ascertaining the extent of civic participation in new democracies might be difficult, but it is such a crucial measure that relative standards are necessary in order to accurately describe the current state of civic participation in new democracies. How can civic participation be measured and what degree should be considered low or high for civic participation in these new democracies? A low level of civic participation refers to social indifference, which differs from the situation of political indifference. Political indifference is measured by political participation, and what is the difference between civic participation/social indifference and political participation/political indifference? As for new democracies, other factors may be utilized to explain civic participation, such as demographic variables (education, income, gender), SES (social and economic status), trust (general and political trust), and so on. Through these independent variables, we can make out the differences in the various civil societies among the new democracies, and furthermore gain a deeper understanding of their relationship to their respective historical contexts.

This paper focuses on civic participation and its disadvantaged factors in civil society and democratic life in new democracies, especially after long-term deprivation of political freedom. I emphasize the experiences of Central and Eastern European countries or the post-communist countries, especially the Czech case, and make a comparison with Taiwan. The disadvantaged factors in this paper at least involve social indifference, corruption, powerless for the politics and no trust for governments and the general society. The factors of development in politics and the economy do not necessarily guarantee the participation in civic participation, which is regarded as a prominent component of civil society and democracy. There are still many other factors that influence the consolidation of civil society and democracy in the new democracies, and the legacy of prior regimes is one of the most decisive. Due to the degree of overall political and social control during the period of authoritarian or communist regimes, people removed themselves from politics, so their trust in politics is diminished. When confronting the bureaucratic system, people become powerless, or unwilling to concern themselves with politics. Therefore, the legacy of prior regimes, both authoritarian and communist, consists of political distrust, a sense of powerlessness and political indifference. During the period of democratization, corruption is also a serious problem, and corruption often brings about further political distrust and apathy toward politics. Research instruments involve international surveys including ISSP Citizenship 2004, Taiwan and Czech domestic election records and some other surveys like CVVM in the Czech Republic.

## THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

**Theory and question**

I pose the question of whether social and political trust or distrust has an effect on civic participation. Political trust and even social trust in new democracies is, as usual, lower than that of the older democracies, and it appears to be related to the reluctance to join civic associations and to take part in political or social activities. Trust is an important theoretical concept of social capital. Fukuyama outlines the definition of social capital as “an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals... They must be instantiated in an actual human relationship: the norm of reciprocity exists in potential in my dealings with all people, but is actualized only in my dealing with my friends” (Fukuyama, 2001:7). Fukuyama associates trust, networks and civil society with social capital. He confirms the importance of trust in associational life. Putnam identifies social capital as “the features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and social networks” (Putnam, 1993:167). Das brings trust, cooperation and other similar processes together under the concept of social capital, and even expands his definition to include some norms of trust and reciprocity toward networks, associations and organizations that constitute social capital for individuals (Das, 2004:65). Halman and Luijkx classify trust, norms of reciprocity and engagement in networks into the main components of social capital (Halman & Luijkx, 2006:70). Vesely and Mares identify clusters of topics which are associated with social capital such as transformation of social structure during economic and political transition; importance of social networks for an individual; trust; social cohesion, welfare state and social solidarity; socio-economic development; civic participation; and corruption (Vesely & Mares, et al., 2006:10). Halman and Luijkx suggest that individual-level social capital makes individuals active participants in building a good life, and even extends to include communities and even entire nations (Halman & Luijkx, 2006:65). It is not my intention to explore social capital in relation to civic participation, but rather the element of trust. Trust as social capital contributes to social cohesion and solidarity, and I argue that political and social trust promotes positive civic participation and it is helpful for democratic consolidation in new democracies.

In the political sphere, trust and “other civic attitudes allow citizens to join their forces in social and political groups” and enables them to push forward their political aims (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003:2). In the social field, trust “facilitates life in diverse societies and fosters acts of tolerance and acceptance of otherness” (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003:2). Stolle synthesizes different viewpoints regarding social capital resources and suggests that social capital “does not exist independent in the realm of civil society: governments, public policies, social cleavages, economic conditions and political institutions channel and influence social capital such that it be-

comes either a beneficial or detrimental resource for democracy” (Stolle, 2003:21). Though civil society and social capital are closely associated, they are two separate concepts. Civil society emphasizes the membership in and activities of voluntary groups of NGOs and NPOs, which can be an indicator of democratic development. Social capital focuses on trust, norms and civic participation, which can make people actively participate in macro-level politics and subsequently, democratic development. Saxton and Benson find the strength of political engagement and establishing ties are vital for the community (Saxton & Benson, 2005:16). Rudolph and Evans suggest that political trust has “policy consequences” and reflects citizens’ policy satisfaction (Rudolph & Evans, 2005:660–661). Obviously trust (political and social) appears as an influential factor for the discussion in civic participation; however, I intend to examine if the effect of trust still plays a significant role affecting the development of civil society and democracy in new democracies.

If the logic of conventional political participation is a rational mechanism for representative democracy, the main political right of the citizens is voting, and after voting, the voters let go of political affairs and allow political experts or professional politicians to deal with all political issues. Today we still emphasize the essential function of elections, for political elites cannot be replaced by another mechanism to perform governmental tasks and functions. However, people can take advantage of more channels of participation such as monitoring or even taking part in governmental decisions; that is, the scope of political participation is enlarging. While as far as the context of civil society is concerned, the expansion of political participation stands as an example of political progress but its scope still does not encompass social concerns. Therefore, even though the sphere of political participation has become large, it still cannot satisfy our needs to participate in civil society. Deliberative democracy can be seen as the result of enlarging political participation; however, deliberative democracy should be involved in the broader scope of civic participation (or citizen participation, civic engagement), which asks for the public to participate not only in deliberative politics, but also in civic associations and related activities, and various forms of political and social action to express social concerns. Participatory democracy does not equate to some kind of political mechanism, but should expand its scope to become a democratic way of life, corresponding to the notion of civil society.

Civil society acts as associational life in the public sphere, and it requires civic participation in order to build a more consolidated democratic society. The four negative factors: political distrust, sense of powerlessness, political indifference and political corruption, are disadvantageous to the development of civil society and democracy. Democracy without the foundation of trust is hardly consolidated (Dowley & Silver, 2002:505). Trust is always associated with more participation in political and social concerns; however, distrust makes the public indifferent to political or social participation (Levi & Stoker, 2000:486). Societies under totali-

tarian regimes inadvertently forced people to retreat from the public sphere and into private circles. Despite the disappearance of the prior regimes, the shadow of the legacy from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes still has some impact on people's attitudes and behaviors; therefore, people are afraid or not interested in politics. Corruption is a serious problem in the new democracies, and it may destroy the newborn democratic values and practices and threaten the consolidation of democracy (Třika, 2006:12–13). Corruption in the older democracies is also a serious challenge to their societies; however, the rule of law fosters more confidence among the public than the new democracies (Blake & Martin, 2006:1–2). Democracy is not only a constitutional institution, but also a life way in civilized society; therefore, democracy requires more citizens to participate. Civic organizations play a vital role in civil society; if more people engage in associational life, they will pay more attention to social concerns. In the preceding chapters, we found that civic participation in the new democracies is not as common as in the older democracies. Less civic participation is the result of insufficient development of modernization on the one hand, and from the prior regime legacy on the other hand. This paper mainly explores the negative factors that influence the development of civil society and democracy, and these factors can be regarded as the prior-regime legacies.

### **Taiwan and Czech cases study**

Taiwan is located in the eastern part of Asia, an island state surrounded by the ocean, with two-thirds of its territory being mountainous. Taiwan Strait, an average distance of 200 kilometers, separates Taiwan and mainland China. The Czech lands lie in the heart of Europe; it is a landlocked country with mostly plains and low mountains. The two countries, due to their strategic locations and the significance of geopolitics, were very often occupied or heavily influenced by neighboring powers throughout history. Taiwan had been the colony of Spain, the Netherlands and Japan, and currently still exists under the geopolitical influence from China, Japan and the USA. The Czech lands were governed by the Habsburg monarchy and Hitler's Germany, and then were a member of the Eastern block led by Russia. Taiwan's martial law, which was enacted in 1949 and lifted in 1987, made Taiwan an authoritarian state for 38 years. The Czech Republic, or Czechoslovakia, was a communist regime from 1948 until 1989, and was viewed as a totalitarian state for 41 years.

#### **The Taiwan case**

Taiwan became a colony of Japan in 1894 because China was defeated by the newly modernized Japan. Japan intended not only to occupy Taiwan but to rule the



whole of China. Through eight years of resistance against the Japanese invasion, China triumphed over Japan and regained control over Taiwan in 1945; however, the following four years saw a fierce domestic war between KMT and the Communist Party. When the domestic chaos spread to mainland China, Taiwan also fell into disorder, for poor governance by Chinese officers brought about the 228 incident, in which a great number of Taiwanese elites were massacred by the KMT and the whole of Taiwan was paralyzed by attacks among the local Taiwanese and Chinese militaries. In 1949, KMT lost the struggle over Chinese dominance with the Communist Party, and the national government withdrew to Taiwan. It was estimated that between 1.5 and 2 million Mainlanders fled to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War (Roy, 2003:76). The national government declared martial law in 1949 to limit the political freedom of the press, publication, addresses, demonstrations, strikes, and rallies. KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek, persisted in the return back to mainland China, and established Taiwan as a foundation of anti-communist sentiment, so a series of administrative measures were put into place for the preparation of restarting a war with the Chinese Communist Party. In the meantime, KMT's government arrested, detained and slaughtered the opposition elites and dissidents, most of whom were Taiwanese, so the political atmosphere was very tense. It was known as the White Terror and it lasted for the whole period of martial law from 1949 to 1987. During this time, more than 29,407 people were unjustifiably put to trial (Po Yang, 2005:197).

Due to the structure of the Cold War, Taiwan received the support of the USA to contain Communist China. However, when the American government began to compromise with China in the early 1970s, Taiwan's international position declined. Taiwan withdrew from the United Nations in 1971, broke off diplomatic relations with Japan in 1972 and with the USA in 1978. The KMT government focused on the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty; it halted the elections of the parliament (National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan) while waiting to regain control of mainland China. However, the local-level elections, which were not related to the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty, could continue. In the 1964 election of local governors, four oppositional candidates triumphed over KMT's candidates, most notably in Taipei's mayoral race, in which the no-party affiliation candidate Kao Yu-shu won the seat (Po Yang, 2005:130). Since then, the common people could cultivate their democratic values and attitudes through regular elections. KMT's government emphasized electoral democracy and freedom to distinguish itself from the autocracy of Communist China. This desire to distance itself from mainland China stemmed from KMT's aforementioned setback in international diplomacy, and when KMT found it impossible to get China back during the 1970s and 1980s, the societal and political situations had changed. Social movements flourished in the 1980s, the so-called "Golden Decade of social movements" (Hsiao, 2005:84).

Social movements as a popular form of civic participation encompassed all social problems and often mobilized the masses to demonstrate in the streets. These movements were: the consumer movement (1980), self-assistance for community anti-pollution (1980), environmental and ecological protection (1981), women's movement (1982), the rights of the aboriginal (1983), students' movement (1986), labor movement (1987), farmers' movement (1987), human rights for teachers (1987), social welfare for the disabled and weak groups (1987), rights for retired soldiers (1987), Chinese mainlanders' advocacy groups (1987), blacklisted Taiwanese advocacy groups (1988), anti-nuclear power (1988), 228 peaceful memorial movement (1989), educational reform (1990), etc (Chan, 2005:164–165; Lin, 2005:68–69). These social movements pressed KMT's government to consider further liberalization and democratization, and at the same time many non-governmental organizations were set up to address specific concerns. Civil society played a significant role pushing forward democratization after 1986, and since then many large, organized and influential social movements have been established to pursue their interests (Hsieh, 2000:61). It was not until the late 1990s that civil society groups gained entry into the decision-making procedure of social policy – a decade after democratic breakthrough (Wong, 2005:106).

Many scholars associate civil society or non-governmental organizations with some specific issues relating to Taiwan's unique situation. Wang credits NGOs with being the channel of national reunification for Taiwan and mainland China (Wang, 2000:111). Liao Fu-Te urges the establishment of a national human rights commission through NGOs (Liao, 2001:90). Laliberte explores the involvement of Buddhist NGOs in the process of democratization in Taiwan (Laliberte, 2001:9798). Marsh examines the relation of organization participation and the *quanxi* (social relation or network) capital, which is more relationship-based than either individual- or collective- based social capita (Marsh, 2003:601). Liao Shu-Chuan confirms the contribution of women's participation in social movements and NGOs (Liao, 2003:29). Some scholars argue that the “non-Western case of civil society tends to center on conceptual categorization (e.g. does colonial Taiwan have a civil society?), rather than on cultural and historical processes (e.g. what distinct cultural sources facilitated the development of civil society in colonial Taiwan?) (Lo, Bettinger & Fan, 2006:79). The old image of Asian society is regarded as Confucian, patriarchal, authoritarian and socially conservative (Wong, 2003:235). Madsen considers that the Confucians always searched for a possibility to establish a stable political order and in East Asian society today, “apologists for authoritarian governments like that of Singapore invoke the Confucian tradition to suppress much of what would be considered part of civil society in the West” (Madsen, 2002:191). Ho thinks “it is the familial collectivism inherent in Confucianism that is largely responsible for the development of the ‘democratic’ civic person in Taiwan” (Ho, 2003:168). Madsen notes that contemporary Taiwan is probably the most open society in East Asia (Madsen, 2002:198).



Taiwan's successful democratization is praised as a "political miracle," parallel to its well-known "economic miracle" of the 1960s and 1970s. Martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan received the status of "free country" in a 1997 Freedom House publication due to the improvement of civil liberties and civil rights (Kuo, 2000:85). During the 1990s, Taiwan's transition went remarkably smoothly with almost no political violence or economic downfall (Fell, 2006:21). Taiwan has been a "real democracy," as proved by its functioning free elections, pluralist political system, division of legislature, executive, and judiciary, the existence of non-government organizations, the depoliticized army, and the independent media (Furst, 2005:60). However, Copper raised four questions to challenge Taiwan's democracy: "(1) Taiwan's mixed political system, which was not ready for the opposition to become the ruling party; (2) Taiwan's style of democracy was copied from America's, in some ways wrongly. This made it a system that did not fit an Asian country and allowed for ethnic politics and some other undesirable aspects of democracy to evolve; and (3) the Chen Administration ignored the importance of economic development" (Copper, 2003:145). Chen Sui-bian succeeded Li Ten-Huei (KMT, 1987–2000) as Taiwan's president from 2000 to 2008, and during the eight years of DPP's (Democratic Progress Party) governance, some contentious issues vexed Taiwanese society and resulted in antagonistic relations. National identity almost became the most important issue in Taiwan. The former vice president Lu Hsiao-lian (2000–2008) claims that Taiwan was occupied by KMT and the 228 Incident was the result of the resistance by the Taiwanese against external influence from China (Lu, 2007:219). Chen and Lu compare Taiwanese identity with Chinese identity. Political issues were the priority of the DPP's government and weakened civil society and social movements for the expression of social concerns. DPP lost the presidential election in 2008 and proclaimed that they will go back to the route of social movements, and emphasized the importance of collaboration with civil society. Taiwan has been through the criteria of Huntington's two-turnover test, and democratic development has been more stabilized. KMT's government carried out liberalization first in order to continually maintain its power, and once they could not resist social pressure for more freedom and democracy, KMT's government, led by President Li Ten-Huei, started large-scale constitutional reforms.

### The Czech case

The Czech lands were under the Habsburg monarchy's governance for over three hundred years until 1918, when the Czech and Slovak nations decided to join and create an independent united state, which was called as Czechoslovakia. The new state was a republican democracy, whose first president was T.G. Masaryk.

At that time, several millions of ethnic Germans lived in Bohemia and Moravia and they were not willing to recognize the new state. (Polisensky, 1991:110–111) The conflict between the Czechs and German ethnic groups became the excuse for Hitler's invasion of the Czech lands in 1939. The Czech part of Czechoslovakia was occupied by Nazi Germany for six years from 1939 to 1945, while the Slovak part became an independent country. The democratic government led by President Benes was short-lived and a communist takeover succeeded in 1948 after the February Coup. Klement Gottwald became the leader of Czechoslovakia, and the regime changed into a dictatorship of the Proletariat. Political trials and communist party purges during this time claimed between 200,000 and 280,000 victims (Cornej & Pokorny, 2003:69). Czechoslovakia put Stalinism into practice for twenty years from 1948–1968, where the Soviet Russian model was emulated for social control and industrial development. Czechoslovakia joined the COM-ECON in 1949 and entered the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Czechoslovakia declared itself a socialist state in its constitution in the 1960s; it was the first Eastern block state to do so, next only to the Soviet Union.

Alexander Dubcek, who was elected as the secretary of the Communist Party, advocated "socialism with a human face" to start a series of liberalization reforms optimistically called the Prague Spring. The manifesto "2000 Words," organized by the novelist Luvik Vaculik on 27<sup>th</sup> June 1968, obtained 70 writers' signatures and "condemned the Communists for their past monopoly of power and corruption" (Dowling, 2002:111). The manifesto's signatories expressed support for the Dubcek leadership. Soviet leader Leonid Illyich Brezhnev began to regard the Czechoslovak reforms as harmful to the integrity of the Communist community and finally decided on military intervention. The Prague Spring was cut short by the invasion of the Warsaw Pact countries on 21<sup>st</sup> September 1968. Gustav Husak replaced Dubcek as the leader of the Party and the state and initiated the period of Normalization.

Normalization was a return to the situation before January 1968. Some 500,000 Czechoslovaks were expelled from the KSC (Czechoslovak Communist Party), which resulted in millions of people losing privileges such as access to education (Fawn, 2000:22). Citizens of the CSSR (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) were not permitted to travel freely, and people reacted with growing apathy (Cornej & Pokorny, 2003:78). The trade unions and the youth organizations were recentralized (Agnew, 2004:270). On 1<sup>st</sup> January 1977, Charter 77 was published, which admonished the rulers of the CSSR for violating human rights and asked them to fulfill their international obligations. This Charter gained more influence and encouraged more people to oppose the communist regime in the second half of the 1980s. A large student demonstration and general strike took place toward the end of 1989, and then the Civic Forum and The Public Against Violence led the opposition groups' negotiations with the communist regime (Leff, 1997:81–83).

The 'Velvet Revolution' brought about the end of the communist regime and replaced it with political elites to rule the democratic government. Vaclav Havel became the new president in 1989, and during his 13-year presidency, Havel insisted on the highest standard of moral principles in his political affairs. He held up the ideal of civil society and democratic values. Another vital character was the Federal Minister of Finance in 1991, Vaclav Klaus, who was responsible for the task of privatization of the economy; his idea was known as 'coupon privatization'. The post-communist society faced a wide range of changes. The new democratic regime had to work out the new political and social mechanisms, which differed a lot from the prior regime. After two decades of Normalization, freedom became very valuable. The ruling elites of the communist regime were replaced by another group of new political elites, and the new elites proceeded with liberalization and democratization on the basis of clearing the legacy of the prior regime, which became the legitimacy for the new regime.

Myant and Smith suggest that communist rule leaves a certain negative legacy in at least three different forms. The first is the formal networks, in which the communist power structure operated. The second is the continuation of various attitudes and habits developed from the communist period, partly from the accepted behavior of those in powers and partly from the need to cope with conditions of shortage. These include lack of generalized trust, willingness to ignore formal rules and dependence on personal contacts and mutual favor networks. The third is an alleged apathy and unwillingness to participate in public life, generated during the post-1968 Normalization when individuals sought comfort in a private sphere that they could separate from the formal sphere (Myant & Smith, 2006:153). The third or non-profit sector (civil society) in the Czech Republic did not appear until 1989. It was built on a rich tradition, the roots of which dated back to the National Revival in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. This period consisted of variety of cultural, artistic, and educational associations and societies which became an important part of Czech civic life. The creation of an independent Czech state in 1918 provided a positive impulse for the development of civil society. During the Second World War and after 1948, the right to associate was restricted, and a number of NGOs were dissolved. The state also gained control and organized a range of leisure time activities for children, youth, adults and the elderly (Rakusanova, 2006:21).

In the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution, there was a strong desire held among the new political elites to incorporate a wide array of interests within the formal arena. The former dissidents now entrusted with political power were fully aware of the need for the post-communist political system to be inclusive and to encourage active participation from a citizenry long excluded from politics (Fagin, 1999:100; Eyal, 2000:68–69). T.G. Masaryk is often regarded as a Westward-looking liberal democrat. Masaryk regarded democracy as an objective standard, where the pursuit of truth mattered above that of interest. A skeptic might argue

that such a democratic legacy was erased by the experience of dictatorship and totalitarianism (Dryzek & Holmes, 2000:1046). In the Czech Republic, two main and opposing views of democracy emerge as “participatory” and “majoritarian.” The participatory model, which was dominant during the 1989–92 Government of the Civic Forum, aims to focus on the promotion of civic participation in public affairs. The majoritarian model was adopted by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the main party in government from 1992–1997. ODS firmly committed to the conception of democracy in which the relation between the citizen and the state is expressed primarily through the act of voting (O’Mahony, 2003:179).

Hadjiisky believes that the participatory model of democracy proved dominant during the first period of democratization largely because it was promoted by Vaclav Havel and some other former dissidents who gained important positions in the political arena (Hadjiisky, 2001:46). Havel thought the only proper task of the state is to defend the institutional basis of a depoliticized, independent, pluralist, and self-organizing civil society. Anything else is a mortal threat to personal autonomy and social health. This trend of thought, which had been implicit in the civil society literature from the very beginning, would soon examine how personal autonomy could be protected by political democracy, civil liberty, and the rule of law (Ehrenberg, 1999:193). Havel rooted “civil society” in the need for respect for general moral principles of tolerance and respect for one another. In the mid-1990s, he associated the concept of civil society with the vision of a non-political sphere that would educate and socialize citizens, but he used the term to focus on issues more directly linked to questions of power (Myant, 2005:261). Vaclav Klaus was elected as the new chairman of Civic Forum in 1990, and his thinking dominated the formulation of the Civic Forum, and later, the ODS platform. He considered political reform to be subordinate to economic reform. Klaus, as a neo-liberalist, maintained that there is no place for environmental policy; only the market and private property are essential activities of government. Klaus claimed that the notion of civil society stands outside current standard sociological or political disciplines and its basic origins come from rationalist philosophers’ attempts at social engineering. Klaus felt confident enough to counterpoise “a society of free individuals” to “so-called civil society” (Myant, 2005:260–262; Auer, 2006:421). Havel is a strong supporter of civil society and participatory democracy, while Klaus emphasizes the institutions of representative democracy. The Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999, and entered the EU in 2004. In the beginning of the 1990s, international assistance played an important role in stabilizing the development of civil society (Glenn, 2000:161–162); however, when the political and social reforms had reached a certain point, international aid withdrew from Eastern Europe.

### A comparison in a historical perspective

Taiwan is a post-authoritarian country, and the Czech Republic is a post-communist one; however, both of them are two examples of democratic consolidation in the third democratic wave (Huntington, 1993). After briefly introducing their background of social and political development, I conclude with some comparative differences between these two cases, largely in a historical perspective. First, Taiwan had no democratic experience prior to democratization, while the Czech Republic had had over twenty years of democratic practice in the Czech Lands (1918–1938; 1945–1948). Secondly, Taiwan sped up liberalization in the early seventies when international pressure required it to do so in order to maintain the legitimacy of KMT's governance, while Czechoslovakia turned to Normalization – which was the result of the liberalization of 1960s. Thirdly, social movements flourished in the 1980s, the so-called “Golden Decade of Social Movements” in Taiwan, and pushed forward further liberalization and democratization, while oppositional movements appeared in the end of the 1980s in Czechoslovakia and eventually overthrew the communist regime. Fourthly, the authoritarian party, KMT, gained more legitimacy during democratization; therefore, KMT's government slowed down the process of democratization for the reason of social stability in Taiwan, while in the Czech Republic, the legitimacy of democratization was based on the lustration of the communist regime; therefore, the new democratic regime could strive for the new constitutional mechanism of liberalization and democratization simultaneously in the Czech Republic. Finally, very little international assistance was provided to Taiwan to promote civil society or the third sector, while international aid poured into the Czech Lands to support the stability of civil society or the third sector.

### THE DISADVANTAGED FACTORS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Although the development of politics and the economy increases the level of civic participation, the legacy of prior regime still acts as a “pulling” power to hinder the development of civil society. Additionally, the distance between the new democracies and the older democracies in terms of political and economical development explains part of the reason why the level of civic participation still lags behind that of the older democracies. On the other hand, the legacy of prior regimes also provides part of the answer when attempting to make sense of the low level of civic participation. I use three datasets to examine the question of prior-regime legacy: International Social Survey Programme 1996 (Role of Governmental III, ISSP 1996), ISSP 2004 (Citizenship), and ISSP 2006 (Role of Government IV). Four questions are selected to represent “Political distrust,” “Sense of powerlessness,” “Political Indifference” and “Political corruption.” The first



question is: "Most of time we can trust people in government to do what is right," and two of the options, "disagree" and "strongly disagree" are coded as "political distrust." The second question is: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," and two options, "strongly agree" and "agree" are regarded as "sense of powerlessness toward politics." The third question is: "How interested would you say you personally are in politics," and two options, "not very interested," and "not at all interested," are coded as "political indifference." The fourth question is: "How widespread do you think corruption is in the public service," and three options, "a moderate number of people are involved," "a lot of people are involved," and "almost everyone is involved," are used as "political corruption." Table 1 is the collection of results for the data in ISSP1996, ISSP2004 and ISSP2006. Not all datasets are complete for each survey. Many countries are not included in the survey of ISSP 1996, especially the post authoritarian countries. Essentially, I take the data of ISSP 2004 as the major analysis, and the other two data are taken as a reference from which we can see a change in values.

As for the analysis of ISSP 2004 data, the average level of political distrust in the post communist countries (52.1%) is higher than in the older democracies (35.9%) and the post authoritarian countries (46.42%). However, as far as geopolitical culture is concerned, the average of the political distrust in the Central and Eastern European countries is slightly lower than the Latin American countries (52.4%), but higher than the average of Eastern Asian countries (41.3%). Regardless of the difference among the older democracies, the post authoritarian countries and the post communist countries, the difference is not significant statistically (see Table 2).

As for the ISSP 2006 data, the ranking is similar; that is, the average of the post communist countries is the highest among the three blocks of countries: the average of the post communist countries is 49.2%; the post authoritarian countries (43.1%); the older democracies (35.3%). There is also no significant difference among these three groups of countries in the aspect of political distrust in 2006 (see Table 3). According to Figure 1, we can see the difference in political trust and political distrust between the older democracies and the new democracies. There is almost no difference between the political trust and distrust in the older democracies; political trust (34.2%) is higher than the new democracies, and political distrust (35.3%) is lower compared with the new democracies. However, the situation of the post communist countries is quite the opposite of the older democracies, while the political trust (15.9%) is the highest and the political distrust (49.2%) is the lowest, and the difference between political trust and distrust is the largest (33.3%). The post authoritarian countries hold the middle position in political trust (30.1%) and distrust (43.1%) among the three groups of countries. The overall control of political life in the communist regimes still seems to affect society in the form of the legacy of the prior regimes; that is, people are not likely to believe that civil servants provide a good service for the public.



Table 1. The disadvantaged factors in civil society (%)

	Political distrust			Powerless sense			Political Indifference			Corruption	
	1996	2004	2006	1996	2004	2006	1996	2004	2006	2004	2006
<b>Older Democracies (The West)</b>											
<b>Western European Countries</b>											
Germany (West)	43.7	61.1	43.7	64.2	57.9	68.1	28.9	29.9	25.7	72.4	67.0
Great Britain	39.9	39.6	38.3	67.9	53.7	57.1	35.8	48.8	33.1	40.4	63.1
Austria		55.3			63.1			42.4		61.8	
Netherlands	25.1	35.8	39.5	47.3	42.3	55.3	19.3	47.1	15.7	34.5	69.8
Sweden	55.9	22.9	45.6	66.8	50.0	51.5	31.5	53.0	29.6	57.0	61.2
France	58.0	45.0	54.3	20.2	8.2	21.6	18.9	41.2	19.0	61.1	75.6
Switzerland	37.1	22.1	18.9	47.6	34.5	42.6	31.3	41.8	37.6	51.6	47.0
Denmark		17.9	19.4		44.8	49.1		37.1	25.0	26.9	15.4
Norway		33.9	25.3		36.3	45.0		35.3	14.0	40.6	61.8
Finland		23.8	26.0		54.8	60.8		65.5	31.1	32.6	50.4
Ireland	28.7	40.7	25.2	68.0	64.7	60.2	41.4	46.5	39.5	52.8	54.4
(Mean) of WECs		(36.48)	(33.62)		(45.14)	(51.13)		(41.81)	(27.03)	(48.59)	(56.57)
<b>Other Western Countries</b>											
Canada	43.3	35.3	35.0	45.3	56.5	51.8	18.5	44.6	26.0	53.5	63.9
Australia	46.3	33.1	36.2	51.0	55.2	53.3	17.5	41.3	20.8	46.1	59.3
New Zealand	44.6	32.4	36.7	61.2	49.2	51.3	19.0	38.7	23.7	34.7	47.8
USA	54.2	39.8	49.6	47.5	35.4	46.5	27.6	30.3	29.6	69.6	73.1
(Mean) of ODs	(43.3)	(35.91)	(35.25)	(53.4)	(47.10)	(51.01)	(26.3)	(42.90)	(26.46)	(49.04)	(57.84)

Post-Communist Countries (Central and Eastern European Countries)													
Hungary	62.3	33.1	45.4	78.8	66.3	72.5	50.7	65.5	47.6	77.4	76.6		
Germany (East)	57.5	65.5	48.8	80.2	69.8	78.8	31.5	32.9	29.4	74.3	72.7		
Czech Republic	55.1	47.3	55.2	75.5	70.0	69.4	30.5	63.7	36.1	87.1	85.5		
Slovenia	50.0	39.1	43.3	81.3	69.3	72.7	47.3	63.7	51.7	89.6	85.7		
Poland	55.3	63.8	57.3	80.5	77.3	75.5	38.9	65.7	40.2	95.2	90.7		
Bulgaria	39.1	62.7		46.0	54.9		40.5	44.4		94.1			
Latvia	55.1	46.6	45.3	28.9	70.6	81.7	38.6	68.4	56.1	81.9	89.0		
Slovak Republic		58.4			73.8			51.7		89.6			
(Mean) of PCCs	(53.5)	(52.06)	(49.22)	(67.3)	(69.00)	(75.13)	(39.7)	(57.0)	(43.52)	(86.15)	(83.37)		
Post-Authoritarian Countries													
Eastern Asian Countries													
Philippines	28.5	34.3	35.1	25.1	40.0	35.4	37.5	40.3	35.8	83.3	86.2		
Taiwan		51.4	42.0		42.2	56.7		77.3	67.8	60.4	48.9		
South-Korea		46.7	56.9		60.7	38.8		44.4	54.2	79.5	75.1		
(Mean) of EACs		(41.33)	(44.67)		(47.63)	(43.63)		(54.00)	(52.60)	(74.4)	(70.07)		
Latin American Countries													
Brazil		64.6			34.4			77.9		95.4			
Venezuela		64.5	46.3		27.0	27.9		58.9	29.5	90.9	84.5		
Mexico		60.7			12.4			53.6		90.5			
Chile		30.3	43.2		20.7	68.5		66.2	66.7	79.1	80.2		
Uruguay		42.1	41.4		11.5	58.4		53.0	48.6	78.8	78.1		
(Mean) of LACs		(52.44)	(43.63)		(21.2)	(51.60)		(61.92)	(48.27)	(86.94)	(80.93)		

Southern European Countries and Others												
Spain		53.6	37.1	45.2	71.4	57.0	62.8	57.9	68.4	52.6	61.7	78.8
Portugal			50.2	42.5		66.9	57.3		60.0	62.8	87.9	88.8
South-Africa			28.7	35.7		58.9	69.7		66.1	55.6	70.2	80.4
(Mean) of PACs			(46.42)	(43.14)		(39.25)	(52.83)		(60.55)	(52.62)	(79.79)	(77.89)

Data source: International Social Survey Programme 1996: Role of Government III (ISSP 1996)  
International Social Survey Programme 2004: Citizenship (ISSP 2004)  
International Social Survey Programme 2006: Role of Government IV (ISSP 2006)

Table 2. T-test of the disadvantaged factors (2004)

	Mean % (SD)			Mean Difference		
	OD (n=15)	PC (n=8)	PA (n=11)	OD vs. PC	OD vs. PA	PC vs. PA
Political distrust	35.9(12.0)	52.1(12.3)	46.4(13.1)	-16.15	-10.5	5.6
Corruption	49.0(13.9)	86.2(7.6)	79.8(11.6)	-37.1*	-30.8*	6.4
Powerless	47.1(14.4)	69.0(6.6)	39.2(19.9)	-21.9*	7.9	29.8*
Political indifference	42.9(9.0)	57.0(12.7)	60.6(12.2)	-14.1	-17.7*	-3.6

\*p=0.001 or p<0.001

Table 3. T-test of the disadvantaged factors (2006)

	Mean % (SD)			Mean Difference		
	OD (n=14)	PC (n=6)	PA (n=9)	OD vs. PC	OD vs. PA	PC vs. PA
Political distrust	35.3(11.0)	49.2(5.8)	43.1(6.4)	-13.95	-7.88	6.07
Corruption	57.8(15.1)	83.4(7.1)	77.9(11.7)	-25.52*	-20.05	5.48
Powerless	51.0(10.8)	75.1(4.5)	52.8(15.1)	-24.12*	-1.82	22.30
Political indifference	26.5(7.6)	43.5(10.1)	52.6(13.1)	-17.06	-26.17*	-9.11

\*p=0.001 or p<0.001

Table 4 illustrates Czech political trust. Czech people express political distrust toward the institutions of Government, Parliament and Senate. These three central institutions are the most important bodies that deal with national affairs; however, their level of trust is quite low. The percentage of trust is between 20% and 40%. The Czechs have more confidence in the head of state (President) and the local councils or municipalities, the former of which can hardly be touched by the common people, and the latter of which has the most frequent contact with citizens. The average of political trust in the Czech Republic in 2004 is 47.3%, which is lower than Taiwan (51.4%), while the situation of 2006 is the opposite: Taiwan (42%) is lower than the Czech Republic (55.2%). The Czech and Taiwanese cases are not exceptional; that is, they are ranked in the middle among the countries in the study, even though their situations are better than some of older

democracies. On the other hand, the trend of political distrust illustrates (see Figure 2) that the level of political distrust is declining; however, the rankings are the same as the older democracies, the post authoritarian countries and the post communist countries. The average of the post communist countries in political distrust stayed above 50% in 1996 and 2004, and fell below 50% in 2006.




Figure 1. Political trust and political distrust (2004)

Table 4. Trust in the constitutional institutions, Czech Republic (%)

	III/08	IV/08	V/08	VI/08	IX/08	X/08	XI/08	XII/08	I/09	II/09
President	64	63	63	62	67	65	63	60	65	67
Government	32	31	29	28	30	26	26	27	30	32
Parliament	24	24	22	22	24	20	20	21	22	26
Senate	27	26	24	25	26	24	24	26	26	29
Regional council	47	48	42	44	44	46	46	44	49	48
Local council	63	65	63	64	65	64	63	63	66	65

Source: CVVM ([www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100875s\\_pi90223.pdf](http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100875s_pi90223.pdf)) 2009/2/28




Figure 2. Trend of political distrust

As for the sense of powerlessness in politics (2004), the level for the post communist countries (69.4%) is still higher than the other two blocks of countries: the older democracies (47.1%) and the post authoritarian countries (39.3%). In undemocratic countries, the power of authority is so strong that it is generally impossible for people to change the wills of the governments, and due to the prohibition of organizing civic associations and free expression, people feel powerless before authority. The situation is similar to political distrust, for the political control of citizens in the communist countries was so strong that the sense of powerlessness in the post communist countries is larger than the post authoritarian countries. However, the average of the Latin American countries is quite low (21.2%), even lower than the average of the older democracies. The situation in the Latin American countries is quite special, and it is hard to say if this is associated with the relative frequency of military coups, which make people feel confident in their “power.” The level of the Eastern Asian countries (47.63%) is similar to the older democracies. The difference between the older democracies and the post communist countries regarding the sense of powerlessness is statistically significant, while no difference exists between the older democracies and the post authoritarian countries. As for the results of ISSP 2006, the state of the sense of powerlessness is similar between the older democracies and the post authoritarian countries, while there is a significant difference between the older democracies and the post communist countries. Figure 3 illustrates the sense of powerlessness for politics.



The trend in the post communist countries rises between 1996 (67.3%) and 2006 (75.13%). The level of the sense of powerlessness is quite high in comparison to the level of the older democracies and the post authoritarian countries. Citizens in the post communist countries report political distrust and sense of powerlessness despite their better development of politics and the economy than the post authoritarian countries. The explanation may lie in the legacy of prior regimes. The trend of the sense of powerlessness in the older democracies first declines from 1996 to 2004, and then rises again between 2004 and 2006; however, the level of the sense of powerlessness is lower than the post authoritarian countries. The situation of the post authoritarian countries is hard to explain, especially in the Latin American countries; however, it appears normal in 2006.




Figure 3. Trend of political powerless sense

As for political indifference, the average of the post authoritarian countries (60.6%) is the highest among the three blocks of countries in 2004. Next to the post authoritarian countries are the post communist countries (57%) and the older democracies (42.9%). There is a significant difference between the older democracies and the post authoritarian countries, while no significant difference exists between the older democracies and the post communist countries. The percentage of political indifference in Taiwan is quite high (77.3%), which shows that most Taiwanese people are not interested in politics. The levels of political indifference in 2006 are lower than in 2004, which show that the state of political indifference in Taiwan is improving. The highest level of political indifference in 2006

is still the post authoritarian countries (52.6%), while the lowest one is the older democracies (26.5%). There is a significant difference between the older democracies and the post authoritarian countries. Post communist countries that have high averages of political distrust and sense of powerlessness categories do not have a similarly high level of political indifference. The result illustrates that there are more people who have political interest in the post communist countries than in the post authoritarian countries. Figure 4 shows the trends in political indifference. The lowest average of political indifference in the older democracies is in 1996 (26.3%), and rises to its highest point in 2004 (42.9%), and then declines in 2006 (26.5%), and a similar trend appears in the post communist countries. Political indifference is related to civic actions, for those who are not interested in politics will not participate in civic actions to express their public concerns. Taiwan has a high percentage of political indifference; their civic actions are quite passive. This passive situation is detrimental to the development of civil society. Representative democracy is founded on political indifference, which means that citizens do not participate in the political sphere and have full confidence in political experts; however, the percentage of political distrust in Taiwan is also high. Therefore, the high percentages of political indifference and political distrust co-exist, and this situation is not only harmful to representative democracy, but also to participatory democracy.




Figure 4. Trend of political indifference

Political corruption can be a factor of political distrust, the sense of powerlessness, and political indifference; it is also part of the legacy of the prior regimes, for the bureaucratic apparatus under dictatorial rule has absolute power and bureaucratic practices are inclined to become the source of corruption. People in new democracies generally believe corruption exists. The average of political corruption in the post communist countries reaches 86%, which is equal to the Latin American average (86.9%) (2004). The average of the post authoritarian countries is almost 80%, while the average of the older democracies is also very high (49%) (see Figure 5). The difference between the older democracies and the new democracies, both the post communist and the post authoritarian countries, is significant. The average of corruption in 2004 (49%) is higher than the average in 2006 (57.8%) in the older democracies, while the averages of the post communist countries and post authoritarian countries decline slightly in 2006. The average of corruption in the Czech Republic is higher than the post communist countries in 2004 and 2006. The percentage that Czech people consider to be widespread corruption in 2004 is 87.1% and in 2006 is 85.5%, while Taiwan has lower percentages: 60.4% in 2004 and 48.9% in 2006.




Figure 5. Political corruption

This research includes political distrust, the sense of powerlessness, political indifference and corruption as the definition of the legacy of prior regimes. Despite the positive gains in political and economic development in the new democracies, especially the post communist countries, levels of political distrust and the sense of powerlessness are still quite high in comparison with the older democracies. This research also proposes that the legacy of prior regimes has a negative

influence on civic participation. I use the Taiwan and Czech cases to examine the correlation between the prior-regime legacy and civic participation. Table 5 illustrates the correlation between the prior-regime legacy (the disadvantaged factors of civil society) and organizational membership in Taiwan, and we can see that the significant correlations are negative with the exception of the correlation between corruption and sports, leisure, or cultural groups. The negative relationship explains that those who have high levels of political distrust, perceived corruption, sense of powerlessness and political indifference are not likely to join civic associations. People who have no political interest appear not likely to participate in all forms of civic associations.

Table 5. Correlation of prior-regime legacy and organizational membership, Taiwan

	Political party	Trade union, professional associations	Religious organizations	Sports, leisure, cultural groups	Other voluntary associations
Political distrust	-.013	-.001	.009	.024	-.002
Corruption	.005	-.006	.008	0.69**	.038
Powerless	-.005	-.069*	-.067*	-.131**	-.017**
Political indifference	-.114**	-.070**	-.069**	-.094**	-.130**

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $< .01$  (two-tailed)

On the other hand, the significant correlation between the prior-regime legacy and civic actions are almost all negative except the correlation between corruption and internet discussion (see table 6). Those who have political indifference seem not to take any political and social actions, and people who have the sense of powerlessness are also unlikely to take part in all forms of civic actions, in addition to demonstrations. The correlation between political distrust and civic actions is not significant; this explains that it is also possible to take political and social actions due to the reason of political distrust. Those who have political distrust are not necessarily indifferent to politics; however, the relationship between political distrust and civic actions is not apparent. Corruption can be the cause of political distrust; however, the percentage of political distrust in Taiwan is higher than the average of the post authoritarian countries, and the percentage of corruption is much lower than the average of the post authoritarian countries. It demonstrates that Taiwanese people seem to have no confidence in the capability of civil servants.

Table 6. Correlation of prior-regime legacy and civic actions, Taiwan

	Signed a petition	Boycott	Demonstration	Political meeting
Political distrust	-.021	.033	-.017	-.062
Corruption	.048	.025	.020	-.040
Powerless	-.106**	-.061*	-.052	-.099**
Political indifference	-.225**	-.180**	-.172**	-.292**

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed)

Table 6. (Continue)

	Contacted a politician	Donated money	Contacted media	Internet discussion
Political distrust	-.037	-.026	-.022	.054
Corruption	.026	-.006	.033	.072**
Powerless	-.072*	-.118**	-.065*	-.084**
Political indifference	-.025**	-.153**	-.131**	-.158**

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed)

Czechoslovakia had a flourishing democracy for twenty years before World War Two, and conversely, it also exercised the social control of Normalization for twenty years after the Prague Spring in 1968. During the twenty years of democratization since the Velvet Revolution in 1989, the development of politics and the economy in the Czech Republic can be a model example for the post communist countries; however, the effect of prior-regime legacy still exists, although it may weaken with the passage of time. The data for 2004 demonstrate the averages of the sense of powerlessness, political indifference and the sense of corruption are higher than the averages of the post communist countries. In spite of the better political and economic development than the other post communist countries, the legacy of prior regimes appears to have a very strong effect on civil society and democracy. Table 7 illustrates the correlation between prior-regime legacy and organizational membership in the Czech Republic (ISSP 2004), and we can see that all correlations are negative. Those who are affected by political distrust, sense of corruption, sense of powerlessness and political indifference are not likely to participate in civic associations. These four factors, political distrust, sense of corruption, sense of powerlessness, and political indifference are the most impor-

tant components of prior-regime legacy, although other factors may still result in political distrust, indifference, sense of corruption or sense of powerlessness. In general, we can see that the difference in these four factors between the older democracies and new democracies is still large. In addition to insufficient modernization, the legacy of prior regimes still has a profound effect on the development of civil society.

Table 8 illustrates the correlation between the four factors regarding prior-regime legacy and civic actions. We can see that Taiwan has a similar situation to the Czech Republic. Most of those who have political distrust, sense of corruption, sense of powerlessness, and political indifference do not take political and social actions. These civic actions can be defined as the expression of public concern, so less participation in civic actions is detrimental to civil society. These four negative factors significantly influence involvement in civic actions. People who have political indifference are not willing to express social concerns through civic actions. Those who are not interested in politics stay away from public concerns, although many of the civic actions are not associated with politics. Those who feel powerless appear to avoid petitions, boycotts, demonstrations and political meetings. On the other hand, those who have no confidence in civil servants do not choose to participate in civic actions to express their opinions. According to the analysis of chapter four, the difference in the level of participation in civic actions between the Czech Republic and the older democracies is still significant, and the four factors can provide some explanation for the low level of participation in civic actions.

Table 7. Correlation of prior-regime legacy and organizational membership, Czech Republic (2004)

	Political party	Trade union, professional associations	Religious organizations	Sports, leisure, cultural groups	Other voluntary associations
Political distrust	-.062	-.043	-.125**	-.137**	-.054
Corruption	-.014	-.007	-.106**	-.077**	-.027
Powerless	-.098**	-.046	-.034	-.027	-.075*
Political indifference	-.199**	-.107**	-.045	-.050	-.093**

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed)



Table 8. Correlation of prior-regime legacy and civic actions, Czech Republic (2004)

	Signed a petition	Boycott	Demonstration	Political meeting
Political distrust	-.117**	-.081*	-.081*	-.098**
Corruption	-.037	.044	-.060*	-.008
Powerless	-.071*	-.076*	-.115**	-.082**
Political indifference	-.211**	-.148**	-.203**	-.262**

\* p<.05; \*\*<.01 (two-tailed)

Table 8. (Continue)

	Contacted a politician	Donated money	Contacted media	Internet discussion
Political distrust	-.030	-.147**	-.006	.036
Corruption	-.052	-.044	-.048	-.047
Powerless	-.047	-.061*	-.001	-.042
Political indifference	-.178**	-.230**	-.093**	-.080**

\* p<.05; \*\*<.01 (two-tailed)

REFLECTION ON PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

This paper focuses on the function of participation, especially civic participation, rather than political participation. In dictatorial regimes, political participation was often characterized by ideological indoctrination. Political control and social control are commonly utilized by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to maintain absolute power. The so-called participation is always distorted, and citizens cannot express real social and political concerns in the “public field.” On the other hand, the public sphere and civil society seldom exist in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes because the leaders worry about challenges to their legitimacy. Therefore, “participation” in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes plays the role of political socialization. People cultivate their political consciousness and passion through “political participation” which is organized according to a specific political ideology. In the age of ideology, many people are not indifferent to political affairs, for the content of politics is regarded as public affairs, and citizens believe what the government does. It seems that everything is fair in the age of ideology. “Participation” manifests itself in the passion of the citizens. However, the pas-

sion of participation declines after democratization, for “what was right yesterday is wrong today.” The participation of the prior regimes becomes the negative legacy to be criticized in the name of democracy.

During the period of democratization, the history of prior regimes is articulated repeatedly and citizens require transitional justice. At the same time, civil society is constructed as the core component of democracy, and the idea of civil society is composed of at least three elements: associational life, a good society and public sphere. Participation plays a vital role in the newly developing civil society, but the difference lies in the fact that participation is not “enforced”; people are not required to join civic associations or take part in civic actions. Autonomy and freedom for the individual and the civic associations are the basic concepts of human rights and democracy. People choose democracy and support the components of civil society; however, the passion of participation declines. Civic participation nowadays differs from the political participation in the prior regimes, and the form of participation must be transformed into today’s structure. Civic participation is required to express social concerns and its scope is broader than that of political participation, such as electoral behavior. In order to construct a good society, people are encouraged to participate in civic associations or organizations and the public sphere. Such participation contributes to the construction of civil society and democracy for the new democracies, but this construction is not accomplished immediately and there are numerous obstacles that can hinder development. The obstacles are the effects of the prior-regime legacy. The passion of political participation in the past becomes the obstacles of the current civic participation, for the citizens have had no confidence in public affairs. As the development of civil society and democracy progresses, as well as the development of politics and the economy, citizens start learning new lessons of “participation.” Many new democracies have been in the process of democratization for two decades or more since the Third Wave; however, the legacy of prior regimes is still influencing the attitudes and behaviors of the people. Ladislav Holy (1996) and Benjamin Kuras (2001) in their books describe attitudes and behaviors of citizens who have not adapted into the democratic way of life.

We can find contradictions in some cases. Table 9 displays the turnout in the elections of parliamentary representatives in Taiwan and the Czech Republic. The turnout for the election of deputies is high. If elections are taken as an important indicator for the level of political participation, the passion of participation appears to be revitalized and people can build a functioning civil society very soon. However, we also find that political trust is low and political distrust is quite high. Citizens are very enthusiastic when it comes to elections on the one hand, and then express their distrust of the representatives for whom they voted. We can see in Table 4 the average trust of parliamentarians is about 20% in the Czech Republic, and the turnout at these parliamentary elections is between 60% and 70%. People

are very passionate about political participation (elections) and then express their political distrust and sense of powerlessness to those whom they elect. If people are not interested in political affairs, why do they voluntarily take part in the civic duty of voting, and then criticize the elected officials on the suspicion of corruption?

Table 9. Election turnouts of parliament deputies, Taiwan and Czech Republic (%)

<b>Taiwan</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2008</b>
	67.65	68.09	66.16	59.16	58.5
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2006</b>	
	76.41	74.03	58	64.47	

Source: [www.volby.cz/index\\_en.htm](http://www.volby.cz/index_en.htm); <http://210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp>.

This paper explores the possible factors of prior-regime legacy in the new democracies. Although the effects of political distrust, sense of powerlessness and political indifference also influences the older democracies, we still find that the difference between the new democracies and the older democracies is large. On the other hand, those negative correlations between the factors of prior-regime legacy and civic associations and actions in the Taiwan and Czech cases demonstrate that those who have such negative beliefs are unwilling to take part in civic participation. If civic participation is decreasing, it results in a negative cycle, for less attention to or monitoring of the public sphere tends to bring about the expansion or abuse of power by the authority, which then causes people to feel more distrust, sense of powerlessness and indifference to politics and the public sphere. Organizational membership is usually concerned with various social or political concerns, and civic actions are often organized by civic associations. Therefore, civic organizations play a vital role in civil society, and the level of organizational membership is an important indicator to measure the development of civil society. More membership in civic organizations is advantageous for promoting social concerns. Social or political concerns are not limited to the eight forms which are discussed in this research. Public concerns can employ a variety of activities to encourage citizens to participate, such as activities and education for the prevention of AIDS, or to highlight the importance of human rights, and so on. The eight forms of civic actions, which include petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, political meetings, meeting with politicians, donations, contact with the media and internet discussions, are also taken as indicators of constitutional freedom. People who have the outlets to express their concerns regarding public issues are inclined to support democracy. Therefore, democracy requires participation.

The negative factors such as political distrust, political indifference and the sense of powerlessness are negatively correlated to civic participation in the new

democracies. How to rid society of the negative factors seems to be the vital objective in the promotion of democracy. After a twenty-year effort, political development is largely improved in Central and Eastern Europe (see Freedom House scores), and is close to the level of western society; however, the difference in economic development is still large. In fact, economic development involves a wide dimension of modernization, in which rationalization is the key element. Rationalization promotes the maturation of social development and democratic consolidation. However, economic development in the Czech Republic is significantly better than that of most of the other post communist countries, but the level of civic participation is often below that of the post communist countries. Additionally, we can also find the averages of political indifference, sense of powerlessness and the sense of corruption are higher than the averages in the post communist countries. A possible reason why a higher level of political and economical development is accompanied by a lower level of civic participation can be attributed to the legacy of prior regimes. If the situation of civic participation only focuses on the factors of "development" regarding modernization, it may neglect some vital explanatory factors, especially the legacy of prior regimes.

Scholars in Central and Eastern Europe try to explain the situation at the end of the 1980s from the perspectives of reform or revolution or "refolution" (Kis, 1994:63). As far as the extent of change is concerned, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989 was "one of the very few revolutions that counted no dead" (Borek, Carba & Korab, 2003:101). The democratic revolution intended to move from a totalitarian and centralized social system to a pluralist democracy that is "usually conceived as democratic capitalism" (Mlcoch, Machonin & Sojka, 2000:11). The return to Western civilization required the creation of a functioning democratic system and an efficient market economy, which became the principal issues in paving the way for the transformation (Vecernik & Mateju, 1999:296). Although it is very common to explore democratic development of the post communist countries using the theories of "transformation," "transition" or "modernization," the legacy of prior regimes still plays a vital role in the development of democracy. However, the legacy of prior regimes not only involves those undeniably negative effects, but also consists of the possibility of open discourse on subjects such as egalitarian social systems. The "so-called state socialist societies were not only undemocratic, i.e. totalitarian, but simultaneously egalitarian social systems, and these two characteristics were functionally interconnected" (Machonin, 1997:22). After the Velvet Revolution and the following transformation in the Czech Republic, the legacy of "egalitarianism" produced multidimensional interpretations, which includes nostalgia toward the old regimes (Ekman & Linde, 2005:354–355).

The feeling of nostalgia in the 1990s brought to the surface various obstacles to democratization, and became the "negative" effect of civic participation. Following the deepening of democratization, nostalgia toward the prior regime may

be diminishing, but the negative effect of the prior-regime legacy still deserves further examination. Nostalgia often represents, to a degree, a protest against the difficulties of democratic development, and the forms of protest may be passive. These passive actions lead to further political distrust, sense of powerlessness and political apathy. It is not easy to operationalize the concept of civil society, which encompasses three scopes, "positive" and "negative" organizations and also informal citizen participation, according to Vajdova's report about the Czech Republic (Vajdova, 2004:24). In my research, I only use the "positive" organizations and civic actions, which primarily refer to social and public concerns. I also intend to explore the challenges of civil society and democracy from the perspectives of political and economic development and the legacy of prior regimes, and civic participation is the key concept for exploration. Overlapping similarities in the social or political backgrounds of prior regimes in the new democracies allows for a comparison between the development and challenges of their civil society and democracy. The legacy of prior regimes also results in some positive effects in today's democracy, but they are not the major points of discussion in this dissertation. The issue of civic participation can be explored not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. The lack of a better quality of research is the limitation of this dissertation, but it is also the starting point for the continuation of this research topic regarding civic participation and civil society.

## CONCLUSION

The legacy of prior regimes consists of at least several aspects such as political distrust, political indifference, sense of powerlessness, and sense of political corruption. The difference of these negative effects not only exists between the older democracies and the new democracies, but also between the post communist countries and post authoritarian countries. However, the significant difference between the older democracies and the new democracies not only explains the difference in modernization but also demonstrates the effect of prior-regime legacy. Additionally, people influenced by these negative effects usually have lower participation in civic associations and actions. In the examination of the Taiwan and Czech cases, the results are quite clear; it confirms the negative correlation between the effects of prior-regime legacy and civic participation. Those who have high levels of political distrust, sense of powerlessness, and political indifference are more unwilling to participate in civic associations and actions to express social and political concerns, and tend to shy away from civic participation.

Civic participation in the period of democracy is different from political participation during the age of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Political participation in the past was encouraged in terms of ideology and was often mobilized by

the political parties and political institutions to support the policies or the leaders of the dictatorship. However, civic participation today emphasizes the autonomy and responsibility of the civic associations and the citizens, and the purpose of civic participation is to monitor and be involved in public affairs. In the period of democracy, elections appear to be the largest aspect of political participation, but it is according to democratic principles, not authoritarian political mobilization, and people take part in elections voluntarily. We can see that the turnout for parliamentary elections in Taiwan and the Czech Republic is high; however, political trust of parliamentary representatives in the Czech Republic is quite low. Why are so many people willing to vote for politicians in whom they have no trust? The high turnout seems to affirm the importance of democratic elections, but who runs in the elections appears to be unimportant, for the voters will not believe that the politicians are genuinely concerned for the public interest. As a result, the high rate of political participation, in the form of elections, accompanies a high rate of political distrust, sense of powerlessness, and low rate of civic participation. It seems to be a negative cycle, for there is no counterbalance to monitor the political representatives, which is organized by the winners of the elections. The task of the nascent civil society is to attempt to prevent the expansion of the state's power, so if civic participation is passive, it is disadvantageous to the development of civil society. Civic participation is broader than political participation in scope, and civic participation plays a role in expressing public concerns. Therefore, political distrust ought not to bring about the absence of civic participation; on the contrary, political distrust should be the impetus that encourages more civic participation and more involvement in the public sphere.

The other possible factor that influences the development of civil society and democracy is geopolitical culture. The Central and Eastern European countries' return to Europe gave them a clear objective: the democratic development of politics and the economy. They must reach certain standards which the EU outlined in the Nice Treaty for potential new members. The Central and Eastern European countries are located between Western Europe and Russia, so they have been influenced by two very powerful forces throughout history. After the Cold War, the Central and Eastern European countries chose the way back to Europe, meaning that they accept European values of civil society and democracy and the establishment of constitutional institutions. On the other hand, the three Eastern Asian countries, South Korea, Taiwan and Philippines, and even Latin America belonged to the sphere of American power during the Cold War period, and many of these authoritarian countries were forced to cooperate with American operations. These post authoritarian countries that are still influenced by the USA are different from those post communist countries that are close to the EU from the perspective of geopolitics. The Central and Eastern European countries are integrated into the EU and eventually became a part of Europe, even though they were subject to



totalitarian regimes with the strictest social and political control for nearly half a century. However, although constitutional institutions like the Presidential system are inspired by the American model, it is impossible for the post authoritarian countries to integrate with the USA. The post authoritarian countries are influenced more by the USA, but most of them need to find their own unique ways of promoting the development of civil society and democracy. One of the largest differences between the older democracies and the new democracies is economic development, which is involved in the sphere of (re)modernization. The value that measures the development or growth of GDP carries several different purposes, and one of them is modernization or rationalization, which is related not only to the quantity of civic participation, but also the quality. Rational civic participation is a key element for the development of civil society and democracy. Negative spending such as the cost of maintaining social order is also involved in the calculation of GDP. Therefore, rational civic participation must be emphasized.

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## SUMMARY

Paper focuses on civic participation and its disadvantaged factors in civil society and democratic life in new democracies, especially after long-term deprivation of political freedom. I emphasize the experiences of Central and Eastern European countries or the post-communist countries, especially the Czech case, and make a comparison with Taiwan. The disadvantaged factors in this paper at least involve social indifference, corruption, powerless for the politics and no trust for governments and the general society. The factors of development in politics and the economy do

not necessarily guarantee the participation in civic participation, which is regarded as a prominent component of civil society and democracy. There are still many other factors that influence the consolidation of civil society and democracy in the new democracies, and the legacy of prior regimes is one of the most decisive. Due to the degree of overall political and social control during the period of authoritarian or communist regimes, people removed themselves from politics, so their trust in politics is diminished. When confronting the bureaucratic system, people become powerless, or unwilling to concern themselves with politics. Therefore, the legacy of prior regimes, both authoritarian and communist, consists of political distrust, a sense of powerlessness and political indifference. During the period of democratization, corruption is also a serious problem, and corruption often brings about further political distrust and apathy toward politics. Research instruments involve international surveys including ISSP Citizenship 2004, Taiwan and Czech domestic election records and some other surveys like CVVM in the Czech Republic.

The examination of the Taiwan and Czech cases confirms the negative correlation between the effects of prior-regime legacy and civic participation. Those who have high levels of political distrust, sense of powerlessness, and political indifference are more unwilling to participate in civic associations and actions to express social and political concerns, and tend to shy away from civic participation.

**Keywords:** civil society, participatory democracy, social distrust, comparisons between Czech Republic and Taiwan