

I. ROZPRAWY I ANALIZY

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Three cognitive frameworks for analyzing metaphoric plant names: Cognitive Grammar, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Blending Theory

**Analiza metaforycznych nazw roślin w ramach trzech modeli
kognitywnych: gramatyki kognitywnej, teorii metafory pojęciowej
i teorii integracji pojęciowej**

Abstract: The aim of the article is to examine the applicability of three theoretical frameworks developed within Anglophone cognitive linguistics, Ronald Langacker's Cognitive Grammar, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner's Conceptual Blending Theory, in the study of semantic motivation behind folk plant names. Even though none of the theories has been originally developed as a tool for reconstruction what Jerzy Bartmiński terms the linguistic worldview, the theories may help to capture semantic nuances behind folk names and contribute to in-depth and comprehensive descriptions of folk conceptualizations. Since the scope of applicability of the three frameworks overlaps on conceptual metaphors, the article demonstrates the analysis of the metaphoric name *gęsi pępek* (lit. 'goose navel'; daisy, *Bellis perennis*) and discusses strengths and weaknesses of the three frameworks in the task of reconstructing conventional folk imagery encoded in the name.

Key words: folk plant names; Cognitive Grammar; Conceptual Metaphor Theory; Conceptual Blending Theory; linguistic worldview

Introduction

At first glance, Slavic cognitive ethnolinguistics and Anglophone post-

Chomskyan cognitive linguistics are two very different worlds. For the former, culture (especially folk culture) is in the main focus of research, while grammatical technicalities of morphology and syntax are less exciting fields. The latter is preoccupied primarily with the conceptual mechanisms behind the grammatical technicalities and other linguistic phenomena, but frequently has little to say about the way cultural concepts manifest themselves in language. Yet, after a closer inspection, it becomes evident that there are more similarities between Slavic cognitive ethnolinguistics and Anglophone cognitive linguistics than meets the eye. To see this, it is useful to separate the theoretical tools from the research goals pursued by means of those tools. While the goals pursued by the two paradigms often differ dramatically, there are usually no dramatic differences in their views on the role of conceptualization in various linguistic phenomena: both Slavic cognitive ethnolinguists and Anglophone cognitivists acknowledge that language is shaped largely by mental representations entertained by speakers. Moreover, there are no dramatic differences in the understanding of many fundamental theoretical concepts like metaphor, metonymy, motivation, etc., although minor terminological discrepancies are not uncommon.¹ In this article I attempt to divorce the tools of Anglophone cognitive linguistics from their customary goals and employ them to the tasks typical of cognitive ethnolinguistics.

The three theoretical frameworks analyzed in this article are Ronald Langacker's Cognitive Grammar (CG), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), and Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner's Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT). None of the frameworks has been designed specifically for the reconstruction of linguistic worldview behind linguistic expressions, but each of them is a useful tool for describing aspects of meaning inherent in linguistic worldview. Obviously, none of them can replace the methodologies designed specifically for ethnolinguistic analysis, but they may contribute to the methodologies by drawing researchers' attention to different aspects of linguistic imagery. In this sense, they can serve as useful additions to the standard toolkit of ethnolinguists.

From the metatheoretical point of view, I adopt the so-called semantic approach to theories (cf. Suppes 1960). In the semantic approach,

presenting a theory in the first instance by identifying a class of structures as its models. In this (...) approach the language used to express the theory is neither basic nor unique; the same class of structures could well be described in radically different ways, each with its own limitations. The models occupy centre stage. (Van Fraassen 1980: 44)

¹ The similarities between the two projects are discussed competently in Bartmiński (2012).

In the passage, van Fraassen's term *language* refers to a formalism in which a theory is expressed rather than a natural language used for communication. From this perspective, Cognitive Grammar, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and Conceptual Blending Theory are different formalisms (or van Fraassen's "languages") used to build models of conceptual processes underlying linguistic meanings.

The semantic approach allows for comparing models in terms of criteria like empirical adequacy, logical coherence, scope of applicability, etc., but in general the goal of a semantic metatheoretical analysis is not to decide which formalism is "the best" in some absolute terms. Instead, the analysis offers insights into the usefulness of each formalism for particular purposes. For example, as far as the scope of application is concerned, CMT and CBT are not limited to the analysis of linguistic data and the frameworks have been successfully applied in studies on multimodal discourses and cultural artifacts (cf. e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Forceville and Urios-Aparisi 2009). The theories, however, are not designed to cover all types of linguistic expressions, so they have limited applicability for the study of various grammatical phenomena. Cognitive Grammar, in turn, is designed specifically to cover a wide variety of grammatical phenomena and can be used to build comprehensive models of languages, but it is far from obvious whether the CG toolkit can be fruitfully used in the study of multimodal and non-linguistic discourses. The current study is limited to analyses of metaphoric plant names, so that the frameworks lend themselves to metatheoretical comparisons, but it should be borne in mind that originally the theories were not designed to cover the same types of phenomena and therefore they are not comparable in all respects.

Cognitive Grammar

Cognitive Grammar (CG) is a model of linguistic competence developed originally by Ronald Langacker (1987) and Leonard Talmy (1988). The key theoretical concept of CG is construal, which pertains to alternate ways of depicting an object or event in the mind of the conceptualizer. Construals emerge as a result of foregrounding and focusing attention on particular components of the conceptual substrate. The conceptual substrate is essentially the conceptualizer's knowledge about the world organized into the so-called domains. The process of highlighting elements of a domain resulting in a construal is termed profiling. For example, by Cognitive Grammar's lights, the name *wężowe ziele* (lit. 'snake herb'; sedum, *Sedum*)

encodes a mental representation of hepatica in which the plant is profiled as a herb (signaled by the word *ziele* ‘herb’ functioning as the lexical head of the composite expression) related to snakes (signaled by the adjective *wężowe* ‘snake’²).

The term *profiling* is an example of slight terminological discrepancies between Cognitive Grammar and the Lublin school of ethnolinguistics founded by Jerzy Bartmiński. For Bartmiński, profiling

is a subjective (i.e. performed by the speaking subject) linguo-conceptual operation, which consists in shaping the picture of the object in terms of certain aspects (subcategories, facets) of that object: e.g. its origin, features, appearance, functions, experiences, events connected with them, etc., within a certain type of knowledge and in accordance with the requirements of a given viewpoint. (Bartmiński 2009: 89)

There are some parallelism between Langacker’s and Bartmiński’s models, as noted by Jörg Zinken:

While the concept of profiling in the work of Bartmiński is close to what Langacker calls profiling, the focus is clearly placed differently. While Langacker aims to describe a universally operative semantic process, Bartmiński intends to reconstruct a particular socio-cultural situatedness. A profile is a particular configuration of linguistically entrenched judgements, a configuration that is typical for a particular speaking subject. This subject is (usually) not an individual person, but an idealized subject: a member of a particular socio-cultural group. (Zinken 2009: 3)

A comparative analysis of the two approaches in the context of plant names descriptions has been offered by Agnieszka Mierzwińska-Hajnos (2010).

A comprehensive characterization of construal requires attention to be paid to several descriptive dimensions. One of them is the distinction between the profile and the base, i.e. the distinction between the elements in the foreground of the conceptualizer’s attention and the elements in the background. The background elements do not enjoy full focal prominence, but they are usually crucial for the apprehension of the profile. Another dimension is the scope of conception, i.e. the portion of the cognitive domain used in the process of profiling. For example, in Cognitive Grammar formalism, the differences between various folk name of the dandelion (*Taraxacum*) are best explained as the differences in the cognitive domain against which profiling takes place. Thus, the profile of the name *zimkowã salãta* (lit. ‘spring salad’) emerges from the domain [food]; *maślak* (cf. Polish *masło* ‘butter’) emerges from the domain of [cattle farming], as the plant was believed to enhance the quality of butter produced from cow’s milk; and *dętki* (‘blowers’; cf. Polish

² In CG formalism, adjectives profile relations between participants. Unsurprisingly, in the case of *wężowe ziele* the relation profiled by the adjective holds between the plant and a snake.

dać ‘to blow’) emerges from the domain [musical instruments], as dandelion stems were used as makeshift musical instruments. Yet another dimension of construal is specificity, which, as the name suggests, pertains to the amount of detail evident in the construal. For example, while the word *flower* and the expression *daisy in my garden tarnished by warm spring wind* have the same referent, they differ with respect to the specificity of underlying mental imagery (cf. Langacker 2008, sec. 3).

Perspective, often listed as yet another dimension of construal, is perhaps best described as an umbrella term of more specific factors relevant for a comprehensive characterization of construal. Perspective covers (among other things) the vantage point from which the conceptualizer apprehends the object of conception, and viewing arrangements, which pertains to the degree to which the aspects of conceptualizer’s mental experience are themselves objects of conception. Langacker explicates the nuances of this dimension by means of a theatrical metaphor. In the so-called optimal viewing arrangement (OVA), the object of conception is located “on stage” within the focus of conceptualizer’s attention, while the conceptualizer is located “off stage” outside the focus of attention. Under the theatrical metaphor, the conceptualizer is a member of the audience observing the objects and events unfolding on-stage. In such a case, the object of conception is said to be construed with maximal objectivity and the conceptualizer with maximal subjectivity. Yet in some construals, aspects of conceptualizer’s mental experience may “enter” the on-stage region and enjoy some degree of focal prominence. In extreme cases, the conceptualizer occupies the entire on-stage region, for instance, when they function as the profile of the personal pronoun *I*. In such a case, the conceptualizer is construed with maximal objectivity by virtue of functioning as the object of conception. This variant is termed the egocentric viewing arrangement (EVA). Most construals are located somewhere in the spectrum between the two extreme variants (cf. Langacker 1987, sec. 3.3.2.4.; Langacker 1990).

Metaphoric and metonymic construals are examples of viewing arrangements departing from standard OVA. Langacker does not offer a special CG framework for analyzing metaphor, but borrows the theoretical apparatus from Fauconnier and Turner’s Conceptual Blending Theory (cf. e.g. Langacker 2008: 51), discussed in more detail in Section 4. Nonetheless, metaphoric and metonymic construals are analyzable in terms of dimensions of construal proposed by Langacker. For our purposes, it is particularly worthwhile to focus on the viewing arrangement. All metaphors and metonymies require apprehension of subjectively perceived similarities or contiguities between entities on the part of the conceptualizer. In other words, when the concep-

tualizer acknowledges similarities or contiguities between two entities and encodes them in names, the conceptualizer goes beyond the “objective” properties of the plant and associates the referent with something else. Due to this, an aspect of the conceptualizer’s mental activity becomes foregrounded, i.e. it enters the on-stage region and becomes more objectively construed. Therefore, the conceptualizer’s presence in the on-stage region is more prominent than in the case of standard OVA, where the conceptualizer is construed with maximal subjectivity and remains off-stage (or “in the audience,” under the theatrical metaphor). It is worth emphasizing that a more objective construal of some aspect of the conceptualizer’s mental activity (like the apprehension of metaphoric similarity) does not necessarily mean that the conceptualizer as such enjoys the on-stage presence and is construed objectively. On the contrary, in metaphoric construals the conceptualizer typically remains off-stage and is construed subjectively to a large extent, yet some aspects of the conceptualizer’s mental experience are featured on-stage to a larger extent than in standard OVA. A similar viewing arrangement can be found in Langacker’s analysis of the contrast between the English words *communist* and *commie*, in which the axiological valuation inherent in the latter results in enhanced objectivity of the conceptualizer in the construal (cf. Langacker 2008: 262).

The elaborate motivation behind *gesi pepe* (lit. ‘goose navel’; *Bellis perennis*) is a good illustration of enhanced objectivity of the conceptualizer. The name is a jocular and affectionate allusion to the small size: the mature plant is so short that it only reaches the goose belly.³ The name employs a metonymy, as it evokes a concept associated with the daisy via the relation of spatial contiguity to goose navel. The plant itself is construed subjectively: it is located in the off-stage region outside the focus of attention. The on-stage region is occupied by the conception of goose navel, which is in the main focus of attention and is therefore construed objectively. In other words, the name explicitly evokes the mental image of a goose navel and evokes the daisy only implicitly, via an explicit image.

Figure 1 depicts a part of the construal. The rectangle marked as “OR” stands for the on-stage region apprehended by the conceptualizer, marked as “C.” The rectangle inside the on-stage region stands for the concept goose navel. Since geese do not actually have navels, this conception is best

³ “My godŭmy gansipampki, bo siŭngajŭm gansi do pamka.” (“We say goose-navels, because they grow up to geese’s navels.”) (cf. Wyderka 2008: 71). Other variants of the name are *gesipepek*, *gesipepek*, and *gesipepka* (cf. Majewski 1894, Wyderka 2008: 71). Possibly, the semantic motivation was borrowed from German, where the connection between daisies and geese are encoded in the name *Ganseblümchen* ‘geese flower’ (cf. Bartmiński 2019: 244).




Figure 1: The construal behind *gęsi pepek* ‘daisy’

understood as a metaphoric blend integrating conceptual content from two different domains (marked in the figure as dotted line rectangles): [goose body] (“gb”) and [human body] (“hb”). The rationale for associating the two domains is co-occurrence: geese waddled in fenced patches of meadows strewn with daisies and the flower brushed against their bellies. Only small portions of the domains are blended and placed on-stage, which Figure 1 represents as the respective rectangles being located partly outside OR, since only a small portion of knowledge about geese is necessary to comprehend the notion of a goose navel. As already mentioned, the concept DAISY, i.e. the intended referent of the name, is located entirely off-stage, since it is not evoked explicitly in the name. Therefore, it is construed highly subjectively. The figure shows two metaphoric blends marked with dashed line arrows within OR. One of them combines the concepts goose and navel. The other blend combines the blend goose navel with daisy. The dotted-line rectangle overlapping the domains [goose body] and [human body] represents a novel domain [goose with navel] resulting from the first. This novel domain serves as the conceptual basis for apprehending daisy in terms of goose navel. In sum, the construal involves two metaphoric blends: one combining the goose body with the human body and the other combining the goose navel with

plant. The latter blend is motivated by the metonymic association between the goose navel and the height of a daisy.

To appreciate the conceptual complexity behind the name *gęsi pępek*, it is crucial to reveal the intricate interplay between metaphors and metonymies. Any comprehensive theoretical description of the motivation behind the name should capture the interplay in one way or another. While Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Blending Theory discussed in the sections to follow do capture the conceptual interrelations, they do it in their own ways and emphasize different aspects of mental imagery.

Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1993) defines a metaphor as a cognitive process that consists in understanding one concept in terms of another. More technically, a conceptual metaphor involves a mapping of selected content from one conceptual domain (the source domain) to another (the target domain). For example, the construal behind the metaphoric name *ptasi chleb* (lit. ‘bird bread’; hawthorn, *Crataegus*) can be described as a mapping of the concepts bread from the source domain [human food] onto the concept hawthorn in the domain [bird food]. Conceptual metonymy, in turn, is defined primarily as a referential device, in which one concept grants a mental access to another concept. More technically, conceptual metonymy involves mapping within a single domain. For example, the name *wardziec* (yarrow, *Achillea*) recruits the vehicle concept hard from the domain [yarrow]. The metonymy involves a mapping within a single domain, since the concept of HARDNESS belongs to the domain organizing information about the plant, so that no knowledge from outside the domain is recruited in the construal. Moreover, the metonymic name *wardziec* differs from the metaphoric name *ptasi chleb* (lit. ‘bird bread’) in that in the former yarrow is not (metaphorically) identified with hardness, while in the latter hawthorn is (metaphorically) identified with bread.

It is difficult to fairly compare Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Cognitive Grammar simply because the two theories have been designed to account for different kinds of conceptual phenomena. CMT has been developed primarily in order to account for the conceptual mechanisms underlying metaphoric and metonymic expressions, so it is hardly surprising that the theory is largely inapplicable to the analysis of non-metaphoric and non-metonymic names. Under a sufficiently broad understanding of metonymy, all motivated plant names can be analyzed as metonymic to some extent,

if only because they exploit salient associations between the plant and one of its properties, elements of the environment, function, etc. This suggests that CMT can be used to describe at least some elements of all motivated plant names. Nonetheless, Cognitive Grammar has theoretical resources for fine-grained and comprehensive descriptions of construal behind all linguistic expressions, regardless of whether they are metaphoric or metonymic in nature. In the cases of predominantly metaphoric and metonymic construals, where CMT and CG analyses are comparable, CMT usually trades descriptive power for simplicity. Even though CMT analyses of metaphoric and metonymic expressions may be complicated, the basic theoretical toolkit includes only two domains with a cross-domain mapping for metaphor and one domain with domain-internal mapping for metonymy. In comparison, CG toolkit has several descriptive dimensions of construal, some of which involve several parameters. For instance, the already mentioned dimension of perspective includes sub-dimensions, such as vantage point and viewing arrangement. Therefore, a CG analysis reveals more semantic intricacies at the cost of significant complexity.

Consider a CMT analysis of the name *geşi pepek* sketched in Figure 2. Similarly to the CG analysis in Figure 1, the CMT analysis features two cross-domain mappings: one depicting the goose abdomen in terms of the human abdomen and the other depicting a daisy in terms of the metaphoric concept goose navel. The box marked as “gn” (the domains [goose navel]) signals that the novel metaphoric conception GOOSE NAVEL serves as the source domain in the metaphor DAISY IS GOOSE NAVEL. Figure 2 is structurally similar to the part of Figure 1 within the on-stage region (“OR”). Most of the visual differences between the two figures correspond to the differences between the two theoretical frameworks used to describe the name. In Figure 2, the absence of the on-stage region and the conceptualizer (marked “C” in Figure 1) results from the fact that CMT does not feature the relation between the conceptualizer and the conceptualization as one of its basic descriptive dimensions. Hence, a CMT analysis does not explicitly cover the distinction between the objective/subjective construal, so the on-stage region, intended to “flesh out” the theoretical distinction, is redundant.

Prominence is a key theoretical notion in both Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Cognitive Grammar, but it is incorporated in the theories in slightly different ways. In the latter, prominence manifests itself primarily in profiling determining the topology of the construal against the cognitive domain. In Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the conceptual structures mapped across cognitive domain are prominent against the source and the target domains, but CMT researchers refer to this process more generally as “hiding




Figure 2: Metaphoric mappings behind *gesi pepek* ‘daisy’

and highlighting” or “focusing” (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, chap. 3). The fact that prominence has not gained comparable theoretical significance in CG and CMT can be explained by different goals of the two theories. Cognitive Grammar is a comprehensive framework for modeling linguistic processes and needs to account for phenomena not covered by Conceptual Metaphor Theory (and vice versa). For example, CG accounts for the fundamental distinction between grammatical classes by postulating that the distinctions amount to the differences between types of profile: nouns profile things, verbs profile temporal relations, adjectives profile atemporal relations, etc. (cf. Langacker 2008, chap. 4). Hence, the notion of prominence instantiated by profiling, carries a significant explanatory burden in Cognitive Grammar. A comprehensive description of a metaphor within CMT does not require the analyst to go into details of how conceptual structures emerge against their cognitive domains and general terms like “hiding and highlighting” or “focusing” are usually accepted as sufficient to cover this process.

Conceptual Metaphor Theory may partly account for metonymic components of cross-domain mappings that are not metaphoric in nature, but the framework is not suitable for providing comprehensive descriptions of this sort of words. For example, the name *wężowe ziele* is motivated by both the fact that sedum grows near the ground, has “snake-like” stems, and was believed to repel snakes.⁴ More technically, the construal behind *wężowe ziele* involves a cross-domain mapping from the domain [sedum] to the domain

⁴ “Wężowe ziele to takie, co ma takie długie śnurki, tak się wlecząc po łące i kwiatki takie żółte. I łuno jest od węży, żeby węży nie było, to ono chroni od węży. I się wije po ziemi jak wąż.” (“Snake herb is one that has long strings, it crawl through a meadow and has yellow flowers. And it’s from snake, so that there are not snakes. And it slithers on the ground like a snake.”) (Pelcowa 2017: 480).

[practical usage]. Even though such a cross-domain mapping is an essential feature of metaphor, the construal lacks the metaphoric identification of the target with the source concepts. Notice that in the case of *wężowe ziele* the plant is depicted as a type of herb (Polish noun *ziele*) qualified by its relation to the snake (Polish adjective *wężowe*), so the construal preserves the biological identity of the referent. Conceptual metaphors, in turn, typically alter the classification of the referent. For instance, the metaphors behind *ptasi chleb* (lit. ‘bird bread’) depicts hawthorn as a type of bread rather than a type of herb or plant.

It seems unlikely that the association between sedum and snake-repelling properties of *wężowe ziele* is metonymic in nature, at least by the lights of strict CMT. CMT requires that metonymy operates within one cognitive domain, but the name of the plant is motivated by both the shape of the leaves and medicinal use. Thus, the two associations operate simultaneously across two different domains: [physical appearance] and [practical usage]. Alternatively, it is possible to propose one extensive domain [sedum] embracing all encyclopedic knowledge about the plant. This maneuver would automatically place all associations between sedum and elements of knowledge about sedum within the domain [sedum] and automatically render all associations of this sort as metonymic. However, this solution is awkward, since it would group very different aspects of knowledge, like the knowledge about the plant’s appearance and usage, into a single domain. CMT usually assigns different aspects to different domains, like [physical appearance] and [practical usage]. What is worse, proposing an all-embracing category would effectively render the distinction between metaphor and metonymy unfeasible. For example, if all encyclopedic knowledge about the hawthorn belonged in a single domain [hawthorn], so would the associations between the plant, bird food, and bread motivating the name *ptasi chleb*. This would lead to a counterintuitive conclusion that the construal depicting the hawthorn as bird bread is in fact metonymic, since it operates within a single all-embracing domain. Of course, the limited applicability of CMT in the analysis of non-metaphoric mappings should not be treated as a shortcoming of the theory, since CMT has not been originally designed to cover non-metaphoric conceptualizations.

Conceptual Blending Theory

Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 1998; Turner Fauconnier and Turner 2002) has been designed to account for composite concepts produced by integrating distinct semantic structures. A conceptual

metaphor is a good illustration of such a composite concept.⁵ CBT postulates four mental spaces, defined as temporary arrays of conceptualization, usually evoked for the purpose of on-going discourse. Two of them are the so-called input spaces embracing the conceptual content integrated in the course of the blending process. The elements from one input space are typically associated with the elements of the other input spaces by means of correspondences. In the case of *ptasi chleb*, the spaces include the concepts of HUMAN FOOD and BIRD FOOD respectively and the two types of food are associated with correspondences across the two input spaces. The generic space includes elements and structures shared by both inputs. Since the conceptualizations in the input spaces typically differ in specifics, the elements in the generic space usually abstract away from the details, which results in highly schematic content. In the case of *ptasi chleb*, the generic space embraces the abstract notion of unspecified food consumed by an unspecified living organism. Finally, the blended space integrates the content from the other spaces into a coherent whole. The integration gives rise to an emergent structure often governed by its own “internal logic” and comprising novel elements absent from the inputs. For instance, in the blended space behind *ptasi chleb*, hawthorn is presented as bread for birds, even though neither of the input spaces features bread-eating birds.

CBT excels at presenting the topology of composite construals involving complex mappings between various concepts. Figure 3 sketches a CBT analysis of the blend behind *gęsi pępek*. The left-hand part of the figure features the creation of the blended concept goose navel in the blended space B_1 from the semantic content supplied by the input spaces of [human body] and [goose body] (marked “ I_1 ” and “ I_2 ” respectively). The association is motivated by the similarities between the content of the two inputs and the abstracted similarities (i.e. the overall body structure with distinguishable abdomen) are included in the generic space G_1 . In the right-hand part of the diagram the concept goose navel is blended with the concept DAISY from the input space I_3 . The generic space of this blend (G_2) includes the content associated with both daisies and goose navels: being located close to the ground (marked with double-headed arrows). The two metaphoric mappings mentioned in the CG and CMT analyses from the previous sections correspond to metaphoric blends B_1 and B_2 . The fact that the composite conception GOOSE NAVEL is metaphorically identified with the daisy is accounted for by the blend GOOSE NAVEL functioning as one of the input spaces for the blend B_2 , which combines the concepts goose navel and daisy

⁵ Nonetheless, not all blends are metaphoric in nature. See Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007) for a more detailed discussion.

into a novel emergent structure (marked as “GN”).




Figure 3: The conceptual blend behind *gęsi pepek* ‘daisy’

Since Conceptual Blending Theory is intended to capture the mechanism of creating various types of composite conceptual content, its application is not limited to metaphoric names. For example, CBT can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of non-metaphoric cross-domain mappings, like the one in the construal behind *wężowe ziele* (lit. ‘snake herb’, hepatica). Within the CBT formalism, the name of the plant is a result of the blending of the content from the input spaces [sedum] and [snake]. The corresponding elements are snake-shape from the sedum input and shape in the snake input. The generic space contains the abstract association with snake features in both inputs and the blended space contains the novel concept of a plant associated with a snake. In terms of CBT, the crucial difference between metaphoric blends like *daisy* and *goose navel* in Figure 3 and snake-plant is that the former involves what Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007) term *fusion*. Fusion is a distinctive feature of metaphoric blends and consists in combining distinct entities from input spaces into a single entity in the blended space. It is due to fusion that metaphors depict the source and the target concepts as identical, i.e. a daisy is metaphorically depicted as a goose

navel and hawthorn is metaphorically depicted as bread. Non-metaphorical blends do not involve fusion. Instead, they closely associate two entities from different inputs without merging them into a single entity, so that both entities remain distinct in the emergent structure.

Similarly to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Conceptual Blending Theory is designed primarily to describe the processes of creating composite semantic structures and therefore does not include all the descriptive dimensions available in Cognitive Grammar. The process of blending is performed in somebody's mind, so the presence of the conceptualizer is implicit in the model, but the position of the conceptualizer vis-à-vis the object of conceptualization, captured in CG by the distinction between objective and subjective construal within a certain viewing arrangement, is not explicitly accounted for in CBT. Nonetheless, the two frameworks are largely compatible and Langacker often appeals to CBT in his analyses of composite conceptual structures, especially metaphors (cf. e.g. Langacker 2008: 527-528). This kind of interrelations are possible, because CG, CMT, and CBT differ primarily in the scope of applications and formalisms, rather than basic assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning. In other words, all three theories are intended to describe different phenomena by means of different theoretical notions, but all of them identify the semantic content of words and linguistic expressions with dynamic conceptualizations and acknowledge that the conceptualizations rely on general cognitive capacities of the human mind. The capacities include, but are not limited to, the ability to mentally construe a situation in alternate ways, to conceptualize similarities and contiguities, and to focus attention on particular elements of an entity or event.

Conclusion

The three theoretical frameworks discussed in the article cannot replace the methodologies developed by cognitive ethnolinguists, simply because they have not been designed as tools for a comprehensive reconstruction of linguistic worldviews encoded in names. Nonetheless, if used properly, they can be useful additions to the ethnolinguistic theoretical toolkit. Cognitive Grammar, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and Conceptual Blending Theory reveal the richness and diversity of conceptual imagery behind folk names in different ways. The descriptive dimensions of CG allow for a detailed analysis of the construals behind plant names. The distinction between objectivity and subjectivity of construal apparent in viewing arrangements helps demonstrate various ways in which conceptualizers enrich the mental imagery of name

referents. Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Blending Theory excel at unveiling complex networks of semantic connections supporting the mental imagery encoded in names. Consequently, the theories may help us appreciate vivid folk imagination, often giving rise to surprising, unexpected, and fanciful associations between various entities and phenomena.

Apparent terminological discrepancies and different research aims should not make us oblivious to the deep resemblances in the basic assumptions about the nature of language shared by both Anglophone cognitive linguistics and Slavic cognitive ethnolinguistics. Most importantly, cognitive ethnolinguists also identify linguistic meanings with conceptual representations and appreciate the role of basic cognitive faculties and experiential basis in the formation of these representations. Cognitive Grammar, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and Conceptual Blending theory have ready-to-use tools that ethnolinguists can add to their theoretical and methodological repertoire.

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Analiza metaforycznych nazw roślin w ramach trzech modeli kognitywnych: gramatyki kognitywnej, teorii metafory pojęciowej i teorii integracji pojęciowej

Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest ustalenie stopnia przydatności trzech modeli teoretycznych, wypracowanych w ramach lingwistyki kognitywnej, tj. gramatyki kognitywnej Ronalda Langackera, teorii metafory pojęciowej George’a Lakoffa i Marka Johnsona oraz teorii integracji pojęciowej Gillesa Fauconniera i Marka Turnera, do analizy motywacji ludowych nazw roślin. O ile żaden z tych modeli nie został opracowany jako narzędzie rekonstrukcji językowego obrazu świata (patrz prace Jerzego Bartmińskiego), o tyle mogą one uchwycić kryjące się w badanych nazwach niuanse semantyczne, a tym samym wnieść wkład w opis konceptualizacji obecnych w języku ludowym. Ponieważ zakres zastosowania wszystkich trzech modeli obejmuje wyrażenia metaforyczne, w artykule proponuje się analizę ludowej nazwy stokrotki *gęsi pepepek*, omawia mocne i słabe strony każdego modelu, użytego w celu rekonstrukcji skonwencjonalizowanego ludowego sposobu obrazowania obecnego w nazwie rośliny.

Słowa kluczowe: ludowe nazwy roślin; gramatyka kognitywna; teoria metafory pojęciowej; teoria integracji pojęciowej; językowy obraz świata