The Methods of Statutory Interpretation in the Practice of the High Courts of Hungary

Zoltan J. Toth

Abstract


The present paper deals with the methods of statutory interpretation, focusing, primarily, on the Hungarian practice thereof. It uses the term ’interpretation’ in the sense of Jerzy Wróblewski’s well-known category as an activity that one does if the meaning of a given text is vague or dubious and he/she wishes to reveal the appropriate meaning of the text in question. Firstly, the paper reviews the techniques by use of which judges (or anybody else) can decide what a given word, phrase, sentence or text means, or what it does not, establishing a classification that attempts to cover the pool of the possible methods of statutory interpretation. Secondly, the article analyses and introduces, in a legal sociological way, what kind of methods and in what proportion are applied by high courts in Hungary, and, mainly, by the Supreme Court of Hungary in the judicial practice.


Keywords


statutory law, Supreme Court

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/bc.2016.1.173
Date of publication: 2017-02-13 11:12:08
Date of submission: 2017-02-13 10:35:12


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