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Editorial

En el undécimo volumen de la revista *Anuario Latinoamericano – Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales*, les recomendamos leer el contenido del Dossier titulado “Brasil: entre la democracia y el autoritarismo” y coordinado por Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga y Katarzyna Krzywicka. La inestable situación política, económica y social, así como las negligencias y amenazas en el campo de la seguridad sanitaria en el país, atraen la atención de la opinión pública, periodistas, científicos y analistas. Los problemas internos de Brasil tienen una dimensión internacional y son de particular importancia en el contexto de las elecciones que se celebrarán en 2022. Los autores de los artículos publicados en el Dossier hacen una valiosa e importante contribución a la discusión actual sobre el estado de la democracia brasileña.

Tradicionalmente les recomendamos que presten atención a la sección “Artículos y ensayos”, así como los alentamos a leer reseñas de libros en la sección “Reseñas e informes”.

Deseándoles una buena lectura, les invitamos a enviar artículos y reseñas de libros para los próximos volúmenes de *Anuario Latinoamericano*. Las informaciones sobre los temas del Dossier de los volúmenes previstos para la publicación y los plazos para el envío de contribuciones están disponibles en el sitio web de nuestra revista.

Katarzyna Krzywicka

Lublin, 18 de julio de 2021

Dossier

América Latina: Brasil

Coordinado por Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
y Katarzyna Krzywicka

Brasil: entre la democracia y el autoritarismo. Presentación

Brazil: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism. Presentation

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Brasil es un sujeto relevante e influyente de las relaciones internacionales por su ubicación geopolítica e importante potencial económico y demográfico. El Estado ha llegado al siglo XXI como la cuarta democracia electoral más grande del mundo, con 182 millones de habitantes y 125,9 millones de votantes, pero marcado por nuevos y viejos desafíos. Desde una perspectiva procedimental, los indicadores muestran que el país se encuentra entre las democracias relativamente estables en cuanto a los procedimientos que regulan la competencia política, la alternancia de partidos políticos en el poder, la configuración de un sistema de partidos inclusivo y la expansión de la participación ciudadana electoral. Cabe destacar que, desde 1985, no ha habido intentos de intervención militar en la política, como ocurrió en otros períodos

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de la historia del país. Sin embargo, considerando la esencia de la democracia, Brasil sigue presentado déficit de representatividad de los grupos sociales minoritarios. Además, Brasil no ha podido avanzar lo suficiente para democratizar el acceso de la mayoría de la sociedad a las políticas de bienestar social, profundizando así la desigualdad en la distribución del ingreso, el acceso a la educación y la atención médica adecuada, lo cual acrecienta la brecha social.

Aunque se observa que la sociedad brasileña es cada vez más compleja, la vieja cultura populista, la invasión de lo público por lo privado, la segregación social, una cultura religiosa conservadora en costumbres y valores y la falta de un proyecto de país de la élite económica conviven simultáneamente¹ (Krzywicka, 2020). Sigue existiendo un sistema de exclusiones en la administración de la ley y los recursos, el rezago educativo y tecnológico con tan solo escasas excepciones en el desarrollo de la investigación científica, así como un cierto avance en el campo jurídico y administrativo en algunas empresas, organismos e instituciones públicas.

La asimetría existente en el funcionamiento de varios elementos del sistema democrático brasileño ha generado muchas contradicciones en su desempeño, afectando así el grado y la amplitud de su legitimidad. Sin embargo, los gobiernos de las coaliciones gubernamentales más perdurables del último periodo democrático –de 1995 a 2002, con la centroderecha encabezada por el Partido de la Socialdemocracia Brasileña (PSDB), y de 2003 a 2015, con la centroizquierda, bajo el liderazgo del Partido de los Trabajadores (PT)– efectuaron cambios importantes y significativos en Brasil. En el campo de la economía, por ejemplo, los gobiernos del PSDB lograron controlar la hiperinflación, aprobando una enmienda constitucional para reorganizar las finanzas públicas. Cabe destacar que, con relación a la condición social de la población, en los gobiernos del PT, entre 2002 y 2012, la desigualdad disminuyó sistemáticamente como el resultado de las políticas de distribución del ingreso y el aumento real del salario mínimo (Arretche, 2015). Sin embargo, las políticas más sustantivas que atacaban los problemas estructurales de la desigualdad brasileña, como el sistema tributario regresivo o la concentración de la tierra, fueron relegadas por los gobiernos del PSDB y del PT.

La composición del PT como el partido gobernante, con sectores de la sociedad no siempre alineados con los ideales progresistas, redujo significativamente la efectividad de su gobierno, a pesar de la implementación de políticas paradigmáticas, como la Bolsa Familia y el Proceso de Aceleración del Crecimiento (PAC)², el uso de mecanismos de mercado en la formulación

¹ Caio Prado Jr. ([1942] 1970) parece haber sido profético cuando habló del significado de la colonización brasileña y su carácter de colonia de exploración. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1964) también compartió la idea de que no había burguesía nacional. La burguesía existe, pero no es nacional. Por lo tanto, puede ser hábil para administrar un negocio, pero no para liderar un proyecto nacional.

² El Programa de Aceleración del Crecimiento (PAC) se lanzó a principios de 2007. Era un programa que abarcaba un conjunto de políticas económicas previstas para los cuatro años si-

de las políticas, como el PROUNI (Programa Universidade para Todos) y el FIES (Fundo de Financiamento Estudantil), y la eminencia de un proyecto de «desmarginalización» a través del consumo, con crédito de nómina. Aunque el balance general es positivo en términos de inclusión social, la reforma de las pensiones en 2003 y los recortes sociales de 2015 revelaron la resignación de la construcción de un *Estado de bienestar*.

La estabilización y profundización de la democracia brasileña comienza a colapsar en 2014 cuando, por un lado, el resultado de las elecciones presidenciales –la reelección del PT para el cuarto mandato– no fue aceptado por el mayor partido de oposición, el PSDB; y, por otro lado, se puso en marcha la operación Lava Jato, para combatir la corrupción, llegando a políticos de casi todos los partidos de la base del gobierno del PT y de la oposición. Luego, en 2016, el proyecto de poder hegemónico en el país sufre un golpe con la destitución de la presidenta Dilma Rousseff, como resultado del procedimiento de *impeachment*. En el siguiente gobierno, formado por Michel Temer del Movimiento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), comenzó el regreso de personal militar a posiciones clave del Estado brasileño. Finalmente, un síntoma más del colapso de la democracia brasileña fue el ascenso al poder tras las elecciones de 2018 del populista autoritario de derecha³, excapitán del Ejército y congresista, Jair Messias Bolsonaro⁴, acompañado por el general de reserva Hamilton Mourão. La combinación de fuerzas civiles, militares y de seguridad pública aseguró la realización de los intereses de estos grupos. Esto se debe a que, por un lado, la agrupación Bolsonaro necesitaba unirse a segmentos que le proporcionaran el capital político y simbólico suficiente para tener el voto nacional. Por otro lado, los militares y la policía civil vieron una oportunidad para volver a controlar el Estado brasileño en medio de un creciente descontento y resentimiento hacia las corporaciones. La mayoría del electorado nacional embarcó en su narrativa con un fuerte énfasis en la mentalidad militar, movilizándolo temas como la antipolítica, el *anti-establishment*, el anticomunismo, la

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Presentación

Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Katarzyna Krzywicka

güentes y que tenía como objetivo acelerar el crecimiento de Brasil. Previó inversiones totales de R\$ 503,9 mil millones para 2010, siendo una de sus prioridades la inversión en infraestructura, en áreas como saneamiento, vivienda, transporte, energía y recursos hídricos, entre otros.

³ Se define aquí populismo autoritario como un estilo retórico que puede ser movilizadopor los líderes autoritarios de derecha e izquierda, cuyas estrategias discursivas buscan deslegitimar a los intelectuales, enfatizan la seguridad colectiva en detrimento del cambio social. Además, el populismo defiende la preservación de la tradición y el modo de vida, la obediencia a los líderes del grupo, que tiende a resultar en políticas públicas contrarias a la ciencia, basadas en "nosotros" contra "ellos" y que busca deslegitimar las instituciones políticas de la democracia liberal. Bolsonaro se alinea con la ola de populismo autoritario de derechas que dio prominencia a Nigel Farage durante la campaña del Brexit, que eligió a Donald Trump en los Estados Unidos y Viktor Orban en Hungría, entre otros (Norris & Inglehart, 2018).

⁴ Con una carrera parlamentaria iniciada desde la redemocratización, cuando fue elegido concejal, en 1988, en 1990 fue elegido diputado federal por el PDC por primera vez, reeligiéndose siete veces por varios partidos (PPR/PPB, PTB, PFL, PSC).

seguridad pública, el armamento de la población y la lucha contra la corrupción (Braga & Casalecchi, 2019).

En los últimos tres años, Brasil, bajo el gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro, ha retrocedido en todas las áreas. Según el Informe Variaciones en la Democracia (V-Dem)⁵, Brasil es el cuarto país que más se alejó de la democracia en 2020 en un ranking de 202 países en casi todos los indicadores analizados. En la economía, los indicadores eran negativos incluso antes de la pandemia. En 2019, el retiro en dólares americanos de la economía brasileña superó la entrada por 44,7 mil millones, el peor resultado desde 1982. En el mismo año, el crecimiento del PIB fue del 1,1 %, por debajo de las expectativas del mercado y por debajo de los dos años anteriores. Ese año la tasa de desempleo también decepcionó con un nivel del 11,9 %, ligeramente inferior al 12,3 % de 2018, pero con una informalidad récord de un 41,1 % de la población ocupada o 38,4 millones de personas (Agência Brasil, 2020; Estado de Minas, 2020; Nery, 2020). Además, la deuda pública federal, que incluye el endeudamiento interno y externo de Brasil, cerró 2020 en R\$ 5,01 billones. El valor representó un aumento del 17,9 % en comparación con 2019, cuando la deuda fue de R\$ 4,249 billones⁶. Así, en 2021, incluso con la aprobación de la controvertida Enmienda Constitucional de “Teto de Gastos”, la deuda alcanzó, por primera vez, el 90 % del PIB. El aumento del gasto público propuesto por el gobierno para mitigar los efectos de la pandemia de coronavirus no ha contribuido a mejorar su imagen ante los ciudadanos.

Al análisis de la actual situación interna de Brasil, cabe agregar una observación sobre la actividad internacional de este país. Entre los años 1995 y 2015, Brasil pareció emerger como el líder regional y la potencia mundial. Desde 2017, la política del gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro en el campo de relaciones internacionales indica que Brasil tiende a aislarse de alguna manera, renunciando a participar en los foros políticos regionales, como la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) o la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC). Así

⁵ Según este informe, el mundo está experimentando una ola de expansión de la autocracia iniciada en 1994. Esta sería la tercera ola desde 1900 (las dos primeras tuvieron lugar entre las décadas de 1920 y 1940 y entre principios de la década de 1960 y finales de la década de 1970). Si en 2010 el 48 % de la población mundial vivía bajo regímenes considerados antidemocráticos, en 2020 este porcentaje aumentó al 68 % y volvió al nivel observado a principios de la década de 1990. En el grupo G-20 -que suma las economías más grandes del mundo- además de Brasil y Turquía, India también mostró una caída en los parámetros democráticos tan significativa que ya no se consideraba la democracia más grande del mundo y llegó a ser clasificada, por V-Dem, como autocracia con elecciones. Según los investigadores, los procesos de India, Turquía, Polonia y Brasil, a pesar de estar en diferentes etapas, siguen el mismo guion. En primer lugar, atacan a los medios de comunicación y a la sociedad civil. Luego, fomentan la polarización de la sociedad, faltan el respeto a los oponentes y difunden información falsa, y después socavan las instituciones formales.

⁶ Mas información en la Secretaría del Tesoro Nacional, del Ministerio de Economía. Máximo, W. (27.01.2021). Dívida pública fecha 2020 acima de R\$ 5 trilhões. Agência Brasil. Recuperado el 22 de septiembre de 2021, de <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2021-01/divida-publica-fecha-2020-acima-de-r-5-trilhoes>

renuncia a su aspiración de liderazgo regional y contribuye a la desintegración de los Estados latinoamericanos. Los cambios en la política exterior del gobierno de Bolsonaro llevaron a una redefinición de la narrativa de la política exterior de Brasil y roles internacionales del Estado (Sawicka, 2020).

Los autores de los artículos del Dossier dedicado a estudiar el caso de Brasil se comprometieron a explicar los complejos problemas de la democracia brasileña, como también dilemas y amenazas contemporáneos del funcionamiento del Estado. Las consideraciones y análisis presentados por los autores se centran en explicar las condiciones, la especificidad y los efectos del gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro en términos de la política interna y funcionamiento del sistema político brasileño y además la política externa de Brasil.

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Dossier
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Incomplete Democracies: The Brazilian Case

Democracias incompletas: El caso de Brasil

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ABSTRACT

The article aims to analyze whether, after 30 years of current Brazilian democracy, political institutions will be resilient enough to deal with the consequences of an authoritarian government elected in the middle of a deep representation crisis. In other words, would this be a turn to an illiberal democracy? From an analysis of the situation, we traced a chronology of circumstances – transition from the authoritarian regime, popular dissatisfaction, critical elections of 2018 as a time of exhaustion for the New Republic, dynamics of the party dispute – that converged to the rise of ultra-right forces, elected through a democratic regime. Data referring to public perception concerning institutions, electoral results, and performance of traditional parties in recent electoral cycles (general election of 2018 and municipal election of 2020) are analyzed. We conclude that the growth of center-right parties in the 2020 municipal elections indicate that – despite the analytical correctness of the literature on the possibility of internal corrosion of democracies by nationalist neopopulism – the thesis regarding incidental rulers has strong evidence visible in Brazil.

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KEYWORDS: *Brazilian democracy, Bolsonaro government, party system, democratic backlash, electoral realignment, critical election.*

RESUMEN

El artículo pretende analizar si, tras 30 años de la actual democracia brasileña, las instituciones políticas serán lo suficientemente resistentes como para afrontar las consecuencias de un gobierno autoritario elegido en medio de una profunda crisis de representación. En otras palabras, ¿se trataría de un giro hacia una democracia antiliberal? A partir de un análisis de coyuntura, trazamos una cronología de circunstancias –transición del régimen autoritario, insatisfacción popular, elecciones críticas de 2018 como momento de agotamiento de la Nueva República, dinámica de la disputa partidaria– que confluieron al ascenso de fuerzas de ultraderecha, elegidas en el marco de un régimen democrático. Se analizan los datos referidos a la percepción pública sobre las instituciones, los resultados electorales y el desempeño de los partidos tradicionales en los últimos ciclos electorales (elecciones generales de 2018 y municipales de 2020). Concluimos que el crecimiento de los partidos de centroderecha en las elecciones municipales de 2020 indica que – a pesar de la corrección analítica de la literatura sobre la posibilidad de corrosión interna de las democracias por el neopopulismo nacionalista – la tesis relativa a los gobernantes incidentales tiene fuertes indicios de mostrarse en Brasil.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *democracia brasileña, gobierno de Bolsonaro, sistema de partidos, retroceso democrático, reajuste electoral, elección crítica.*

Introduction¹

The results of the 2018 elections, with the victory of Jair Bolsonaro as president of the Republic, questioned the future of democracy in Brazil, which had begun to consolidate itself around the 80s through a transition that gave rise to an institutional arrangement denominated as the “New Republic”. Although the “anti-PT-ism” exercised had an important role in the behavior of electors who did not identify themselves with PT, the work of Jairo Nicolau points to a generalized dissatisfaction of the population in all levels of income, age, and education. Even though Nicolau’s work provides, as a backdrop, a discussion about political culture, this work will concentrate its focus on institutional dynamics, having been seen that, as warns Przeworski, despite the fact that democracies need democrats, the relationship of cause and effect between questions and answers related to belief in the democracy gives rise to controversies (Przeworski, 2019, p. 129).

In other words, the question is if Brazilian democratic institutions will be resilient enough to face the consequences of an authoritarian government,

¹ This paper is fruit of research funded by the National Council of Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) through a Productivity Grant.

elected amid a representative crisis, or if it is a turn in the direction of a low-quality democracy – or illiberal democracy, a term adopted in recent literature. Such questioning necessarily goes through the debate and analysis of party disputes, which is par excellence a form of the expression of “general will”. Nevertheless, the analysis of an electoral dispute does not exempt the analysts from the task of contextualizing the elections with a theoretical and historical backdrop that sets the stage of the dispute and puts it in a broader perspective, placing it – using the term coined by Huntington – in a wave that brings with it a demonstration effect.²

The main hypothesis of this paper is that the 2018 election, which broke the polarization between the two main parties, PT and PSDB, caused the divorce between society and the political system. Its peak were the protests of 2013, accentuated by the investigations of Car Wash Operation, and it was consummated by the questioning of the 2014 electoral result. To measure the disruptive depth of 2018, we will confront the performance of the main parties elected to Congress, along with the results for mayoral and city halls and city council elections in twenty-seven capitals. Therefore, if there is proof of a steep decline in the number of traditional parties in 2020, we can affirm that the rise of Bolsonarism was a movement of tectonic plates towards a regime of different nature than a competitive democracy. If the return of traditional parties in 2020 is verified, we can classify Bolsonarism – at least the most extreme form of it – as what Sérgio Abranches conceptualized as “incidental rulers” (Abranches, 2020).

For the author, incidental governments are products of popular uprisings against the established parties that lose their connection with society and fall short of the expectations, mainly, of those who are in a less favorable position in a market economy system. Such incidental governments are supported by unstable majorities in parliament, in the case of parliamentarism, or around a leadership that gains popularity in a critical election. Being “incidental”, the rulers generally are not elected to a second term and, therefore, an authoritarian regime does not come to fruition. However, their time in power tends to leave a legacy of discreditation of democracy (Abranches, 2020, pp. 77–96).

From controversial congressman belonging to the lower clergy to president of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro was notable for his aggressive, prejudiced and far-right speech. Always emphasizing obscure passages of the military regime, throughout his terms, now in the exercise of the presidency of the Republic, Bolsonaro approaches a kind of “antigeisel”, trying to promote a slow, gradual, but not always safe closure. However, given the thickening of the political and health crisis, the chances of Bolsonaro becoming an incidental elected official in a critical election are great.

² The first wave of democratization was in the period between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of World War 1. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: The Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. São Paulo: Attica. 1994.

We divided this discussion into five sections. After the introduction, in the second section, we delimited the historical and theoretical debate to discuss the principal approaches regarding the risks of the current democracy in the context of Bolsonaro's election. In the third section, we laid out a panorama of the public perception of institutions and the implications for the dynamics of political polarization. In the fourth part, we seek to empirically test our hypothesis taking into consideration the results of the 2018 and 2020 elections. Finally, in the fifth section, we present our final considerations.

From transition to instability: the background of an authoritarian electoral option

Many authors have faced the challenge of conceptualizing the diverse regimes that, in one way or another, mix authoritarian components with a democratic façade. This challenge intensified with the election of Trump and Bolsonaro, and that, according to Przeworski, left us a warning that the democratic institutions may not offer the necessary safeguards to prevent their rules from being subverted by the duly elected rulers. (Przeworski, 2019, p. 19).

Among the attempts to conceptualize the current regimes that distance themselves from what is considered a prerequisite for free and complete democracies, perhaps the most fruitful endeavor was undertaken in the 1990s by Fred Zakaria when he coined the term “illiberal” to characterize regimes of peripheral countries that had, as their *modus operandi*, the systematic violations of civil liberties, freedom of speech, corruption, and fraudulent elections (Zakaria, 1997). The idea that democracy can erode from within resounds in the work of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), in their analysis of the election of Donald Trump, and Albertus Menaldo (2018) in regard to democracies in consolidation.

Levitsky and Ziblatt formulate a series of indicators seeking to measure what characterizes as a contemporary demagogue. Among these indicators are the disdain for the “rules of the game”, the attempt to delegitimize the opponent, the tolerance for, or encouraging of, violence and restrictions on the exercise of civil liberties. According to the authors, this would be the authoritarianism that would install itself in the United States and that would parallel the ascension of Mussolini and Hitler. All exaggerations aside – principally concerning the American democracy – it is necessary to recognize the successful finding that the military coups or great revolutions belong, at least for the moment, to the past. On the other hand, it seems irrefutable that the institutional antibodies developed by democracies are the result of the distinct historical processes of institutional enrooting, and therefore, each democracy will produce a different reaction.

In the same line of reasoning, Albertus and Menaldo (2018), with a broader comparative scope point out, like Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), the silent

establishment of authoritarian regimes, but they also emphasize the role of the political elite. According to them, such institutions are designed to safeguard the members of the authoritarian regime. This reasoning leads Albertus and Menaldo to counterpose an elite-based democracy and a popular democracy. A democracy based on the elite is one whose institutions and legal framework limit the distributive responsibilities and, in some way, restrict competition. On the other hand, a popular democracy would ensure a more efficient democratization process in which the “authoritarian rubble” is nullified.

On the other hand, the concept of national populism, as expressed by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin (2020), offers a less catastrophic perspective for democracy. For the authors, national populism is an answer to the wariness of what is considered “traditional” politics (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2020, p. 130). The origin of national populism is in the distrust caused by the elitist nature of liberal democracy, the insecurity caused by the migratory waves, the sense of deprivation brought on by the neoliberal globalized economy and by the misalignment between traditional parties and society (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2020, pp. 20–22).

In the Brazilian case, we have a transition initiated “from the top” with the indirect election of General Geisel in 1974. A member of the moderate line, Geisel, along with Golbery, noticed the erosion of the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime, even though the economy was growing at an accelerated rate. Nevertheless, according to Chirio (2012), the transition initiated by Geisel was not aimed exactly at democratization, but at “distension” to neutralize the arbitrariness committed by the hard-liners and the institutionalization of a hybrid regime, in which the representative practice did not threaten the political limits granted on the basis of an authoritarian ideal.

In order to put an end to the distension, Geisel had to maintain the electoral calendar and, on another front, face the regime’s hard-liners. The legislative elections of 1974 and 1978 were moments of great uncertainty regarding the continuity of the process of opening of the authoritarian regime, since the victory of the opposition in the most developed regions of Brazil threatened the government’s majority in the National Congress. In the case of a controlled opening, the elections became the main institutionalized channel for contesting the regime, and, for this very reason, a constant source of rule changes so that the opposition would not obtain an overwhelming victory in the legislative elections.

On the other hand, even if the hotspots of guerilla movements had been done away with in the Costa e Silva and Médici governments, hardline sectors (sectors that the current President Jair Bolsonaro is sympathetic to) continuously expressed their dissatisfaction with the opening of the dictatorship, first with the murder of the journalist Wladimir Herzog and a worker named Manoel Fiel Filho in 1975, then with several bomb attacks during the Figueiredo government, the latter chosen by Geisel to be his successor and carry out the transition.

The New Republic arises from this tension within the military regime and from a transition that preserved the institutional foundations of the political regime and that allowed the majority of the political elite from the previous regime to remain at the head of the public administration. It is in line with the Albertus and Menaldo's thesis about the influence of elites from the previous regime on the institutionalization of the new democracy. According to Souza (1988) and Diniz (1997), skepticism regarding the prospects of a democratic consolidation was justified by the characteristics of institutional continuity and little social representativity of political parties.

Although several academic papers, produced during the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, have verified, based on solid statistical models, the strengthening of rules and intra-institutional mechanisms³, the carelessness with historical and social processes did not allow due attention to be given to the fact that the short period of political stability experienced in the New Republic was achieved thanks to the ability to manage large coalitions during the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010). The first stabilized the economy – while still Minister of Finance of Itamar Franco – and began to build the foundations of a regulatory state, and the latter – benefited from the stabilization of the economy – expanded income distribution and social inclusion.

The sixteen years of political and economic stability (Cardoso / Lula period) were preceded and followed by two impeachments of presidents who failed to manage coalitions (Collor, 1992 and Rouseff, 2016), a high degree of party/parliament fragmentation, unemployment, recession, and corruption scandals that reveal the persistence of promiscuous relationships between parties, the state, and the private sector.

The polarization of the presidential elections, from 1994 to 2014 between PT and PSDB, did not minimize the spread of acronyms present in the general elections. The same strategy of “dividing oppositions to govern”, devised by Golbery do Couto e Silva, when he put an end to bipartisanship in 1979, was used by Rouseff aiming at the destabilization of the PMDB, which, since the re-democratization, had been the center of governance and, therefore, essential in coalitions.

The strategy, which had not worked out in the authoritarian period, was even worse under the democratic regime. The attempt to use the governmental machine to stimulate the creation of new parties increased the price of negotiations between the executive and the legislature precisely at the time when the expansion of government spending had reached its limit, which made it

³ The studies produced under the aegis of neo-institutionalism began by focusing on the internal dynamics of the House of Congress (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999) passing through the connections between the offices of ministers and electoral performance – suggesting the existence of a vicious cycle (Meneguello, 1998; Santos, 2003), and lastly sought to understand the dynamics of the changing of parties and coalitions (among others see Melo, 2004; Krause *et al.*, 2017).

impossible to maintain public policies aimed at social inclusion and caused an intense economic recession.

The rupture of society with the channels of political representation occurred in 2013, with large popular demonstrations mobilized by social networks in the style of the “Arab Spring” and, as observed in the rest of the world, showed the decline of institutionalized channels of political representation. However, notwithstanding other exogenous factors, in 2013 the inability of the Brazilian political system to consolidate accountability mechanisms that allow for a minimum level of accountability between government and governed was an endogenous factor. What followed was the implosion of the political parties’ funding mechanisms, the protagonism of players who did not have elective mandates, such as prosecutors and magistrates, and the desperate attempt to maintain a political system that no longer even looked at the electorate.

It is in this context that the 2018 election takes place, with a weakening participation of the center parties and the confrontation between the left and the extreme right, each highly ideological, in Przeworski’s words, each side believing that the other is the enemy to be destroyed at any cost (Przeworski, 2020, p. 45).

Political discontent: a brief overview of public perception of institutions

Trust in the political system is directly linked to its capacity to respond to the needs and expectations of society. Thus, the recognition of its democratic legitimacy, on the part of society, depends on the performance of its institutions. In other words, institutions only exist inasmuch as people believe in their legitimacy.⁴ But trust in governments and satisfaction with the democratic regime are not the only sources of legitimacy in the political system, – there is also a need for free, periodic, and competitive elections (Dahl, 1997; Schumpeter, 1961). In any case, citizens’ assessment of the institutions’ performance is key to understanding the support for democratic norms in the country.

In this section, we assess the Brazilian population’s perception of the functioning of the democratic regime and political institutions through survey from the Brazilian Electoral Study⁵ (ESEB). More specifically, the degree of public satisfaction with democracy and the evaluation of Brazilians regarding

⁴ In general terms, the legitimacy of democratic institutions can be considered as “the belief that the political institutions in place, despite their defects and flaws, are better than others that may be established and, therefore, can demand obedience” (Linz, 1978, p. 16).

⁵ The ESEB is a post-election survey of academic nature associated with the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project of the University of Michigan, coordinated by the political scientist Rachel Meneguello (CESOP/Unicamp).

the performance of political institutions for the period between 2010 and 2018 will be assessed. Table 1 shows citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of Brazilian democracy based on ESEB three-wave data.

Table 1.
Satisfaction with
the functioning
of democracy (%)

	2010 (%)	2014 (%)	2018 (%)
Very satisfied / satisfied	48	38.1	12.3
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	17.5	20.8	4.8
A little satisfied/ not at all satisfied	30	35.9	80.2
DK / NR	4.5	5.2	2.7

Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018.

In fact, Brazilian democracy does not live its best moments. According to the data, there is a decline in citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and a significant increase among those who declare themselves dissatisfied. Only 12% of respondents affirmed they were satisfied with the performance of democracy in 2018, a drop of 36 percentage points compared to the survey carried out in 2010, while 80% of respondents declared themselves dissatisfied in the 2018 survey, which represents an increase of 50% compared to 2010. Although satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is shaken, in general, most citizens do not endorse authoritarian regimes, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2.
Preference
for democracy (%)






	2010 (%)	2014 (%)	2018 (%)
Democracy is always better than any other form of government	78.4	62.1	68.7
In some situations, a dictatorship is better than a democracy	8.2	10.3	15.2
It does not matter	5.3	8.6	5.3
DK / NR	8.1	19.0	10.8

Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018.

Despite the high preference for democracy, in almost a decade, there was a decrease of ten percentage points in the rate of those who prefer a democratic regime to an authoritarian alternative. The number of those who express preferences for authoritarian regimes has also increased, although it is still only a small part of the population. In contrast to the high levels of preference for democracy, the high dissatisfaction with it is complemented by the negative evaluations regarding the performance of political institutions, which represents widespread rejection. In the figures below, we present how the Brazil-

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Source: elaborated on the basis of ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018. The question of the survey: “How do you evaluate the performance of (...)?”. In the values, those who answered excellent and good were added; average positive and negative regular; bad and very bad; and did not know and did not respond.

ians evaluated the performance of the following institutions: political parties, National Congress, presidency, judiciary, and armed forces.

As the figures show, there is an increasing tendency in the rejection of representative institutions over the years. Political parties and the National Congress are the institutions whose performance is the most poorly evaluated. The percentage of those who think the performance is bad/very bad continues to grow over time and exceeds 60% in 2018, while the rate of those who consider it excellent/good does not reach 20% for both. The performance of the federal government, on the other hand, shows lower levels of rejection than those observed for parties and Congress, although the rate of those who find the federal government bad/very bad has been increasing over time, exceeding 40% in 2018. The judiciary, in the year 2018, presented a positive rating (43%) close to the rejection rating (35%), but what calls the attention is that during the historical series there is a decrease in the frequency of those who consider their performance to be average and an increase in the evaluations of opposite poles – great/good versus bad/very bad. On the other hand, the armed forces are the institution that traditionally receives the highest positive evaluation, increasing from 42% in 2010 to 62% in 2018, the percentage of individuals who evaluate their performance as excellent/good.

Negative evaluations regarding the performance of institutions contribute to dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the country. That is what the opinions in relation to the representative arenas indicate, in particular, the political parties, for which discontent is widely noticed. In the three waves of the ESEB, similar questions were asked about party identification, more precisely asking whether citizens like and feel represented by any political party. The results of these opinions can be seen in the following Table 3.

	LIKE			REPRESENT		
	2010 (%)	2014 (%)	2018 (%)	2010 (%)	2014 (%)	2018 (%)
Yes	47.7	31.6	15.8	39.2	25.4	27.6
No	51.7	64.5	83.3	57.9	67.8	68.8
DK / NR	0.6	3.9	0.9	2.9	6.8	3.6

Table 3.
Representation and party
preference (%)

Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018. Questions: “Is there a political party that you like?” (2010 and 2014); “Do you consider yourself close to any political party?” (2018); “Is there a political party that represents the way you think?”

The data reinforce negative evaluations of the parties. It is noteworthy that there is an increase among those who declared that they did not like any party. In the survey carried out in 2010, approximately 50% stated that they did not like any party, while in 2018, this share rose to 83% of respondents. On the other hand, there was a sharp decline of around 30% in the percentage of those

who declared that they liked a party in 2018, compared to 2010. Among those who declared that they did not feel represented by any party, there was an increase of 11 percentage points, in the 2018 round, compared to 2010, with approximately 70% of respondents declaring that they did not feel represented by any party.

In the survey carried out by ESEB in 2018, questions were also included regarding citizens' trust in the country's political institutions. Once again, mistrust in relation to the parties prevails, with 84.4%, reaching the highest levels of distrust, followed by the National Congress with 81.2% and the presidency with 70.1%.⁶

In general, the data show that in the public perception there is a prevalent feeling of discreditation and distrust of representative institutions, which increased considerably in the last election analyzed. In the next section, we seek to identify how this context of widespread citizen discontent was reflected in the last general elections of 2018.

From social to electoral polarization

Never before in its political history had Brazil experienced such a long period of democratic institutionalization, that is, stability in political competition patterns. However, in a society with little democratic experience and frequently used anti-republican practices, as is the case in Brazil, there was an increasing skepticism towards parties and government institutions.

The intersection of these elements culminated in the growth of radicalism and the intensification of political polarization in society, changing the pattern of competition that had prevailed in the previous six presidential elections (1994–2014) structured around the dispute between the Workers' Party (PT) versus the Party of Social Brazilian Democracy (PSDB) (Braga, 2010; Limongi & Cortez, 2010; Carreirão, 2014), and gave rise to the ascension of the extreme right-wing populist candidates like that of Bolsonaro.

Regarding the polarization of society, the ESEB survey asked about the ideological self-positioning of voters on a scale from zero to ten, where zero represents more to the left and ten more to the right. In 2018, the vast majority, 43%, positioned themselves between seven and ten on the right scale, an increase of 16 percentage points in relation to the 2014 survey. On the other hand, 20% positioned themselves in the center (between four and six on the scale) and approximately 15% positioned themselves between zero and three on the scale in the 2018 survey. These results indicate a turn to the right of society which was reflected in the elections.

⁶ These results included the answers little/no trust. The question in the ESEB survey was: "Regarding these institutions, what level of trust do you have in them?"

In the context of an increase in political polarization of the population, the traditional center-right parties (mainly MDB and PSDB) had a setback in the 2018 elections, opening space for “new” competitive political parties – such as REDE, Novo and PSL itself –, increasing party fragmentation⁷. From a systemic point of view, the dynamics of a polarized pluralism, as Sartori (1982) defines, with centrifugal tendencies of party competition and high propensity to institutional instability, ends up taking over. Under this political context, the center loses its capacity to structure electoral preferences, increasing ideological distances.

At the same time, we observed an increase in electoral uncertainty, caused by the Brazilian (economic and political) crisis, but also by an increase in the supply of candidates in the 2018 presidential race. Figure 6 below shows the evolution of the number of candidates in the presidential elections and the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) coefficients for presidential disputes throughout the post-88 democratic period.




Figure 6.
Number of Candidates
and Effective Number of
Candidates in Presidential
Elections

Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.

In the 2018 presidential race, PT, to a certain extent, remained as the uniting pole of the left (rivaling PDT). The novelty was the emergence of Bolsonarism, which managed to attract a large part of the votes of the center-right and

⁷ In the Congress elected in 2018, Brazil broke its own record of fragmentation, electing congressmen from 30 different parties compared to 28 in 2014. In the Senate, there were 15 different parties in 2015 and it turned into 21 different ones in 2019. Currently there are 33 registered parties in the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE).

right-wing electorate, as well as of those segments of the center-left that were unhappy with the PT government, increasing anti-PT-ism. Nevertheless, the ENP of effective candidates for the presidential election has remained stable. What gained strength in this election was the ideological polarization, which took a turn to the extremes.

The high degree of uncertainty that marked the 2018 general elections in Brazil translated into a strong polarization around the presidential dispute. For the first time, a government with representatives of the armed forces – president and vice president – was democratically elected in Brazil. The analysis of the results of the first round of the presidential dispute, under the right/left axis, presented in Table 4, shows the high concentration of voting at the extremes of the ideological spectrum (92%), in detriment to center candidates.

Left	Center	Right
PT; PDT; PSOL; PSTU; PPL; REDE	PSDB; MDB; PODE	PSL; PATRI; DC; NOVO
43.41% valid votes	6.76% valid votes	49.83% valid votes

Source: TSE. Proportion of votes by party in presidential elections: PSL: 46.03; PT: 29.28; PDT: 12.47; PSDB 4.76; NOVO: 2.5; PATRI: 1.26; MDB: 1.2; REDE: 1; PODE: 0.8; PSOL: 0.58; PSTU: 0.05; DC: 0.04; PPL: 0.03.

The influence of Jair Bolsonaro’s candidacy generated a coattail effect on other electoral disputes, to the point that many candidates linked their campaign to that of Bolsonaro, in detriment to candidates from the same party. As an emblematic example, this phenomenon occurred with the campaign of the governor of São Paulo still in the first round. The ex-mayor João Doria (PSDB), with “BolsoDoria”, linked his campaign to that of Bolsonaro, then leader in voter intentions for the presidential dispute⁸.

According to the information in Table 5, in the elections for federal congressmen, in large part, this trend was also replicated, with a concentration of votes for the right-wing parties. The coattail effect of the presidential election was also felt in the voting of the small party Partido Social Liberal – Social Liberal Party – (PSL) for which the then presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro ran, becoming the party with the highest number of votes in the 2018 elections and also the one that most increased its seats compared to the previous legislature, skyrocketing from 1 elected congressman in 2014 to 52.

The 2018 election is an example of what in political science is often called a “critical election”, that is, one in which there are significant transformations

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Table 4.
Distribution on the left/right axis of the valid votes in the presidential elections (2018)

⁸ Other elected candidates, getting a ride on the Bolsonaro wave were Wilson Witzel, a judge and political novice, elected to the Rio de Janeiro government by the Christian Social Party, and Romeu Zema, businessman and also a novice in elections, elected as governor of Minas Gerais by Partido Novo.

in the patterns of party competition in effect until then. Caught in the wake of a prolonged crisis (starting with the popular demonstrations of 2013 and aggravated by the complaints of corruption revealed by Lava Jato from 2014 onwards), the 2018 election had an overwhelming impact on the electoral performance of traditional parties by breaking the center of the party system and pushing the electorate to extremes in the political spectrum. Meanwhile, the right grew electorally. Led by Bolsonaro, it left behind the stain of the “shamed right wing”, once associated with the political and economic burden of the

Table 5.
Distribution on the left/
right axis* of valid votes and
seats in the 2014 and 2018
elections for the House of
Congress, by party (%)

Parties	Votes (%)		Seats (%)	
	2014	2018	2014	2018
Right	38.4	59.2	41.4	58.6
Center	31.9	15.6	30	15.7
Left	29.7	25.2	28.6	25.7

Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.

* Note: Parties in the left field: PT, PSB, PDT, PSOL, PC do B, PCB, PMN, PPL PSTU, PCO, PV, REDE Center: PSDB, MDB, PTB, PMB, PROS, PPS, SD. Right: DEM, PATRI, PHS, PP, PR, PRB, PRP, PSC, PSD, DC, PRN, PRTB, PSL, PT do B / AVANTE, PTC, PTN / PODE, NOVO.

military regime (1964–1985), and assumed the liberal-conservative agendas, which found fertile ground in the 2018 elections, electing the most conservative Congress in the post-re-democratization period. This right-wing wave that has taken over the country is not limited to just a monolithic group but finds support in different sectors of society.

In an insightful article, Timothy Power and Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira (2019) distinguish four sectors of the Brazilian right. The first, known as political/clientelist right, is formed by parties and politicians with office-seeking motivations, who prioritize participation in government coalitions aimed at accessing state resources, regardless of ideologies. This category includes parties with no program commitments, and they are recognized as “Centrão” (Big Center), made up of office-seeking parties (PMDB), “parties for rent” from right-center (PTB, PR e PP), and tiny parties, usually co-opted by the governments in office.

The other three sectors of the right show greater programmatic adherence and are identified as the economic right, committed to an agenda of pro-market reforms and shrinking of the state; the religious right, identified with evangelical and neo-Pentecostal segments, committed to defending conservative moral agendas, such as opposition to abortion and homosexuality; and the authoritarian right, which combines a radical defense of law and order with a nostalgia for the military regime (Power & Rodrigues-Silveira, 2019, p. 264).

In the 2018 elections, Bolsonaro got himself elected uniting the last three rights – economic, religious, and authoritarian – and explicitly campaigning against the political right, reinforcing the “outsider” aspect of his candidacy. Paradoxically, while presenting himself with an anti-establishment rhetoric, contrary to conventional party politics, Bolsonaro made use of a long tradition of parties with weak programmatic commitments, which work as personal vehicles, and he was elected by a small party – which he joined a few months before the elections. Before that, he had already been in seven right-wing parties.

Once elected, Bolsonaro composed his ministerial cabinet mainly with former members from the three right-wing sectors that occupy important positions, but mainly with military personnel, and refused to negotiate the formation of a government coalition and adopt practices associated with what he called “traditional politics” or “old politics”. Such *modus operandi* caused numerous problems of political articulation and increased the protagonism of Congress in the relationship with the Executive power, which had a low success rate in the approval of executive orders sent to Congress and also a high proportion of presidential vetoes overturned, which earned him the nickname “queen of England”.

Instead of appointing technical members, as he had promised, he formed his cabinet of members of the ideological wing given over to radicalism (formed by his sons and the astrologer Olavo de Carvalho) and turned to the military (retired and active), who began to act as “co-signers” of the government that opted for a minority strategy – unprecedented in the Brazilian coalition presidentialism – in the negotiation with Congress. Without a supporting coalition, he runs the risk of becoming politically isolated and transforming himself into a “lame duck” president. The fact is that not only the absence of a coalition with parliament creates a perception that Bolsonaro is a weak president. Other examples can be seen in the breaking away from his former party, PSL, which occurred when he failed to take command of the party and in the plan to found a new party (Alliance for Brazil), which seems more and more distant. At the end of his second year in office, worn down by his disastrous performance in the health crisis, in a context of increasing unpopularity, he turned to acting strategically with parties attracted by the benefits of public power, forming a government coalition with greater room for maneuver in the Legislative branch.

To do so, Bolsonaro gets closer to the political right (the so-called “Big Center”) and negotiates the nomination of positions in companies and state agencies in exchange for support in Congress, in order to ensure his own survival and prevent a potential impeachment process. However, this approximation with the parties of the so-called “Big Center” should not occur without raising tensions in other sectors of the right and the Bolsonaro’s bases, since Bolsonaro himself was elected – and continued after being elected – with a discourse critical of the “Big Center”, whom he associated with “old politics”.

At the same time that the series of crises contributed to the weakening of the president in relation to the other powers, it has also incited tension between the government branches, with Bolsonaro threatening to adopt illiberal practices. It should not be underestimated, given that he keeps at the center of his government the authoritarian right wing – which is not necessarily the military –, openly hostile to institutions and opposition forces.

Finally, another question that is worth highlighting is the high rate of electoral alienation (sum of blank, null or abstention votes), which, in the first round of voting of the 2018 presidential elections, reached almost 30% of the electorate, i.e., almost one third of eligible voters abstained from choosing of the president. These results indicate that, besides the two blocks of polarization in the dispute, there is still another “third electoral force”, composed of those voters who do not feel represented by any of the candidates. The figure below shows the evolution of voter apathy for first rounds in post-redemocratization presidential races:




Figure 7.
Evolution of blank, null and abstention votes in the first rounds of presidential elections (1989–2018)

Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.

Figure 7 shows that from 2006 on, electoral alienation rates increased gradually over the years, even though voting is mandatory. A probable explanation for this phenomenon is the dissatisfaction with the political scenario, which faces a serious crisis of representation caused, *inter alia*, by the recurrent involvement of the political class in corruption scandals. In this context, it is noteworthy that, in a very polarized election like the one in 2018, about one-third of the total electorate opted out of choosing the President of the Republic, practically the same number of votes that the president-elect received. In view of all this, the high rate of electoral alienation seems to have the source in the discontentment toward representative institutions seen in the nation’s public opinion.

Performance of traditional parties in the 2018 and 2020 elections

Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case

Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues

Finally in this section, we verify in which direction the Brazilian political regime is going with the ascension of Bolsonaroism to power in 2018. Therefore, if there is proof of a decline of traditional parties in 2020, we will be able to affirm that Bolsonaroism was a shift of tectonic plates toward a regime of another nature than that of a competitive democracy. If the return of traditional parties in 2020 is seen, we could classify Bolsonaroism – at least in its most radical form – as what Sérgio Abranches conceptualized as “incidental governments” (Abranches, 2020). To this end, we have prepared tables 6 and 7 which compare the performance of traditional parties in the 2018 general elections with that achieved by the same political agents in the 2020 municipal elections. Traditional parties are those affiliations that have been in the country’s party system since the political opening process in the late 1970s.

The 2018 elections marked changes in relation to previous ones, with a strong shift to the right and the collapse of traditional parties that lost space in the Senate and Congress (PP, MDB, PSDB, PT, and PTB) and the rise of parties that until then had little representation (PSL) and newcomers in elections (REDE and NOVO). This effect was repeated, at least in part, in the 2020 municipal elections, in which, with the exception of DEM and PP, which registered an increase in the number of mayors elected and seats in the city councils, all other traditional parties decreased the number of cities governed and seats occupied in the city councils, compared to 2016.

The 2020 elections were held in an atypical scenario of health restrictions and social isolation resulting from the coronavirus pandemic. The best performances were attributed to the right-wing and center-right parties of the ideological spectrum, such as PP and DEM, which significantly increased the number of municipalities won in 2020. On the other hand, PSDB and MDB were the biggest losers of the executive offices in municipalities. In absolute numbers, PSDB (–277) and MDB (–260) were the parties that lost the largest number of municipalities compared to 2016. Among the parties that are part of the left-wing political spectrum, PT suffered a strong shrinkage since 2016 and, following this downward trend, shrunk even more in municipalities and did not elect a mayor in any of the country’s capitals.

Although traditional parties have lost seats in Congress and significantly decreased the number of elected mayors, parties such as PSDB, MDB, and PT are far from becoming irrelevant. As can be seen, in the 2020 elections, PSDB and MDB partially recover from the strong electoral setback suffered in the 2018 elections, with the MDB being the party that continues to have the largest number of elected mayors in Brazil, governing 784 municipalities in all. The PSDB, on the other hand, although it lost the largest number of municipalities, remained the party that manages cities with the most inhabit-

ants, in total, about 34 million Brazilians live in municipalities governed by the “Toucans”⁹.

Moreover, the results of the 2020 municipal elections represented important defeats for candidates supported by President Bolsonaro, as in the case of Celso Russomano (Republicans), who was eliminated from the second round of the race for mayor in São Paulo, and Marcello Crivella (Republicans), who suffered a crushing defeat in the second round of the race for mayor in Rio de Janeiro. The poor performance of the candidates who were linked to Bolsonaro and associated with the erratic conduct of the president in dealing with the health crisis, contributed to the weakening of Bolsonarism and the loss of the president’s prestige. The following tables present the performance of the traditional parties in the 2018 national and 2020 municipal elections.

Votes and Seats	PP	DEM	MDB	PSDB	PT	PDT	PTB	Blank/Null	Total
Percentage of votes in the House of Representatives	5.6	4.6	5.5	5.9	10.3	4.7	2.1	18.712.260	98.398.564
Number of governors elected	1	2	3	3	4	1	0	21.749.078	27
Number of Senate seats	6	6	12	8	6	4	3		81
Number of seats in the Federal House of Representatives	38	29	34	29	54	28	10		513

Table 6.
Performance of traditional parties in the general elections of 2018 (Brazil)

Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.

Votes and seats	PP	DEM	MDB	PSDB	PT	PDT	PTB	Blank/Null	Total
Percentage of votes for mayor	7.5	8.3	10.7	10.5	6.8	5.2	2.6	10.969.405	100.879.416
Number of elected mayors	685	466	784	522	183	314	216		5.568
Percentage of votes for city councilmen in the city council	7.4	6.6	8.5	6.6	5.6	5.4	3.8	10.138.845	102.802.066
Number of seats in the city council	6172	4187	7109	4270	2575	3326	2375		58.114

Table 7.
Performance of traditional parties in municipal elections of 2020 (Brazil)

Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.

⁹ The figure of a toucan is the symbol/mascot of PSDB.

The first important observation from these results is that from one election to the next there was relative continuity in electoral support for the parties. When we bear in mind the total number of valid votes, there was even an increase in the electorate that opted for a political party when casting their ballots. Although voting continues to be mandatory in our context, the choice of a party is one way of expressing society's electoral preferences. But even with all the process of erosion and disorganization experienced in recent years, Brazilian political parties maintain a significant margin of allegiance by the national electorate.

A second important aspect to note is that, among the older parties, those on right of the ideological political spectrum, DEM and PP, and center-right, PSDB and MDB, increased their electoral political power considerably in the 2020 election. While the parties on the left, PT and PDT, decreased the margin of electoral support and, consequently, control of political positions. There was, therefore, a return of conservative forces to political control of the country.

It is important to emphasize that the Brazilian right-wing segment concentrates the oldest parties, under different names, but long standing in national politics. It is the political family that has persisted from the Imperial Age to the Sixth Republic (1985 onwards). Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power (2000) show that the success of the conservative parties in maintaining political power in much of this period is related to the strategy of conciliation with civilian and military groups at the head of the government coalition at the national level, to the extent that they will remain in power even if in alliance with the forces that were politically opposed to them. Specifically concerning the last democratic transition process, Hagopian (1996), O'Donnel (1996) and Souza (1989) point out that the absence of a rupture between the 1964–1985 authoritarian regime and the so-called New Republic resulted in the continuity of the conservative political elites in charge of the reorganization of the new democratic order.

As was the case in the electoral results in the United States with the victory of Democrat Joe Biden, the growth of right-wing and center-right parties in the 2020 Brazilian municipal elections are indicative that, despite the analytical merit of the mentioned literature on the possibility of internal corrosion of democracies, the thesis regarding incidental rulers was evident in the United States and has strong indications that the same evidence will be seen in Brazil.

Final considerations

In the face of the critical election of 2018, the traditional right parties, associated with the political establishment, displayed resilience and were victorious in the 2020 municipal elections. Even though municipal elections do not have a decisive impact on the national one, past trends can pave the way for the path to future disputes. However, the risks to democracy posed by an authori-

tarian government, elected in 2018 to command the fourth largest democracy in the world, raise an alert about the need to maintain constant vigilance.

The 2018 elections consecrated an extreme right-wing candidate as president of the world's fourth largest democracy. If, on the one hand, his victory, legitimized at the polls, is proof of the consolidation of the democratic system in the country, on the other hand, it has sparked fear of a democratic regression.

This fear is justified when we consider that Bolsonaro has met all four requirements proposed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) to identify potential authoritarian rulers: rejection of or weak commitment to the rules of the democratic game; denial of the legitimacy of opponents; tolerance and encouragement of violence; willingness to restrict the civil liberties of opponents, including the media. In his 28 years as a congressman, Bolsonaro has become notable for his extreme positions and authoritarian bias, with controversial statements not rarely associated with hate speech, disparaging "minorities" (women, LGBT, blacks, and indigenous people) and apology to military dictatorship and torture (Sponholz, Christofolletti, 2019; Smith, 2020). As noted above, the divisive ethos, widely exploited during his campaign, has lasted during the government, which has always been prone to crises and always finds itself in a constant tug-of-war against the Legislative and Judiciary branches.

In the midst of the crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic, Bolsonaro continued to instigate the polarization of society, encouraging participation in pro-government demonstrations and against other branches, ignoring the recommendations of health authorities. Hostility against political institutions and irresponsibility are characteristic of populist-authoritarian politicians, both from the right and the left.

Therefore, a dilemma the democratic process faces is that free and fair elections can elect extremist demagogues who are not committed to institutional limits. This dilemma was emphasized by Fareed Zakaria, in an article written in 1997, in which he coined the term "illiberal democracy" to refer to countries – especially Latin American and Eastern European countries – whose transition to democracy retains traces of the authoritarian period. In the author's words:

Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22)

This phenomenon is extremely challenging since it is the democratic mechanisms of popular elections that allow leaders with authoritarian profiles to come to power (Zakaria, 1997; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). When elected, such leaders subvert the laws for their own benefit, raising the liberal deficit and undermining the system of checks and balances, putting the regime at risk of going down the path of illiberal democracies.

For the first time since the re-democratization, Brazil elected an ultra-rightist as president of the Republic. In this sense, it has come closer to countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, which have elected extreme right-wing populist rulers. As if all the extremist outbursts of President Bolsonaro were not enough, the large number of amendments – and repeals – of decrees and provisional measures have deleterious effects, as they allow the Executive to legislate without the participation of the Legislative branch. In fact, democracy has never been his north. As president, he has further intensified the polarization present in society – as if he were in a permanent campaign – and has been testing institutions and contributing to the corrosion of accountability mechanisms. But unlike his far-right counterparts in European countries – such as Polish President Andrzej Duda and, especially, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – Bolsonaro does not have the popular and congress support necessary to transform the country into an “illiberal democracy”.

According to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), for the preservation of democracy, in addition to official rules, political agents must commit to respecting the informal rules of “mutual toleration”, which means recognizing political rivals as legitimate, and of “institutional forbearance”, which refers to the need for parsimony in the use of legal attributions that, at their extremes, may undermine democratic principles. In this case, challenges to electoral results and impeachment proceedings reveal fragile institutional forbearance. The opposite of institutional forbearance is to play the politics of “constitutional hardball”, when institutions are tested to the limit, generating deep animosity among party adversaries. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) assign political parties the responsibility of preventing the emergence of extremist leaders and selecting candidates who respect democratic rules. On this point, the authors are adamant: “political parties are democracy’s gatekeepers”.

With regard to the Brazilian case, the situation of the party system, disorganized by the 2018 elections and still integrated by a large number of parties that have little representation and limited agendas, is quite challenging. Add to this the incentives for candidates to run for ad hoc parties, which function as mere vehicles for promoting their personal careers. One can see the president of the Republic without a party. In turn, these practices are endemic to party institutionalization, because they cause candidates to place themselves above the parties, seeking legitimacy outside the organizations, which generates incentives for individualism and the proliferation of new parties.

We have long known that populist autocrats use political polarization and partisan intolerance to weaken democracy. As a response to this scenario, Brazilian parties have an essential role not only in promoting tolerance and institutional forbearance, but especially in democratizing social, racial, and gender issues if they truly desire to continue managing social conflicts. After all, Brazil reached the 21st century with a relatively stable democracy in terms of the procedures that regulate political competition, the change of political groups in the control of political power at the municipal, state, and national levels, the con-

figuration of a multi-party system, and the expansion of the electoral civil duty. But, at the same time, it presents deficits of representativity of major population segments, such as women, who represent more than 52% of the national electorate, but currently occupy only 15% of the seats in the House of Representatives and 16% in the Senate. With regard to social requirements, the country has not advanced enough to democratize the access of the majority of the population to social welfare policies, deepening inequality in the distribution of income, education, and health, thus increasing the barriers between social classes.

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**Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case**

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Necropsy on Brazilian Democracy

Necropsia de la democracia brasileña

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ABSTRACT

This article explains by what means ongoing democratic backsliding takes place in Brazil, after the pinnacle of its democratic experience. Unlike mainstream concerns about the death of democracies and the quality of democracy, it started neither by the action of outsiders nor through Executive aggrandizement. Institutions regarded as protectors against abuse of power, such as media, the judiciary, public prosecution, and parliament, led to the disruption of democracy. Consequences were militarization, party system deterioration and undemocratic elections, favoring far-right extremist Bolsonaro.

KEYWORDS: *democracy, coup, lawfare, military, elections, Brazil.*

RESUMEN

Este artículo explica como ocurre el retroceso democrático en curso en Brasil, tras el apogeo de su experiencia democrática. A diferencia de las preocupaciones tradicionales acerca de la muerte de las democracias o de su calidad, este retroceso no empezó ni por la acción desde fuera ni a través del engrandecimiento del Ejecutivo. Instituciones consideradas protectoras contra el autoritarismo, como los medios de comunicación, el poder judicial, la fiscalía pública y el parlamento, llevaron a la ruptura de la democracia. Las consecuencias fueron la militarización, el deterioro del sistema de partidos y las elecciones no democráticas, que favorecieron a Bolsonaro.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *democracia, golpe, guerra jurídica, militares, elecciones, Brasil.*

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Introduction

Despite not being free of problems, the end of military rule in 1985 led to the most stable and deeply democratic age in Brazilian history. Indeed, Brazilian hegemonic Political Science used to believe that democratic resiliency in the country was safe, as the institutionalization of the party system, free elections and Executive-Legislative relations seemed to be far advanced (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999; Palermo, 2000; Limongi, 2006).

However, the Brazilian case is an example of how democratic backsliding may be much faster than the progressive advancement of democracy. We may consider that Brazil's democratization process reached a pinnacle with the acceptance of electoral defeat by Fernando Henrique Cardoso's Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) in 2002 and the alternation of power, followed by 13 years in which left-wing Workers' Party (PT) governed, winning four fully democratic elections in a row, with presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff being elected. The dramatic end of that age leads to a fast democratic backsliding, as will be explained in this text.

Brazilian polity is also a useful example to discuss how some usual assumptions in political science may be misleading, as I will do in this article. The death of democracy happened in a way that diverges from mainstream diagnostics according to Levitsky's or Runciman's models (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Runciman, 2018). Indeed, some upcoming reasons were already indicated in a previous text of mine with a similar title: "How democracy dies" (Reis, 2015). By ignoring some core elements, it is not possible to understand Jair Bolsonaro's phenomenon: he is not a cause of democratic breakdown, but rather its consequence and enhancement. Also, as I will discuss later, those authors emphasize a pernicious role of outsiders and support barriers as a solution. However, those very barriers may be undemocratic; they are supporting a specific market-oriented policy and not properly democracy. According to Webster's Dictionary, autopsy (or necropsy) may be defined as "a post-mortem examination to determine the cause of death". Of course, you may identify precisely the defunct. Authors are discussing the death of democracy but looking to a wrong corpse. I will address this problem in "The downfall" section.

The improvements and disruption of Brazilian democracy may be graphically noticed as measured by V-Dem indices for different conceptions of democracy (Coppedge *et al.*, 2017): Electoral, Deliberative, Liberal, Participatory, and Egalitarian (Figure 1). There was a sharp improvement in re-democratization in 1985 and the new Constitution in 1988, a slighter one in the election of Lula in 2002, and a dramatic slump since the 2015 economic crisis and 2016 coup.

This text aims to make a necropsy on Brazilian democracy, exploring how it died. It will be organized this way: in the following section, I will make a brief overview of Brazilian undemocratic history and explain why those 13 years should be considered the most democratic ever. After that, the analysis will




Figure 1.
Indices for different conceptions of democracy

Source: V-Dem (Electoral Democracy Index; Deliberative Democracy Index; Liberal Democracy Index; Participatory Democracy Index; Egalitarian Democracy Index).

move to the de-democratization process that began when Rousseff was ousted from the presidency, divided into three more sections besides the conclusion.

Undemocratic chain

Brazilian history is mostly not a democratic one. Independence from Portugal in 1822 was followed by the introduction of an Empire in which the king had substantial powers, always having the last word due to what was euphemistically called the Moderator Power, not being analogous to current parliamentary monarchies. The proclamation of the republic in 1889 was a military coup, with the introduction of the so-called Sword Republic not leading to more civil liberties than the previous regime. Five years later, it was succeeded by the Old Republic, in which election frauds were the rule, and most of the time rural oligarchies from the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais took turns holding the presidency. Besides that, merely 5% of people voted for president in that First Republic. That undemocratic electoral regime ceased with the Getúlio Vargas coup, known as the Revolution of 1930, which led to the forging of many important institutions, state-owned companies, and social welfare in Brazil. In 1937, that dictatorship centralized its power even more, starting the so-called New State.

Brazil would know a polyarchic regime (Dahl, 1971) only after the end of the New State, in 1945. However, the very first election was disputed by military candidates and, only three years afterward, the recently legalized and electorally strong Communist Party was made illegal again. Elections were not characterized by easy acceptance of the ballot results, and among the most

turbulent events, we may highlight the failed assassination attempt of uncompromising opposition leader Carlos Lacerda in August 1954 and the Vargas suicide in the very same month, not to mention coup attempts (Santos, 2017).

The left-wing Brazilian Labour Party was growing from election to election (Soares, 2001) and indeed had a vice president, João Goulart, who became president after conservative Jânio Quadros resigned from office. However, the Armed Forces only accepted Goulart's presidency after a change in the system of government, from presidential to parliamentary since presidents in the latter usually have much less power than in the former. Goulart accepted those terms, but the regime returned to presidentialism after the people's decision in a referendum in 1963. Once more, most of the Armed Forces did not tolerate this and a coup d'état in 1964 ousted the president and led to 21 years of violent military dictatorship.

Although considered by Alvarez *et al.* (1996) as democratic, the first presidential election in 1985 was indirect, just like the ones held under dictatorship. Additionally, as the winner Tancredo Neves died before the beginning of his term, Vice President José Sarney took office. I must also mention that illiterate people were not allowed to vote throughout Brazilian republican history until the enactment of the 1988 Federal Constitution. The very first free election, in 1989, with biased participation of the press (Goulart, 2008), was followed in 1992 by the impeachment of Fernando Collor, accused of corruption.

In any event, stability endured ever since. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, elected in 1994, had a majority coalition and could make neo-liberal state reforms with strong parliamentary support (Palermo, 2000). On the one hand, the government coalition schemed to change the rules to allow Cardoso to be re-elected in 1998 (Rodrigues, 2014). On the other hand, he did accept his party's candidate's electoral defeat in 2002 and Brazil saw a democratic alternation of power, with left-wing Lula da Silva as the new president.

During their three and a half presidential terms, PT's governments strengthened predictable enforcement. The autonomy of the Federal Police and Public Prosecutor's Office has been considerably increased compared to previous governments, which closely controlled investigations themselves. However, the public's perception of corruption increased, due to the media and the Judiciary "criminalization of politics" (Santos, 2017; Marona & Barbosa, 2018; Feres Júnior & Sassara, 2018; Veiga *et al.*, 2019), reaching its worst level one year before the 2016 coup, according to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer, and worsening again in 2017 as inducted president Michel Temer reversed policies against corruption (see Figure 2).

Other measures taken by the PT strengthened checks on the Executive. For the head of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic (and also the heads of the federal universities), the president of the Republic could choose any candidate from a "triple list" (a list comprised of three names, the first of which received the most votes from her or his colleagues); although, different from previous officeholders, Lula and Rousseff always chose the first name on




Figure 2.
Corruption Perceptions Index 2017

Source: Transparency International / Global Corruption Barometer.

the list, the most voted one. In addition to this, Rousseff enacted a law that stated that only policemen at the top of their career with the Federal Police could be chosen as the Director-General of that bureau. Lula and Rousseff could also indicate most of the justices of the Supreme Court but made no partisan choice.

Additionally, Lula created or re-created national conferences and councils to spread the people's participation in public policies, such as those for the Promotion of Racial Equality, for Women's Rights, for Fighting Discrimination, for Disabled People's Rights, for Elderly People's Rights, for the Youth, and Cities, as well as the National Commission of Indigenous Policy (Pogrebinschi, 2010).

The downfall

Great waves of massive, heterogeneous popular protests in 2013 (Bringel, 2013; Reis & Soares, 2017) began a change in the mood of Brazilian politics, with less acceptance of the rules of the game, great dissatisfaction with political parties, and less control by traditional organized social movements. This article will focus, hereafter, on the eight-year period until the beginning of 2021, in a declining democratic trend.

The media narrative that PT's corruption broke the Brazilian economy (Azevedo, 2017, for example) boosted the anti-PT and anti-politics feelings and desire for a political change, be it democratic or not, and without a clear

direction, favoring someone not identified with political class (Reis & Soares, 2017). The bad economic moment also impacted people's perceptions, and GDP growth in Brazil was almost null in 2014 and fell again in 2015, keeping the same negative outcome in 2016, as Figure 3 shows. The economic crisis was considerably caused by the way corruption investigations in Operation Car Wash were held by judge Sérgio Moro and Federal Police, affecting state oil company Petrobras, engineering and construction companies, and investments (Belluzzo, 2018).




Figure 3.
GDP Growth in Brazil

Source: Tinoco & Giambiagi (2018, p. 9).

Cardoso's party PSDB lost the runoff against the PT for the fourth time in 2014, but its candidate, Aécio Neves, did not accept the result, differently from the previous three defeats. The second term of Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff, would suffer undemocratic pressures until its premature end (Santos, 2017).

Rousseff's impeachment process, distinctly from Collor's, had no relation to corruption. The accusation of manipulating the federal budget dealt with measures which happened in previous and subsequent national and local governments, being neither serious enough (Carvalho, 2018, pp. 105–115) nor enough of a felony to be considered what is known in Brazil as a "crime of responsibility", the type of crime necessary for an impeachment to take place. Only two days after the impeachment was concluded, the same maneuver of which Rousseff was accused was fully legalized in a bill. Indeed, majority opposition sought an excuse to oust an undesired president (Löwy, 2016; Semer, 2016; Reis, 2017). It means that elections in Brazil ought not to be considered democratic any longer, as they are not decisive (O'Donnell, 1999) and do not follow the rule of the ex-post irreversibility (Alvarez *et al.*, 1996).

The impeachment was transformed into a vote of no confidence, like the one that exists under parliamentary systems, what is obviously illegal and ignores the popular sovereign decision in a previous direct election for a limited and fixed presidential term. Therefore, it has been called a "coupeachment" (Klein, 2016) or an institutional, constitutional, or parliamentary coup (Löwy,

2016; Santos, 2017; Pereira da Silva, 2018). By stretching the rules, the opposition disrespected core elements of democracy, with the practical consequence of making any left-wing government unfeasible. This was made clear by the speech of the opposition leader in the lower house, PSDB Congressman Miguel Haddad, during the impeachment process:

Today, we are no longer judging only the nature of the many crimes committed by President Dilma Rousseff which are shown daily in the newspaper headlines. What we are deciding today with our vote in the Chamber of Deputies and afterwards in the Senate is the future of a country destroyed by a president of the Republic who, with arrogance, 1) humiliated the parliament; 2) ruled with her back to the people, who expected from her leadership better days and a better life but received deception and systematic lies; and whose loyalty is not to the nation nor to Brazilian people but to her narrow-minded ideology.

Additionally, other than the intention of a policy switch (Stokes, 2001; Reis, 2016), a reason for the coup seems to be stopping corruption investigations (Fernandes, 2016), as a famous leaked telephone statement from Senator and future Minister of Planning Romero Jucá shows: “It is necessary to change the government to stop this ‘bleeding’ [... in a great national agreement] with the Supreme Court and everything else.” Traditional pro-coup parties such as PSDB and Temer’s Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) were also associated with corruption by voters, having a much worse electoral performance than the PT in 2018, as Figure 4 shows. The situation favored outsiders and back-benchers, such as far-right extremist Jair Bolsonaro (Reis & Soares, 2017), whose Social Liberal Party (PSL), tiny before his candidacy, became the second largest one in the lower house.¹

There is a wave of political science best-sellers concerned about the democracy crisis in the world and the advancement of extremism, often presenting it as the death of democracy. Although agreeing with this general trend, I shall caution about core problems in the definition of the concept of democracy. Consequently, its autopsy is recurrently misdirected: while some democratic elements are perceived as risks, there are undemocratic ones that are presented as a remedy or as minor mischiefs.

Przeworski’s (2019) assumptions share Schumpeter’s idea that “the democratic method never works at its best when nations are much divided on fundamental questions of social structure” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 298). Indeed, Przeworski (2019, p. 20) considers that: “When political parties are highly ideological, when they believe that essential issues or values are at stake, they see their opponents as enemies who must be prevented from coming to office

¹ By the end of 2019, Jair Bolsonaro withdrew from PSL, having no party ever since. Only one of his sons remained as a PSL member, congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro.




Figure 4.
Number of seats in Lower Chamber (selected parties)

Source: Author (using data from *G1*, 08 October 2018).

by any means.” According to him (Przeworski, 2019, pp. 18–19), the stability of democracy depended on a specific agreement: working-class parties accepted capitalism, unions moderated their demands, and “bourgeois parties and organizations accepted some redistribution of income”, with governments organizing that compromise. The difficulty for preserving that arrangement came from the loss of class roots and ideology by political parties, and from the fact that “unions lost much of their capacity to organize and discipline workers”. Those very changes would have as an effect higher income inequality with a reduced slice of the pie for workers. It would make voters susceptible to “populist” speech on the left as well as on the right.

Mainstream political science often shares that perception and expects that responsible governance lies in moderating demands and accepting that *status quo*, not “expecting too much from democracy”. Just like what happens among most of the old established political parties while holding office in Western Europe. According to that approach, changes should be the least dramatic possible, taking place only when they are almost consensual, in the Burkean way (Burke, 1790). However, all outsiders, either anti-neoliberal left-wing or far-right extremists, are equally labeled as “populists”. Any challenge to that political-economic consensus is viewed as radicalization and as a danger to democracy. Political science often follows the Schumpeterian idea that the value of democracy lies in stability and that no bond between popular preferences and implemented policies may be a serious concern.

Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) consider as democratic, even quoting Madison, a polity ruled by an establishment that makes all efforts to avoid any volatility or renewal, by building entrance barriers. That establishment, grounded in pre-existent political parties, is compromised with both endogenous tolerance and free-market policy. According to these authors, outsiders, either

anti-neoliberal left-wing or far-right extremists (they mention a wide variety of politicians from different times and places), were expected to increasingly use demagogic speech (which is, at once, anti-elite and authoritarian) and erode democracy from inside. Therefore, even hard means to take out those outsiders may be acceptable or at least understandable²:

[...] demagogue's initial rise to power tends to polarize society, creating a climate of panic, hostility, and mutual distrust. The new leader's threatening words often have a boomerang effect. [...] the opposition may conclude that, for the good of the country, the government must be removed via extreme measures – impeachment, mass protest, even a coup. (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 76)

Legislatures may also overindulge their constitutional prerogatives. Take the 2012 impeachment of President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay. Lugo, a leftist ex-priest, was elected in 2008, ending the Colorado Party's sixty-one-year run in power. An outsider with few friends in congress, Lugo faced impeachment attempts throughout his presidency. [...] According to one observer, the trial was an "obvious farce.... Lugo's impeachment barely even rose to the level of show trial." Strictly speaking, however, it was legal. (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 110)

Runciman (2018) is also concerned about “right and left populists” and so does he see a crisis in a modern democracy. Attacks on representative government that are not led by militaries, but by businessmen and bankers, are viewed in a variety of ways throughout the book: as conspiratorial theories, as metaphors of coups, as disguised coups, or as distortions on democracy. Runciman emphasizes more the difficulty to undoubtedly identify a subtler coup than gives answers. In any event, he is also not very concerned about a connection between preferences and policies, in two main ways: 1) like Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), he does not see economic elites biasing outcomes as a major problem, and 2) similarly to Przeworski (2019), he considers that democracy is going to end just because of increasing popular demands for solutions (“supercharged solutionism”) and claims for personal recognition (“supercharged expressionism”), the very elements he pointed out as what makes democracy worth (respect and long-term benefits). According to him, they would be increasingly not possible together anymore.

² Authors do say that those actions are “constitutional hardballs”, which violate “norms of toleration and restraint”, but the examples they use throughout the book show more indulgence towards establishment players than when it comes to outsiders. A good example is how they discuss George W. Bush's role. They imply that his USA Patriot Act was “authoritarian”, or an “abuse of power” (p. 93) and they affirm that during his government there was a “decline in forbearance”; however, they also say that only since Trump's candidacy “the window was now also open to true outsiders” (p. 53). Levitsky and Ziblatt's (2018) many given examples of establishment players overturning democracy do not lead them not to relate intolerance to outsiders.

The debates on democratic backsliding in world politics are often directed towards the issue of Executive aggrandizement. It is a historical concern in liberal and republican roots of political thought (Locke, Burke, Montesquieu, and Constant, for instance). The need for “horizontal accountability” (O’Donnell, 1998; Diamond & Morlino, 2005) has been expressed mainly because of this. Therefore, some variables on which literature focuses the most are media integrity, judicial independence, and effective parliament.

According to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Indices, all three had been quite stable in Brazil since the enactment of the new Constitution in 1988, until suffering a sharp decrease since the 2015 economic crisis (see Figure 5). However, the democratic breakdown in 2016 was caused by a cartel agreement between those very actors: the media, Judiciary and Parliament majority (Perissinotto, 2016; Reis, 2017; Santos, 2017; Chalhoub & Lima, 2018; Engelmann, 2018; Feres Júnior & Sassara, 2018; Marona & Barbosa, 2018), backed by then-Vice President Michel Temer.




Figure 5.
Media Integrity, Judicial
Independence, and Effective
Parliament

Source: GSoD Indices 2019.

There is a new and subtler kind of coup that is becoming more common in Latin America than old-style military ones (Coelho, 2016; Löwy, 2016; Santos, 2017; Pereira da Silva, 2018). Those who control the Judiciary and do not suffer opposition from the Armed Forces, whether in the Executive or not, may be able to oust the opposite side if there is no tolerance and the conflicts are not *de facto* regulated by institutionalized rules – like well-known distinctions between “antagonism” and “agonism”, and between “adversaries” and “enemies”, according to the concepts developed by Mouffe (2000, 2005). Protests both in favor of and against the coup happened, but violent police repression victimized those who tried to avoid a democratic breakdown.

As a matter of fact, Rousseff had already enacted a criticized Anti-Terrorism Bill which could be used against activists, and indeed it became an obstacle to those who attempted to defend the president herself against the coup. Before “coupeachment” there was also a process of expansion of Military Justice responsibilities, with consequences such as lack of checks on law enforcement misconduct by officers, particularly with the increasing use of the National Public Security Force in major police operations (Lessing, 2018; Del Río & Gomes, 2018; Del Río & Rodrigues, 2018). This situation, however, would worsen with the new government, as will be explained in the following section.

Militarization

Quite unpopular, Temer assured his survival in office not only by bargaining with Parliament, the Judiciary, and businessmen but also through militarization of his regime. Temer recreated the Cabinet for Institutional Security, to be led by General Sérgio Etchegoyen, a fierce critic of the National Truth Commission and a relative of key repressive agents of the previous military dictatorship (Reis, 2016). Temer also chose a military officer for Minister of Defense, which had not happened in Brazil since the end of Cardoso’s first term as president, in 1999 (Arias, 2018). However, the most radical decision by Temer towards militarization was perhaps the unprecedented authorization of federal military intervention in public security in the state of Rio de Janeiro. In practice, this put the head of that operation above the state governor himself with regards to law enforcement, being different from the aforementioned operations by the National Public Security Force (Lessing, 2018).

Before the presidential election, Presiding Supreme Court Judge Dias Toffoli invited General Fernando Azevedo e Silva, a member of the military close to Bolsonaro³, to be his personal advisor (Brigido & Sassine, 2018). Toffoli also said that the putsch of 1964 should not be called a coup, but a “movement”, adding that people “chose to blame the military” but the left was also responsible for that situation. Bolsonaro began his political career after retiring as a military officer and always defended not only conservative views but also narrow military interests, including refusing any criticism or punishment for the military dictatorship.

As a presidential candidate, Bolsonaro chose General Hamilton Mourão to be his vice president. A strong supporter of Bolsonaro’s candidacy, General Augusto Heleno Pereira has been chosen to be one of his closest advisors, as the head of the Institutional Security Cabinet (Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, GSI). Additionally, Bolsonaro appointed members of the military

³ Eventually, Azevedo was appointed as minister of Defense by Bolsonaro. However, their relationship worsened due to disagreements concerning pandemic and, in March 2021, he was fired, in a decision with unpredictable consequences.

for an unparalleled number of offices and the management of the largest slice of budgetary pie since the end of military dictatorship. That includes state-owned firms and many positions in the cabinet, including Civil House (chief of staff) and even Health during COVID-19 pandemic (Vianna, 2021).

In a public demonstration of authoritarian far-right agenda, GSI head General Heleno informed that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency was spying on Brazilian cardinals because of the meetings with Pope Francis about the Synod of Bishops for the Pan-Amazon region. According to him, those were “alarming” meetings towards a “progressive agenda” and opposition to the government which needed to be “neutralized”. By “progressive agenda” he meant the discussion on climatic changes and the lives of indigenous peoples and *quilombolas* (traditional black communities that descend from former slaves). More recently, referring to an investigation on charges against Bolsonaro, Heleno said that “it is inconceivable and even unbelievable”, and then threatened by stating that “it may lead to unpredictable consequences to national stability”.

Not only an authoritarian and violent faction of the Armed Forces is important inside Bolsonaro’s government, but also there are clues of connections with mafia-like paramilitary groups called “militias” (Paiva & Do Sul, 2019; Calixto, 2019).⁴ Following Bolsonaro’s path, there was also an increase in the number of military candidates and voting winners in the elections for many offices.

According to Cheibub (2006, p. 18), “the military, once activated into politics, are hard to control”, and that is the reason why authoritarian legacies may lead to shorter-life democracies, particularly if they follow military dictatorships. Indeed, as General Eduardo Villas Bôas admitted, the Army High Command planned together a message published by him on Twitter inducing the Supreme Court to deny Lula’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Together with other stages of Lula’s judicial process, it biased presidential elections, an issue I will address in the following section.

Undemocratic election

Far-right personalistic extremism represented by new president Bolsonaro has been boosted by the undemocratic disruptive behavior of institutions that are supposed to put checks on government. Therefore, more attention should be directed to the private media and the Judiciary, not to be taken for granted as neutral actors.

Favorite to win the 2018 presidential election, former president Lula has been condemned and lost his political rights in a politicized judicial process (Weisbrot, 2018; Marona & Barbosa, 2018) in which his constitutional right to

⁴ In order to read more about how militias work, see Phillips (2018) and Manso (2020).

due process was disrespected. Plea bargaining (*delação premiada*) “Snitching Rewards” were adopted in Brazil in a biased way, disrespecting due process and transferring the burden of proof to the accused (Avritzer, 2018). Sérgio Moro, the same judge who condemned Lula with no material evidence to prove the corruption charges against him in the Car Wash Operation in a lawfare case (National Coordination of the Homeless Workers Movement, 2018; Marona & Barbosa, 2018), was rewarded by being chosen as the Minister of Justice and Public Security by then president-elect Bolsonaro.⁵

Public prosecutors involved in the Car Wash Operation and judge Moro schemed together in order to have support in the media and to impact elections, concerned about not allowing PT’s success. It became clear when some private chats between them in the Telegram application were leaked (Duarte, 2020; Estrada, 2021). Brazilian Public Prosecution, following Thatcher and Sweet’s (2003) discussion on delegation, is a non-majoritarian institution, that is, it is not accountable to people’s democratic vote. Considering the authors’ model, it is a non-majoritarian institution with a broad and eventually enlarged *ex-ante* agency and exposed to very little *ex-post* control, enjoying a substantial “zone of discretion”. Therefore, we ought to acknowledge that its misuse of power is no less harmful to democracy than the issue of Executive aggrandizement.

Lula led all the polls, and his interdiction predictably changed the election result (see Figure 6). Although the PT’s alternative for the presidential race, Fernando Haddad, grew in the polls and reached the runoff, he was far from Lula as a favorite against Bolsonaro, who was already in the lead in the polls when Lula’s candidacy was not considered as an option. Then, a biased judicial process determined the result of the 2018 Brazilian presidential election (Londño & Casado, 2019), which must not be considered fair.

However, other serious problems also happened in this electoral process. Bolsonaro, in both his 28-year career as Congressman and in his presidential campaign, manifested intolerance against the left, support for the violation of human rights and the military dictatorship, and offended minorities and vulnerable groups, such as women, blacks, indigenous peoples, and homosexuals (Forrest, 2018). While running for president, he stated that PT politicians and supporters should be shot by a firing squad and that they would be sent to Ponta da Praia, an execution site during the military dictatorship. Unsurprisingly, widespread violence accompanied his campaign, at levels unparalleled with previous national elections. Bolsonaro himself has been stabbed, in not yet fully known circumstances.

Besides his hate speech, some illegal elements may have helped in Bolsonaro’s triumph. The extremist contender’s businessmen supporters allegedly paid for sending voters massive fake news against PT candidate Fernan-

⁵ It was such a powerful new Ministry, controlling most of the law enforcement institutions, that it has been called a “Super-Ministry” by the press.




Figure 6.
Presidential polls – 12 April
2016–18 September 2018

Source: Datafolha and Ibope presidential polls – 12 April 2016–18 September 2018.

do Haddad through the messaging application WhatsApp (Tardáguila *et al.*, 2018). If these accusations are true, different kinds of electoral crimes have been committed: 1) electoral financing by firms is illegal in Brazil; 2) spreading fake news is obviously not permitted; 3) paying for flooding messages in WhatsApp during political campaigns is not allowed either.

Conclusion

As discussed in the present text, literature on democracy backsliding is often misleading. Executive aggrandizement or direct military intervention are often seen as the main (or unique) causes of democratic breakdown. Though, there are other monsters besides Leviathan killing democracy. Institutions responsible for checking may wreck democratic order in an “antagonist” way (contrary to an “agonic” behavior), such as the Judiciary. While searching for “populists”, political science may neglect subtler coups and undemocratic schemes caused by the establishment.

Indeed, the very presidents accountable for the deepening of check instruments on Executive in Brazil were punished by them. Rousseff suffered a “coupeachment”, and Lula became a political prisoner, unable to run in the election in which he led the polls. Besides the intended policy switch to the right, other side effects may be noticed in Brazilian politics since democracy ceased to be a commitment, returning to its undemocratic chain. First of all, the party system has been harmed, and the main parties that opposed PT shrank while backbenchers became more influential. Secondly, militarization grew both inside the government and on elections, what may lead to a rougher

democratic breakdown in a near future if they behave as veto players or simply do not accept to leave. Thirdly, Brazilian society is not only divided, but violent values became more mainstream and openly sustained. As elections are no more the only game in town, and when they happen, there is no ex-post irreversibility, polity also became less predictable, with a broader range of variables to impact.

The Car Wash Operation ended in February 2021. In March, the Supreme Court cancelled Lula's conviction and also considered former judge Sergio Moro as suspect of bias. Lula became eligible again. Perhaps the road back to democracy began to be traveled. Alternatively, maybe the road is still too long, and militaries will be blocking the passage.

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**Necropsy on Brazilian
Democracy**

Guilherme Simões Reis

Ação política do Partido Militar no Brasil sob Bolsonaro

Political Action of the Military Party in Brazil under Bolsonaro

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RESUMO

Discute-se aqui a adequação do termo Partido Militar para avaliar a presença castrense no governo Bolsonaro. Para este fim, resgata-se tanto a literatura sobre partidos políticos em geral quanto aquela que conceitua Partido Militar no Brasil. Em seguida, analisa-se a participação dos seus quadros atualmente no Executivo federal. A metodologia empregada combina releitura bibliográfica com a análise quantitativa dos militares que ocupam cargos comissionados no núcleo do governo Bolsonaro. Conclui-se que o Partido Militar guarda características dos partidos de quadros e dos partidos de massas, conformando um híbrido que é hoje o principal partido de sustentação do governo brasileiro.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: *Partido Militar, partidos políticos, forças armadas, militarização, bolsonarismo.*

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ABSTRACT

The paper discusses the accuracy of the term “Military Party” to understand the current military presence in the Bolsonaro administration. We argue that “Military Party” has the characteristics of both cadre and mass parties, being a hybrid that is currently the main support party of the Brazilian government. The article starts by reviewing previous studies that conceptualized the “Military Party” in Brazil as well as the literature on political parties in general. Then, we present an empirical evaluation of military officers presently working in the Federal Government. The methodology combines a literature review with the quantitative analysis of the military occupying high commissioned positions at the core of Bolsonaro government.

KEYWORDS: *Armed Forces, Bolsonarism, Military Party, militarization, political parties.*

Introdução

A participação das forças armadas (FA) na política, bastante comum ao longo do século XX em toda a América Latina, parecia ter se modificado nos últimos trinta anos, uma fase que os estudiosos das relações civis-militares chamavam de “retorno aos quartéis”. Os acontecimentos políticos do último lustro, especialmente no Brasil, apontam que as portas da caserna nunca estiveram fechadas.

Há várias formas de ação dos militares na política, aqui distingue-se pelos menos três: a institucional – quando a participação se realiza em nome da instituição “Forças Armadas”; a corporativa – quando ocorre pela atuação de *lobbies* ou de representações políticas e sindicais, sejam essas militares ou não; e a pessoal – quando militares, comissionados ou reformados, exercem um papel constitucionalmente reservado aos civis, seja por mandato atribuído pelo poder político, seja por ascensão ao poder pelo voto no Legislativo ou Executivo (Saint-Pierre, 2004, p. 123). Neste texto, compreende-se a ação política do Partido Militar (ParM) como uma combinação das três possibilidades aqui indicadas, predominando a ação corporativa.

Muitos pensam a participação política dos militares, entre estes: Janowitz (1964), Perlmutter (1969), Finer (1975), Moskos e Wood (1988) e Huntington (1996); e para o Brasil: Stepan (1975), Coelho (1976/2000), Quartim de Moraes (1987), Rouquié (1990), Ferreira (1988; 2000) e Carvalho (2005). Em toda essa literatura, a presença dos militares na política é a regra, e não a exceção. Os golpes militares são apenas os momentos mais espetaculares dessa participação.

O efeito negativo desta participação sobre as democracias liberais é elemento comum aos autores mencionados, enquanto a quem cabe maior responsabilidade – se aos próprios militares, aos civis, ou ao sistema político – é o que os faz divergir. Baseando-se nesse leito, é possível afirmar que, analisando a atual presença castrense no cenário brasileiro, os militares voltaram para ficar. Por isso,

neste artigo debruça-se sobre uma possibilidade de análise dessa participação: a constituição de um instrumento de natureza partidária.

Segundo Janowitz (1985, p.131), embora os militares se interessem por política, eles nutrem grande antipatia por políticos e pelos partidos, considerados incompetentes e corruptos, não compreendendo seu papel criador no processo político. “É a política de querer estar acima da política”. Assim, mesmo empregando um termo que, em geral, militares não gostam de ver associado a eles, pretende-se avaliar sua validade explicativa para a situação atual brasileira.

Para alcançar os objetivos elencados, dividiu-se o texto em três seções. Na primeira, resgata-se brevemente a noção de partidos políticos para, na sequência, retomar o esforço de outros sobre o termo partido militar. Depois, é oferecida uma formulação teórica atualizada de ParM. Já na terceira parte, a formulação teórica é confrontada com a análise da ocupação dos cargos comissionados no núcleo do governo Bolsonaro pelo ParM. Assim, pretende-se verificar como as características elencadas na discussão teórica se manifestam atualmente. Estas são completadas por algumas considerações finais.

Partido político: resgate conceitual necessário

Segundo a definição de Weber (1999, p. 75), partido político é uma “associação que visa a um fim deliberado”, seja este fim a realização de um plano com intuítos materiais ou ideais (a exemplo de um projeto nacional); “pessoal”, isto é, destinado a obter benefícios, poder e, conseqüentemente, glória para os chefes do partido e seu séquito; ou ainda os dois conjuntamente. Para Oppo (1998, p. 890), essa definição coloca em relevo três questões. A primeira, o caráter associativo voluntário dos partidos; a segunda, a natureza das ações partidárias orientada à conquista do poder político de determinada comunidade; e a terceira a multiplicidade de motivações que levam à ação política. Trata-se de definição bastante ampla, que compreende desde associações formadas por vínculos pessoais até as complexas organizações burocráticas dos partidos de massa, que têm em comum seu *locus* de atuação: a esfera do poder político.

Ainda para Oppo (1998, p. 899), é a ampliação da cidadania que exige o desenvolvimento dos partidos políticos, como representantes de partes organizadas do povo no sistema político. A crescente demanda por participação exigiu também a expansão da função dos partidos, que passaram a ser vistos não apenas como representantes de segmentos, mas também como responsáveis por educar e organizar as classes subalternas para a política, formando novos quadros.

Os primeiros partidos, porque representavam e formavam interesses bastante específicos, hoje chamam-se partidos de quadros. Para tal classificação, pesou bastante a organização leninista do partido comunista que, segundo Hobsbawn (1995, p. 66), era “extraordinária”, pois impunha aos seus membros “disciplina militar” e “obtinha dos seus membros uma grande dose de entrega e sacrifício”.

Independentemente do número de filiados, nesses partidos de quadros, todas as posições internas ou de atuação na sociedade eram eletivas, e os escolhidos eram subordinados às regras e decisões do partido. A tarefa de representação institucional (nos parlamentos) era considerada secundária, devendo subordinar-se à ação de massas. Assim, não havia a predominância dos parlamentares eleitos.

Com a expansão do sufrágio, a maioria dos diferentes segmentos sociais caminhou para a conformação de partidos eleitorais de massa. Diferente do primeiro, esse tipo de partido não se dirige a estratos sociais específicos, mas sim à sociedade em geral, apresentando plataformas amplas e flexíveis cujo objetivo é cativar grandes segmentos de eleitores.

Nesse modelo, os eleitos, e não os eleitores, ganham maior proeminência, resgatando a ideia dos partidos de notáveis, agora associada à popularidade ou a capacidade de financiar as eleições. Por isso, esses partidos são chamados de *catch all* (pega tudo) ou partido ônibus (Mainwaring, 1991). Por pretender representar um espectro amplo do eleitorado, o verdadeiro partido de massas invariavelmente caminharia para um discurso não polarizado, intermediário e mais ou menos vazio, o que caracteriza o centro político (entre a esquerda e a direita) (Dows, 1999).

No partido de massas, a disciplina partidária é bastante frouxa, sendo mais comum a organização em torno dos eleitos. Para autores como Schumpeter (1984), esses partidos são veículos criados por empresários políticos e destinados a objetivos pessoais, pois os espaços de representação são secundarizados em privilégio de ações para a sua clientela de origem, sejam estas empregos ou recursos.

Duverger (1987) é quem melhor sintetiza as características dos tipos de partidos políticos, organizando o partido de quadros e de massas em dois polos. No entanto, ele informa que o sistema partidário incorpora distintas combinações desses dois polos, já que o surgimento desses tipos de partido não pode ser entendido de forma evolutiva, como se o nascimento de um tipo extinguisse o anterior: diferentes tipos de partido coexistem no sistema partidário (Oppo, 1988, p. 902).

O rápido resgate da literatura sobre partidos políticos emoldura o que aqui é chamado de partido militar (ParM), cuja caracterização e forma de ação política é o objetivo deste ensaio. Não se trata de classificar o ParM como partido de massas ou de quadros, mas informar que, embora este não esteja disponível à representação da cidadania nacional, comporta-se como um partido e influencia a organização do sistema partidário.

Partido Militar como partido político

Avaliar as ações políticas do setor militar não implica em escamotear as especificidades das instituições armadas bem pontuadas por Finer (1975), como o monopólio da força das armas, a organização corporativa pautada pela hie-

rarquia e disciplina, e o sentimento de pertença a um coletivo maior que si mesmo, o “espírito de corpo”. A isso cabe agregar uma característica fundamental: “o princípio constitutivo” das FA é a honra (categoria moral), o que é contrário àquele que organiza a política estatal, que é a Lei (categoria penal). “(...) Lei e Honra são princípios constitutivos que modelam a adesão das consciências individuais aos valores que cada um desses princípios traz implícito (...)” (Ferreira, 2007, pp. 53–54).

A escolha da expressão ParM para pensar a situação atual deve-se, além da sua capacidade explicativa, à sua efetividade pedagógica, uma vez que ajuda os setores da sociedade distantes da temática militar a associar a atuação política de membros das FA com outras práticas adotadas por distintos segmentos sociais na arena política. Assim, o termo ajuda a mostrar como uma determinada fração organizada das FA ganha funções elementares dos partidos políticos, como articulação política, representação de interesses, coesão e organização de vontades individuais.

O termo ParM foi anteriormente utilizado por Ferreira (2000) e Rouquié (1990) para analisar a ação política das FA no Brasil. Outros autores, como Quartim (1985), também o empregaram como metáfora. Eles não discutem propriamente o conceito de partido. Essas diferenças no emprego de um mesmo termo foram uma das motivações para este texto, apresentadas a seguir.

Ferreira (1988; 2000; 2007) argumenta que no Brasil, dada a falta de organicidade das classes sociais – ou seja, “não tem projeto específico enquanto classe” (2007, p. 89), somada à organização do sistema eleitoral – onde a forma majoritária para o Executivo faz com que, aos olhos do eleitor, este aparente ter maior legitimidade que o Legislativo, eleito proporcionalmente –, faz com que as FA apresentem-se como única classe organizada que, para atuarem na política, conformam uma organização semelhante a um partido político. Elas o fazem porque tem quadros preparados, a força das armas e considerável coesão interna (1988).

Ferreira (2000) assinala que o partido fardado¹ não é algo formal para a disputa de eleições, mas uma organização temporária, que só se evidencia em momentos de tensão interna nas FA ou de desencontro entre a instituição e o governo, precisando, portanto, de uma situação social favorável à politização militar. Nessas situações, tal partido revela-se um centro aglutinador no qual as discussões processam-se de modo a construir um discurso coletivo, numa

¹ Ferreira não utiliza o termo Partido Militar, mas sim “Partido Fardado” ou “Partido da Ordem” – aqui avaliando que a evolução política no Brasil está marcada pelo embate entre “ordem” (patrimonial) e “revolução” (burguesa) – ou ainda “Ponto”, neste caso sublinhando a característica burocrática da instituição militar, especialmente quando contrasta seu papel frente à “Banca”, que representaria os interesses das classes dominantes. Segundo o autor, os momentos de maior presença do partido fardado na política brasileira acontecem quando há uma espécie de “empate” entre os interesses das classes no assalto ao Estado, ou quando os interesses da “classe militar” divergem dos da classe dominante – o que aconteceu apenas uma vez, na abolição da escravidão. Consulte-se os capítulos iniciais de Ferreira (2007).

lógica mais semelhante aos partidos proletários. Ferreira ainda pontua que esse centro aglutinador não tem autoridade sobre o conjunto militar “que tende a se dissolver passado o momento agitado em que as FA se movem para efetuar mudanças na sociedade ou em si mesmas” (Ferreira, 2000, pp. 43–44).

Perspectiva diversa é apresentada na coletânea *Os Partidos Militares no Brasil*. O emprego no plural do termo antecipa visão distinta do fenômeno relativamente àquela acima resumida. Usa-se o termo para questionar o lugar-comum de que as FA são um ator monolítico, enfatizando como a política penetra no aparelho militar e vice-versa. Os autores apontam que existe uma tensão permanente entre as tendências políticas organizadas no seio do Exército e a própria instituição. Mas essas tendências internas podem ou não coincidir com correntes da opinião civil, o que impacta na capacidade de massificação dos projetos do ParM no conjunto da sociedade.

Para Rouquié (1990, pp. 9–21), o Exército brasileiro é um espelho deformador das tensões da sociedade, ou seja, os problemas nacionais são refratados internamente pelo prisma institucional. Como grande exemplar dessa conversão, o autor aponta o estudo de Domingos Neto, presente na mesma coletânea (pp. 43–61), que mostra como preocupações que inicialmente eram de natureza profissional, transformam-se em questões político-partidárias. Acrescenta-se que o espelho de Rouquié é um espelho côncavo, pois a lente institucional concentra as informações filtradas do exterior, tornando-as mais agudas.

A questão do momento político é importante para pensar a atuação explícita do ParM (Ferreira, 2000). Todavia, a partir do entendimento de que partidos são partes organizadas do povo no sistema político, nada indica que militares não desejassem ter seus representantes, mesmo que esse sentimento esteja latente e não se expresse diretamente na arena pública. Nesse sentido, Finer (1975) e Coelho (2000) convergem ao apontar que não há nada de normal na não participação dos militares na política. Assim, considerando o grau de comprometimento de segmentos castrenses com o governo Bolsonaro e suas candidaturas ao Legislativo, pode-se dizer com relativa segurança que os militares voltaram para ficar na arena política. Por isso, pretende-se entender como este segmento armado se organiza e atua.

É possível perceber um grau de associativismo entre os militares que foram para a política, daí apontar-se para a organização partidária. Mesmo que isso não ocorra formalmente, a socialização totalizante das FA nas escolas militares e na carreira gera o que Ferreira (2000) chamou de “nação dentro da nação”, de maneira que cada militar considera que críticas dirigidas às FA, ou a cada força singular, atingem-no individualmente, e vice-versa. Em outros termos, em virtude da sua forma de socialização particular, mesmo quando na reserva, militares não tendem a atuar na política como meros indivíduos, e sim como grupo.

Perceber que os militares se organizam para atuar na esfera política, mantendo e ampliando seu poder político, não implica afirmar que essa organização tomará a forma de um partido. Também não quer dizer que o partido buscará

oficializar-se por meio da definição de uma legenda registrada no Tribunal Eleitoral.² Por isso, concorda-se com a afirmação de Ferreira (2000): a finalidade do ParM não é a eleição dos seus, mesmo que essa questão seja considerada relevante.

Quanto à estrutura, o ParM reproduz as características do mundo castrense, quais sejam, a hierarquia e a disciplina. Portanto, ele não se organiza ao redor de notáveis eleitos, e sim ao redor de totens ou o mais próximo disso possível. Mesmo com as reformas castelistas³, totens continuam existindo (Ferreira, 2000, p. 59): o sucesso de tais reformas está em que a posição de totem é ocupada pelos generais de Exército, que comandam as FA e o ParM. Embora possam existir pressões vindas de baixo, apenas com a autorização do Alto Comando algumas atividades podem ocorrer, portanto, os caciques políticos desse partido precisam ocupar (ou já ocuparam) posições hierarquicamente superiores na Instituição militar.

A estrutura do partido é piramidal, como nos partidos socialistas, mas no lugar de organizações locais – regionais – nacionais, as instâncias decisórias seguem a estrutura das FA, partindo dos oficiais generais até as praças. Combinada às características do mundo militar, a tendência oligárquica apontada por Michels (1982) se aprofunda, pois, as bases de fundação do partido – autoridade e disciplina, são as mesmas da Instituição militar. Assim, os membros do ParM são fortemente disciplinados, mas não faz sentido uma discussão sobre a democracia interna ao partido para a tomada de decisões.

Por outro lado, há que não se desconsiderar as relações horizontais no processo de recrutamento. No interior das FA existem subgrupos que se desenvolvem como equipes da mesma idade, que estudam juntos, têm a mesma patente, servem no mesmo lugar, compartilham histórias e até mesmo relações familiares. Em geral, dois oficiais de uma mesma turma (definida pela entrada em uma das academias militares, equivalente ao curso superior civil) se mantêm em contato e se apoiam mutuamente, não importa o motivo ou o lugar em que estejam servindo. Assim, as relações políticas no campo militar ocorrem também de forma horizontal. É dessa maneira que se transmitem ideias, análises e posições políticas. Assim, o ParM atua em diálogo com a “família militar”, misturando aspectos públicos e privados.

O ParM tem uma organização estável, com um corpo de funcionários pagos para desenvolver atividade política e um programa político sistemáti-

² Existe movimentação antiga nesse sentido, partindo de um conjunto de policiais militares que tenta, sem sucesso, registrar formalmente um partido com o nome de Partido Militar Brasileiro <https://aopm.com.br/partido-militar-brasileiro-contagem-regressiva/>

³ Reformas produzidas pelo Marechal Castelo Branco quando no exercício da presidência da República (1964–1967). Além de dotar o país de uma nova Constituição, ele reformulou todo o estatuto militar, os regimentos e regulamentos das FA com o fito de modernizá-las. O objetivo primordial de tais modificações era o de impedir a formação de lideranças (o que Ferreira chama de totens) transversais à hierarquia. O principal mecanismo para tal foi o estabelecimento de regras rígidas de promoção e tempo certo de permanência em cada posto militar.

co. Para resolver o problema do financiamento, se aproveitam de estruturas tais como associações – a mais importante são as ADESG, Associação dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra – e clubes militares espalhados pelos estados, para promover espaços de discussão dos problemas políticos nacionais.

Por outro lado, o ParM tem uma desvantagem diante dos partidos civis, que é a liberdade de movimentação dos seus quadros articuladores, particularmente quando estão na ativa. Por isso, uma vez que estes não estão sujeitos às mesmas amarras do Estatuto Militar, os militares da reserva, bem como a “família militar”, assumem o protagonismo na articulação do Partido. Segundo a Lei 7524/86, o militar inativo pode “opinar livremente sobre assunto político, e externar pensamento e conceito ideológico, filosófico ou relativo à matéria pertinente ao interesse público”. Isso não implica que estes sejam os comandantes do partido, pois quem está na ativa tem o poder de abrir ou não as portas da Instituição para os militantes do partido.

Registre-se que o ParM evoluiu junto com o processo político brasileiro. Parafraseando conhecida expressão de Góis Monteiro, as FA deixaram de fazer a “política no Exército”, praticada no início do século XX, para fazer a “política do Exército”, cujo ponto culminante foi realizado ao longo do regime burocrático-autoritário (1964–1985) (O’Donnell, 1990) quando facções internas do ParM levaram a cabo seus projetos políticos, como exemplifica o “Programa de Metas e Bases para a Ação do Governo”, apresentado em 1970 pelo general-presidente Médici (1969–1974), e o II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (1974–1979), desenvolvido por Geisel (1974–1979).

Diferentemente do ParM que atuou sob o Regime Autoritário, que se assemelhava aos partidos socialistas, cuja principal meta de poder é realizar um programa, o ParM que hoje se conhece aproxima-se muito mais do partido *catch all*, sem conteúdo programático (embora com sólida formação ideológica), com alto proselitismo e com objetivos claros de ocupação e manutenção de cargos na burocracia estatal. Nesse sentido, é uma organização muito mais corporativa do que de representação institucional ou pessoal.

O poder partidário não advém do número de cargos que ocupa no Estado, mas essa é uma questão relevante. As FA sempre administraram a área da defesa, mesmo após a criação do Ministério da Defesa e nomeação de ministros civis, independente do grupo político à frente do Executivo. Também por isso sabem como funciona a máquina pública, sendo capazes de identificar posições estratégicas nos ministérios.

Diferente de Rouquié (1990), não se percebe atualmente a existência de vários partidos militares no interior das FA. Isso não significa que o ParM seja homogêneo e monolítico. O ParM comporta tendências internas, mas estas estão em forte coesão ao redor da unidade da corporação e da ‘família militar’; do sentimento de superioridade diante do mundo político-jurídico do sistema partidário; e da sua maneira de ver a ação política, pautada pela ideia de amigos e inimigos, sejam eles reais ou imaginários.

Retomando as variáveis do quadro proposto por Duverger (1987), quanto à origem, o ParM surge do centro aglutinador e depois se espalha por diretórios. Quanto à morfologia, são altamente centralizados e hierárquicos, assim como as FA. Têm um alto constitucionalismo partidário, mesmo que esse ocorra por canais informais como encontros de turmas, datas comemorativas e a intrincada rede de atividades sociais das FA. Têm uma estrutura simples, e baixa burocratização, pois estes já são cumpridos pela Instituição militar.

Quanto às características fisiológicas, o ParM não necessariamente apresenta seus próprios membros às eleições, mas se preocupa com a vitória eleitoral, pois disso depende a ocupação de cargos governamentais e a conquista de políticas públicas para as suas bases. Porém, ao contrário dos partidos políticos tradicionais, o ParM não precisa atentar-se à formação de seus quadros, uma vez que a tarefa de educação política já é cumprida pela própria Instituição, desde as escolas militares até a ESG. A ideologia ocupa uma função preponderante, e os interesses doutrinários e da própria corporação tem mais espaço nos debates que os interesses pessoais. Em função da hierarquia e disciplina que existem nas FA, a disciplina partidária é alta e os processos decisórios são simples.

Em resumo, o ParM une as diferentes vontades individuais em um discurso coletivo partidário fortemente ideológico e, para isso, cuida da educação política dos seus quadros. Não é monolítico, ou homogêneo, mas é bastante coeso. O partido representa os interesses corporativos, priorizando políticas públicas e a ocupação de cargos pela sua própria base, mas também participa, direta ou indiretamente, de eleições e interpreta a Constituição segundo seus interesses, desejando massificar na sociedade seus entendimentos sobre o país. Seu núcleo duro é permanente, e não ocasional ou reflexo de regimes políticos, sendo responsável por estabelecer alianças e fazer articulações políticas que, em algum momento, aumentam seu poder. Seus aliados principais, e a ele subordinados, são aqueles oriundos das forças de segurança (policiais, bombeiros, militares reformados, ex-funcionários de empresas de segurança privada etc.) filiados a distintos partidos políticos, especialmente aqueles classificados à direita no espectro político. A estrutura organizativa do ParM repete a das FA, baseada na hierarquia e disciplina, e se aproveita de estruturas estatais para o seu funcionamento. Por isso, é um partido com alta disciplina partidária e processos decisórios simples e hierarquizados, comandado por generais de Exército que transmitem suas opiniões políticas ou ocupam estruturas partidárias de cima para baixo, numa lógica piramidal. Generais da reserva desfrutam de especial protagonismo por deterem maior liberdade de ação. O ParM transfere para a política raciocínios de guerra e paz, amigo e inimigo, o que impacta profundamente o sistema político. Por fim, diferente de qualquer outro partido político, o ParM mantém relações diretas com a força das armas.

Mesmo enfraquecida ao fim do regime burocrático-autoritário, a Instituição militar foi exitosa em fazer uma transição “transada” (Share e Mainwaring, 1986) e construir uma memória positiva sobre o regime dos generais. Por outro lado, o ParM se enfraqueceu em virtude da saída do governo e da

“crise de identidade” que se instalou nas FA após a Guerra Fria (Coelho, 2000). Mas o ParM não se dissolveu, e sim voltou-se para dentro, em um período de hibernação, cuidando da sua autopreservação (inclusive geracional), e repensando sua atuação organizativa nas fileiras das FA e fora delas.

Sob o aparente retorno aos quartéis em um processo de construção do controle civil da defesa e das FA, foi-se reformulando as bases para o retorno do ParM à cena política. O primeiro momento fundamental desse processo foi o da Constituinte (1987–1988), quando, por meio de um bem montado *lobby* e contando com assessorias fardadas em vários gabinetes, os militares garantiram para si prerrogativas que nenhum outro grupo social, organizado ou não, foi capaz de construir (Oliveira, 1994, pp. 127–130). Garantida sua autonomia e manutenção da exclusividade na condução da defesa nacional – o Ministério da Defesa viria a ser criado apenas em 1999 –, os militares voltaram para seu estado de hibernação, assim permanecendo, com alguns poucos episódios de ação pública avaliados como irrelevantes pela opinião pública nacional.

Assim, embora emergjam na cena pública com Temer, o ParM vinha se reorganizando desde o fim dos anos 1990, tendo crescido a partir de duas atividades: os megaeventos esportivos – Copa do Mundo e Olimpíadas, que possibilitaram a reconstrução/ampliação de redes com as elites civis, fragilizadas após o fim do regime militar; e a missão da ONU no Haiti⁴, que promoveu a atuação das FA como organizadores do Estado no sentido amplo (indo muito além da segurança pública, especialmente após o furacão que destruiu o país em 2010), reavivando a já histórica prática em segurança interna e fortalecendo laços com oficiais de outros países, particularmente dos EUA. Retornam dessas funções ansiosos por reconhecimento político. Na falta desse reconhecimento nas proporções e moldes esperados, criou-se uma questão militar a ser resolvida⁵.

Se essas atividades permitiram a reorganização do ParM, a eleição de Bolsonaro possibilitou que o Partido chegasse ao poder, e são muitos os sinais que deseja ali permanecer.

O Partido Militar no governo Bolsonaro

Desde o início do governo Bolsonaro, muitos militares ocuparam cargos chave em diversas estruturas de governo e reivindicaram assuntos do seu interesse, como o controle da Amazônia. A relação entre o ParM e Bolsonaro já passou

⁴ Essa reorganização está claramente documentada na série de entrevistas dos *force commanders* da MINUSTAH concedidas a Celso Castro de Adriana Marques (2019).

⁵ Há quem defenda que foi a “questão militar” (1883–1887), motivada, segundo os militares, pelo sentimento de orfandade que animou a tropa vitoriosa no Paraguai, que levou à participação fundamental das FA no movimento republicano – foram elas que proclamaram a República (Cf. Ferreira, 2007). As contradições da atual “questão militar” podem ser percebidas pela leitura de Castro e Marques (2019).

por diferentes momentos, trazendo reflexos para a Instituição FA. Todavia, essa relação não é objeto deste texto. Repetindo, o objetivo aqui é seguir na identificação das características desenhadas para o ParM. Para isso, passou-se à análise quantitativa dos militares que ocupam cargos comissionados no governo Bolsonaro à luz da discussão apresentada⁶.

A fonte utilizada para a análise é a resposta dada pela Casa Civil da Presidência da República ao Requerimento de Informações n. 660/2020⁷, de autoria dos deputados Patrus Ananias, Ivan Valente, Helder Salomão, Nilto Tatto, João Daniel e Valmir Assunção; e o requerimento 647, do deputado Danilo Cabral, ambos solicitando informações sobre os militares nomeados em cargos comissionados no Executivo Federal.

A Casa Civil enviou os dados de toda a estrutura da Presidência da República, defendendo que apenas pode responder a informações de sua própria responsabilidade, e não de toda a administração federal. Assim as informações são relativas: Casa Civil, Secretaria de Governo, Secretaria Geral, Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, Gabinete Pessoal do Presidente da República e Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos. Embora não abranjam toda a administração pública, o que seria necessário para uma discussão sobre a militarização do Estado, os dados oferecidos são uma amostra suficiente para o objetivo desse texto, pois permitem identificar o perfil dos quadros destacados pelo ParM e seu *modus operandi* no núcleo central do governo. O universo total da amostra são 341 pessoas.

É possível que essa amostra não abranja todos os militares nas pastas, pois ela se restringe àqueles que ocupam cargos de chefia, assessoramento ou direção. Diferente da investidura em cargos provenientes de concursos públicos, as nomeações para tais cargos são de livre nomeação e exoneração, portanto, discricionárias da cúpula do governo. Ressalte-se que dada a dinâmica de nomeações e exonerações, a amostra se refere ao extrato de pessoal na data de resposta ao requerimento: 6 de julho de 2020.

Existem diversas modalidades de funções comissionadas, mas neste texto, interessam particularmente os cargos de Direção e Assessoramento Superiores (DAS) e as Funções Gratificadas pelo Exercício de Cargo de Confiança Devidas a Militares (RMP). Essa segunda modalidade só pode ser atribuída a servidores de carreira ocupantes de cargo efetivo em casos, condições e percentuais mínimos previstos em lei, sob a lógica de formação de uma burocracia profissional. Esclarecendo: um ministro não pode preencher todos os cargos comissionados sob sua responsabilidade apenas com recrutamento externo. Por lei, ele necessita atribuir parte dessas funções aos servidores pú-

⁶ Sublinhe-se que a regra constitucional vigente (art. 142, III) permite que militares da ativa continuem ligados às FA caso tomem posse em cargo, emprego ou função pública civil temporária e não eletiva.

⁷ Quando for necessária a menção a esta fonte, ela será anotada como “Resposta CC”.

blicos concursados e em exercício da carreira pública. Por isso, uma parte dos militares ocupando cargos em comissão necessariamente precisa ser da ativa.

Os DAS e os RPM estão sujeitos ao teto salarial do serviço público⁸, hoje definido em R\$39.200,00. No caso dos servidores efetivos nomeados (militares da ativa), a remuneração é regulamentada pelas Leis 11.526/2007 e 12.094/2009. O valor da remuneração dos RMP, em dados de 2019⁹, é baixo, variando entre R\$1.077,15 e R\$ 1.734,92. As comissões em formato de DAS, por sua vez, variam entre R\$2.701,46 e R\$ 17.327,65. Aquelas mais cobiçadas são as DAS 4, 5 e 6, e aquelas consideradas de natureza especial, todas correspondendo às remunerações acima de 10 mil reais.

Pelo decreto 9.732, de 15 de março de 2019, o governo definiu alguns critérios gerais e específicos mínimos a serem atendidos para as nomeações de comissionados conforme cada cargo. Gerais são, por exemplo, idoneidade moral, reputação ilibada e perfil profissional ou formação acadêmica compatível com o cargo para o qual foi designado. Para as mais altas funções exige-se também experiência profissional de 5 anos de atividades em áreas relacionadas; ter ocupado cargo ou função equivalente a DAS-3 ou superior na administração pública direta ou indireta por no mínimo 3 anos; ou ser mestre ou doutor em área correlata àquela do cargo ou função.

Se tais regras apontam para profissionalização do serviço público, o próprio decreto indica que o responsável pela nomeação pode dispensar esses critérios, desde que justifique a medida. Assim, a decisão final, reconhecida pela Lei, é ato discricionário da autoridade responsável pela nomeação. Ou seja, a escolha é, em última instância, política.

A respeito, sublinhe-se que a utilização dos DAS para compor o governo com quadros políticos alinhados ideologicamente não é uma inovação desse governo, mas uma prática consolidada, sendo possível conhecer bastante sobre a base de sustentação política de cada governo, analisando quem são seus comissionados. Dado que o ParM é o principal partido de sustentação do governo Bolsonaro, é esperado (embora não positivo para a democracia e para a Instituição FA) encontrar quadros desse partido nos cargos comissionados do núcleo do governo.

O governo dispõe de um total de 950 cargos comissionados (DAS) para as pastas aqui analisadas. Destes, 141 estão ocupadas por militares, ou seja, quase 15%. Essa informação é relevante para mostrar o peso que os quadros do ParM têm no conjunto das nomeações do governo, como ilustra a Tabela 1:

⁸ A Advocacia Geral da União emitiu parecer favorável à solicitação do Ministério da Defesa para que seja possível acumular dois pagamentos de uma mesma fonte pagadora (governo federal), como é o caso dos militares que estão na reserva (recebendo a aposentadoria) e são nomeados para altos cargos no governo. O somatório das duas remunerações ultrapassaria o teto salarial. O tema é atualmente objeto de controvérsias.

⁹ A lei 13.328 de 2016 estabeleceu um cronograma de reajustes nos valores dos cargos comissionados.

	Total DAS	% ocupada por militares
Casa Civil	229	10
GSI	71	N.A *
Gabinete Pessoal	123	19
Secretaria de Governo	157	15
Secretaria Geral	332	17
Secretaria Assuntos Estratégicos (SAE)	38	21

*Uma vez que o GSI tem muitos militares nomeados através de RPMs, e não como DAS, o raciocínio aplicado para os demais não funciona.

Fonte: elaboração própria a partir da “Resposta CC”.

Analisando individualmente, além do GSI, a pasta que possui o maior número proporcional de militares em cargos comissionados é a SAE, com quase um quarto dos seus nomeados em DAS provenientes das fileiras militares. Por outro lado, a pasta em que esse índice é menor é a Casa Civil.

Salta aos olhos que, no universo de 341 pessoas, 303 são militares das FA, ou seja, quase 90% do total. Essa informação reforça que o ParM faz alianças mais amplas com membros das demais forças de segurança, mas os mantém subordinados a ele. E mais, acrescenta que na partilha dos cargos comissionados no governo, o ParM mantém para si quase a totalidade deles. Também a proporção entre as forças singulares mostra que é no Exército que está o núcleo duro do ParM.

	Total	Percentual (%) *
Exército	216	71
Marinha	45	15
Aeronáutica	42	14
TOTAL	303	100

* Optamos por arredondar as porcentagens para facilitar a leitura e análise dos dados.

Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.

Como indicado, o Exército predomina, com 71% dos indicados. Nesse sentido, tem continuidade a história brasileira em que o Exército sempre se impôs sobre as demais forças singulares, exercendo o comando em virtude de seu peso numérico. Entretanto, ao analisar a proporção dos comissionados diante do efetivo total de cada força separadamente, essa predominância deve ser relativizada. Marinha e Aeronáutica mantêm perfis de ocupação mais discretos que o do Exército, 15% e 14%, enquanto sua proporção poderia ser de 17%.

Ação política do Partido Militar no Brasil sob Bolsonaro

Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil

Tabela 1.
Total de cargos DAS por pasta analisada

Tabela 2.
Origem dos membros das forças armadas

Sabe-se que em todo partido há uma hierarquia interna. Todavia, se nos partidos políticos ela está vinculada à capacidade de angariar votos, no ParM ela reproduz a origem de formação, a Instituição militar. Os dados abaixo permitem a reflexão sobre como as diversas patentes presentes no ParM estão distribuídas pelo núcleo do governo.

Classificação	Patente*	Comissionados	Percentual (%)
Praças	Soldado	1	0,3
	3º Sargento	3	1
	2º Sargento	19	6,3
Subtotal		23	7,6
Oficiais Subalternos	2º Tenente	13	4,3
	1º Tenente	17	5,6
Subtotal		30	9,9
Oficiais Intermediários.	Capitão	64	21
Oficiais Superiores	Major	54	17,8
	Tenente Coronel	26	8,5
	Coronel	75	24,7
Subtotal		155	51
Oficiais gerais	General de Brigada	8	2,6
	General de Divisão	6	2,0
	General de Exército	7	2,3
Subtotal		21	6,9
	Não identificado	10	3,3
TOTAL		303	100

Tabela 3. Patente dos membros das forças armadas comissionados

* Uma vez que são a maioria, optamos por apresentar a nomenclatura das patentes utilizada pelo Exército, que possui seus correlatos na Marinha e Aeronáutica.

Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.

A Tabela 3 mostra a quase completa ausência de praças ou oficiais subalternos entre os quadros indicados pelo ParM, o que parece inconsistente com a forma como Bolsonaro construiu sua carreira política, apresentando-se como representante da “família militar”. Na hora da partilha das cadeiras, contudo, o ParM, comandado pelos oficiais gerais, praticamente não contemplou as baixas patentes no núcleo do governo.

Chamam a atenção os 21 oficiais gerais, com destaque para os ministros-gerais Heleno, Ramos, Braga Netto e Flávio Rocha. Essa predominância indica que é acertada a avaliação de que a organização do ParM mimetiza àquela das FA. As demais cadeiras são ocupadas por capitães e pelos oficiais

superiores. Há um leve predomínio dos coronéis, numa proporção média de 7 oficiais superiores por general.

Sabe-se que a participação feminina nas fileiras militares é ainda muito baixa. Não é diferente no estudado aqui. Na amostra analisada existem 11 mulheres, 3 delas pertencendo ao Exército, 4 à Marinha e 4 à Aeronáutica. Portanto, uma vez que reproduz características da Instituição militar, o partido é comandado por homens. Porém, ao contrário da predominância da força terrestre tanto no governo quanto na direção do ParM, há maior participação feminina advinda das demais forças.

A maior proporção na Marinha (9%) e na Aeronáutica (9,5%) relativamente ao Exército (1,4%) provavelmente acontece por dois motivos. O primeiro, por terem aberto suas fileiras a mais tempo para a presença feminina¹⁰, elas já estão em postos mais graduados e são mais conhecidas internamente a ponto de gozarem de maior legitimidade para as indicações. O segundo, os quadros de comando do ParM nessas forças são mais abertos à presença de mulheres. Seria possível também aventar hipóteses como a de que elas têm relações familiares com outros quadros do ParM também destacados para a atuação no governo, mas os dados disponíveis não permitem esses cruzamentos.

Quanto ao local de atuação, das 11 mulheres, 8 (mais de 70%) estão alojadas na Secretaria Geral da presidência da República, à época comandada por um membro do que poderia ser chamado partido fardado¹¹ – aquele que reúne todas as forças de segurança, e possivelmente, com atribuições similares àquelas em geral atribuídas as mulheres pela sociedade: secretárias e auxiliares em serviços administrativos.

Relativamente à distribuição dos quadros do ParM pelo núcleo do governo, a maioria dos quadros ocupados por militares estão no GSI, totalizando 56%. Como apontado na Tabela 4, este é o espaço mais militarizado do núcleo do governo.

A tabela também permite ver certa simetria no recrutamento de cargos comissionados militares entre a Casa Civil, o Gabinete Pessoal do Presidente e a Secretaria de Governo, entretanto, a Casa Civil tem uma estrutura muito maior que as outras duas pastas, o que indica que, comparativamente, ela é menos militarizada do que outras, provavelmente também acomodando os indicados pelos aliados no Congresso.

Já foi apontada forte presença de altos oficiais e de oficiais gerais entre os nomeados. Todavia, a legislação obriga que uma parte dos cargos comissionados seja distribuída entre servidores efetivos. Por isso, é previsível a presença

¹⁰ O tema não é objeto deste texto, mas importa registrar que a incorporação feminina na Marinha se realizou em 1980 para o Corpo Auxiliar, tendo passado para o efetivo de fato e de direito apenas em 1998; na Aeronáutica aconteceu em 1982 e no Exército em 1992, para o Quadro de Serviço. Em 2012, legalizou-se o ingresso feminino para todas as armas – com exceções pontuais –, inclusive as combatentes, para as três forças. A respeito do tema na América Latina, veja trabalho seminal organizado por Mathias (2009).

¹¹ Quando do levantamento dos dados, o ministro-chefe da Secretaria Geral era Jorge Oliveira, policial militar reformado (desde 2013), alçado ao Tribunal de Contas da União em dezembro de 2020.

Estrutura Administrativa	Indicados	Proporcional (%)
Casa Civil	23	7,5
Gabinete Pessoal do Presidente	23	7,5
Gabinete de Segurança Institucional	169	55,9
Secretaria de Governo	24	8
Secretaria Geral	56	18,5
Secretaria Especial de Assuntos Estratégicos	8	2,6
TOTAL	303	100

Tabela 4.
Lotação dos membros das FA na Presidência da República

Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.

Situação Funcional	Números Absolutos	Percentual (%)
Ativa	208	68
Reserva	94	32
TOTAL	303	100

Tabela 5.
Situação funcional dos comissionados na Presidência da República

Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.

de cargos comissionados preenchidos por militares da ativa, representando 68%, como apontado abaixo:

Há segmentos militares que argumentam que os comissionados na ativa estão cumprindo funções de natureza militar, por exemplo no GSI, e que essa era uma prática comum a outros governos. Para testar esse argumento, optou-se por, em primeiro lugar, destacar os cargos comissionados DAS das funções militares comissionadas, ambos ocupados por militares.

Função	Absolutos	Proporcional
DAS	133	44
NE e ministros	8	2,6
Função militar	162	53,4
Não identificado	8	2,6
TOTAL	303	100

Tabela 6.
Funções comissionadas ocupadas por militares

Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.

Verifica-se, o argumento acima não se sustenta, pois os comissionados que cumprem funções militares podem ser atribuídos a pouco mais de 50% da amostra.

Para identificar melhor o perfil dos principais quadros do ParM, foi separada uma nova amostra, destacando apenas aqueles nomeados em DAS superior (níveis 4, 5 e 6, remuneração maior que R\$10 mil/mês), os ocupantes de cargos de natureza especial e os ministros. Essa segunda amostra equivale a 94 pessoas. Segundo a hipótese levantada, esses são os quadros dirigentes do ParM que foram destacados para o núcleo do governo.

Nessa nova amostra, 72,4% correspondem a militares na reserva ou reformados, o que coaduna com os apontamentos já apresentados, do papel da reserva na articulação política do ParM, uma vez que tem maior autonomia de movimentação.

Quanto à distribuição entre as três Forças, a Aeronáutica sofre uma retração e a Marinha se mantém, o que faz com que o Exército chegue a quase 80% do total de ocupação de cargos. Sob esse aspecto, é possível aventar que a Aeronáutica destacou para o preenchimento dos cargos comissionados militares que efetivamente estão cumprindo funções militares e, por isso, sua representação é menor nessa segunda amostra, estritamente política.

Relativamente à lotação dos membros das FA nestes estratos, os dados apontam a absoluta continuidade da predominância do GSI como local para os quadros do ParM, e a completa militarização dos altos cargos do Gabinete, quase 90%. Os números da cúpula da SAE também impressionam, com quase 40% de militares.

O cruzamento das variáveis força singular de origem e local de lotação permitem aventar nova hipótese sobre o funcionamento interno do ParM. No debate teórico, assinalou-se que o ParM não é homogêneo, mas que suas tendências internas não derivam de conflitos ideológicos. Cruzando as duas variáveis, observa-se que entre os 14 militares da Marinha na amostra, 6 estão na SAE, comandada por um Almirante. Sob a mesma lógica, chama a atenção o fato de que na Casa Civil, todos os militares nomeados pertencem ao Exército. Por isso, levanta-se a hipótese de que uma questão orientadora que orienta a organização das tendências internas ao ParM são as afinidades corporativas. Explorar-se-á esta hipótese em outros trabalhos.

Ainda sobre a ocupação dos estratos DAS superiores, as informações quanto à patente apontam que existe uma **única praça (segundo sargento)** entre os nomeados, servindo no gabinete pessoal do presidente. Mesmo os oficiais subalternos somam apenas 8,5%, mantendo a média já apontada. Outro dado interessante é a ampliação da proporção de oficiais superiores, notadamente de coronéis. Coronéis representam 51% de todos os indicados do ParM para os altos cargos do governo. Dado que o ParM não é um partido formal, sendo impossível analisar “fichas de filiação”, fica a hipótese de que, em seus quadros de direção, predominem os coronéis. Essa presença pode ter relação com a própria maneira como se organiza a carreira militar, pois os coronéis normalmente já cumpriram os cursos de Estado-Maior, entretanto, enfrentam o funil de ascensão ao generalato – a maior parte dos militares segue para a reserva como coronel, portanto.

Os oficiais gerais ocupam a segunda posição nos cargos DAS deste estrato (21,3% dos cargos), com 20 generais, entre estes os 4 ministros. Existem quatro oficiais gerais na ativa: um Brigadeiro do Ar e dois Generais de Divisão, os três servindo no Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, e o Almirante Flávio Rocha como Secretário.

Considerações finais

Neste texto, buscou-se apontar como a nova presença militar no atual governo encontra guarida no que chamamos de ParM. Por meio de um sobrevoo combinado pela literatura que trata de partidos políticos com a de partido militar, buscou-se apontar como a expressão “Partido Militar” é representativa da hodierna forma de atuação política das FA.

Ao estudar o ParM, verificou-se que ele guarda muitas semelhanças com os chamados partidos de quadros, mas destes se afasta no que se refere ao conteúdo programático dos partidos: mais que um programa a dirigir suas ações, o ParM busca especialmente objetivos corporativos.

Comparando-se a ação política do antigo partido militar (até 1985) com a do atual, especialmente avaliada pelos dados quantitativos de ocupação de cargos DAS, verificou-se que a reforma promovida por Castelo Branco foi feliz para impedir a apresentação para o público externo (civil) de lideranças castrenses do oficialato superior, pois são os oficiais gerais que representam (são porta vozes) não apenas da tropa, mas também do ParM. No entanto, a reforma não foi suficiente para impedir que os coronéis atuem como correia de transmissão doutrinária do partido, se constituindo como as lideranças portadoras da vontade do partido.

Por outro lado, confirmou-se a tradição de predominância do Exército frente à Marinha e Aeronáutica na distribuição de cargos. É daí que deriva outra hipótese apontada pelo estudo: tendências internas constituídas pela afinidade corporativa.

Outra tendência do estudo é a maior presença de militares reformados enquanto a voz da caserna, ao menos para o exterior. Isso decorre da sua liberdade para fazer proselitismo político – Heleno é o exemplo mais explícito –, sendo a nomeação para cargos a compensação pelo serviço.

O estudo mostrou ainda que, dos setores do governo analisados, o que congrega o maior número de cargos comissionados ocupados por militares está no GSI. Cabe lembrar que o GSI foi extinto pela presidenta Dilma Rousseff (o que por muitos é avaliado como o estopim final da relação entre a ex-presidenta e os militares) e reorganizado por Sérgio Etchegoyen ainda no governo Temer. Até que ponto esta não é uma maneira de mandar um recado

para as forças de oposição? Esta é uma pergunta que só no futuro se poderá responder.

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Indicators of Authoritarian Behavior of Political Leaders. The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)

Indicadores de comportamiento autoritario de líderes políticos: el caso Bolsonaro (2019–2020)

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ABSTRACT

Based on indicators of the authoritarian behavior of political leaders developed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), this paper examines the political discourse, stances, and attitudes of Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil, during his first two years in office. The research uses a qualitative case study approach centered on literature review, with emphasis on chapters of books and journal articles, as well as news reports for an empirical observation of the behavior of the president of Brazil concerning rules and institutions of democracy. The essentially authoritarian behavior of Bolsonaro signals a trend toward democratic regression in Brazil; however, it is not technically correct to affirm that Brazil is already being governed through an authoritarian regime.

KEYWORDS: *democracy, authoritarianism, Brazil, Bolsonaro.*

RESUMEN

Basándose en los indicadores del comportamiento autoritario de líderes políticos desarrollados por Levitsky y Ziblatt (2018), el autor del artículo examina el discurso político, la postura y las actitudes del presidente de Brasil, Jair Bolsonaro, en los dos primeros años de ejercicio de su mandato. La investigación utiliza un estudio de caso con un enfoque cualitativo basado en la revisión bibliográfica, con un énfasis en los capítulos de libros y artículos científicos, así como los materiales periodísticos, para

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permitir una observación empírica de la conducta del presidente brasileño frente a las instituciones y las normas democráticas. Se observa que Bolsonaro en realidad tiene un comportamiento autoritario, que señala una tendencia de regresión democrática en Brasil, aunque técnicamente no es correcto afirmar que el país ya esté bajo un régimen autoritario.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *democracia, autoritarismo, Brasil, Bolsonaro.*

Introduction

Based on a set of key indicators of authoritarian behavior of political leaders, as developed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), this article examines the political discourse, stances, and attitudes of the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, during his first two years in office, which began in January 2019. This time frame does not include the period of more than two decades that Bolsonaro spent as a congressman, nor his campaign-based declarations. Instead, it focuses on his performance as president to verify whether he can be classified as authoritarian under the adopted model.

This research takes part in the debate about the onset of a new global wave of authoritarianism, either in countries with an already consolidated tradition of democracy, or where the democratic process is still gathering momentum. Brazil, whose re-democratization process took place in the 1980s, after two decades of military dictatorship, is currently in the second category. Contrary to what has traditionally taken place in the 20th century in Latin America, when authoritarian systems generally came to power through violence and State-based military coups, many contemporary societies have witnessed the rise of leaders with authoritarian behavior legitimized through popular vote. Once elected and able to exercise their power, they start to systematically violate the rules of democracy.

This article focuses on the following research question: Is it possible to formally categorize the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, as a political leader with authoritarian behavior? In this respect and based on the test for authoritarianism proposed by the aforementioned authors, the general objective of this article is to critically analyze the period of two years that Jair Bolsonaro served so far as the president of Brazil. Note that due to the limitations of this research, it is not possible to proceed to a profound analysis on the entire range of political phenomena usually associated with authoritarianism, such as populism or democratic regression; however, these topics may still be briefly addressed throughout this text.

In terms of relevance, this article aims to contribute to the set of observations concerning the current situation and the paths of democracy in Brazil, which – due to its geographic dimensions and regional economic weight – levies an additional impact on its Latin American neighbors. This research is

further justified by the currency of the core material, enabling an empirical observation of the behavior of the president of Brazil concerning rules and institutions of democracy during his first two years in office.

Even though there is academic research in political science that examines the start of the Bolsonaro mandate, the literature review has not found any previous study using the theoretical framework proposed here. Neto and Pimenta (2020) analyze the first year of Jair Bolsonaro's role as president, but through a comparative approach to two other presidential periods: Jânio Quadros (from January to August 1961) and Fernando Collor (from March 1990 to December 1992). As a result, the authors declare that despite Bolsonaro having experienced what appears to be a level of conflict similar to that of the presidents mentioned above during his first year in office, the distinctive characteristics of Bolsonaro's mandate center on his intimate relationship with the leaders of the Armed Forces and the solid support of the conservative evangelical electorate.

Methodologically, this research was carried out employing a case study delimited on a geographical and chronological basis but focused on understanding a more complex and comprehensive phenomenon: the growth of institutional authoritarian manifestations in democratic systems. A qualitative approach was adopted based on bibliographical research and through a specific emphasis on the work of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) but also supported by chapters from other books and journal articles, in addition to using news reports available on the internet to verify the practical validity of each of the indicators of authoritarian behavior. This case study has predominantly empirical-descriptive characteristics, focused on assessing the elected case within its actual context: the first two years of Jair Bolsonaro's mandate as the president of Brazil.

Democracy and authoritarianism

At a factual level, the analysis undertaken in this research looks at the behavior of a specific political leader, elected according to the rules of a democratic system but with overtones of supposedly authoritarian conduct. In this scenario, understanding the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism (in addition to the hybrid competitive authoritarianism regime) is fundamental for the objectives of this article.

In general terms, this article adopts the concept of representative democracy advocated by the pluralist theoretical model currently prevalent in contemporary political science, which among its principal exponents includes Robert Dahl, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and Charles Lindblom (Smith, 1997). This theoretical approach is founded on the basis of society with multiple centers of power – not just the exclusive exercising of power by a specific class or group – in addition to the instruments that ensure the freedom of

political participation by its citizens in electing their chosen representatives (Costa, 2007).

Democracy, according to Dahl (1989), is a governing system that meets the following seven primordial conditions: i) “elected officials”; ii) “free and fair elections”; iii) “inclusive suffrage”; iv) “right to run for office”; v) “freedom of expression”; vi) “alternative information”; and vii) “associational autonomy” (p. 221). More recently, Levitsky and Way (2010) added another attribute: “the existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition” (p. 5).

According to Linz (1964), authoritarianism is a political system

with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. (p. 297)

Somewhere between these two concepts, there is a kind of hybrid authoritarianism that is discussed in the works of Levitsky and Way (2010), which presents characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism described as competitive authoritarianism. In this system, there are legal and relatively effective channels allowing opposition parties to compete for power, with elections being held regularly in which opposition parties are not legally prevented from competing. However, one of the distinctive characteristics of this system, even though democratic institutions are respected enough to enable real competition, is that they can be violated in such a manner that competition is often unfair, with opposition parties being impaired from seriously challenging those in power. The authors’ examples concerning the absence of material equality for competition-based conditions are disparities in financial resources and insufficient access to the media.

Note that the aforementioned concepts do not necessarily signify a claim to a hermetic and inflexible definition of democracy and authoritarianism, but instead a perception of its principal characteristic elements. Due to their complex socio-political phenomena, these elements must always be interpreted by those who take part, their individual circumstances, and the periods over which they occur.

Through this conceptual framework, it is possible to classify the Brazilian government system as democratic, even though it is not necessarily a fully consolidated democracy. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit (2021), Brazil is classified as a “flawed democracy,” which is currently positioned in its annual ranking system in 49th place out of a total of 167 countries¹.

¹ According to the democracy index of The Economist Intelligence Unit (2021), there are four democratic quality classifications, listed in descending order: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.

In turn, the most recent report from the V-Dem Institute (2021) classifies the Brazilian system as an “electoral democracy”² but also makes repeated warnings about Brazil being on a democratic decline. According to this document (p. 19), among the ten countries that have “autocratized” the most over the last decade, there are once-stable democracies such as Poland (1st), Hungary (2nd), Turkey (3rd), Brazil (4th), Serbia (5th) and India (7th).

Democracy in Brazil – or any other part of the world – cannot be classified as an absolutely assured achievement free from setbacks or downturns and, as such, immune to an authoritarian jolt. The fact that Brazil has not achieved full democratic consolidation further emphasizes this risk.

The process of slowly and gradually losing democratic quality – especially about “competitive electoral procedures, civil and political liberties, and accountability” – is characteristic of democratic backsliding (Lust & Waldner, 2015, p. 2). This phenomenon has been the subject of studies by multiple authors in recent years, with subtle terminological distinctions such as democratic recession or democratic regression (Diamond, 2015, 2021), democratic decline (Plattner, 2015), democratic decay (Daly, 2019), and de-democratization (Enyedi, 2016). This particular case study is based on this precept, supported by the recent work of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018).

Test for authoritarianism – indicators of authoritarian behavior applied to the case of President Bolsonaro

Inspired by the studies of Linz (1978), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) developed the following set of four key indicators of authoritarian behavior by political leaders that potentially put democracy at risk: “1) rejects, in words or action, the democratic rules of the game, 2) denies the legitimacy of opponents, 3) tolerates or encourages violence, or 4) indicates a willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents, including the media” (p. 18). Table 1 contains a number of questions to be considered as a test for authoritarianism.

Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game

Application of this test for authoritarianism in relation to President Bolsonaro begins with an affirmative response to question 1.a (Do they reject the Constitution or express a willingness to violate it?).

The Brazilian president has already expressed a willingness to violate the Brazilian Constitution by endorsing the Armed Forces’ potential inter-

² According to the V-Dem Institute (2021), there are four classifications of democratic quality: liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, and closed autocracies.

1. Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Do they reject the Constitution or express a willingness to violate it? b) Do they suggest a need for antidemocratic measures, such as canceling elections, violating or suspending the Constitution, banning certain organizations, or restricting basic civil or political rights? c) Do they seek to use (or endorse the use of) extraconstitutional means to change the government, such as military coups, violent insurrections, or mass protests aimed at forcing a change in the government? d) Do they attempt to undermine the legitimacy of elections, for example, by refusing to accept credible electoral results?
2. Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Do they describe their rivals as subversive, or opposed to the existing constitutional order? b) Do they claim that their rivals constitute an existential threat, either to national security or to the prevailing way of life? c) Do they baselessly describe their partisan rivals as criminals, whose supposed violation of the law (or potential to do so) disqualifies them from full participation in the political arena? d) Do they baselessly suggest that their rivals are foreign agents, in that they are secretly working in alliance with (or the employ of) a foreign government— usually an enemy one?
3. Toleration or encouragement of violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Do they have any ties to armed gangs, paramilitary forces, militias, guerrillas, or other organizations that engage in illicit violence? b) Have they or their partisan allies sponsored or encouraged mob attacks on opponents? c) Have they tacitly endorsed violence by their supporters by refusing to unambiguously condemn it and punish it? d) Have they praised (or refused to condemn) other significant acts of political violence, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?
4. Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Have they supported laws or policies that restrict civil liberties, such as expanded libel or defamation laws or laws restricting protest, criticism of the government, or certain civic or political organizations? b) Have they threatened to take legal or other punitive action against critics in rival parties, civil society, or the media? c) Have they praised repressive measures taken by other governments, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?

Table 1.
Four key indicators of authoritarian behavior

Source: adapted from Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, pp. 18–19).

vention in the event of a political dispute between the branches of power, known among his supporters as “military intervention.” In a ministerial meeting recorded on video, which subsequently went public, Bolsonaro, who had been in conflict with the Federal Supreme Court (STF) due to authorized criminal investigations into his sons, stated that he could trigger Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution³, including the possibility that the Armed Forces could reestablish order. This is a distorted and unsustainable interpretation of the constitutional provision, which started with blog posts on the internet and was subsequently rejected by Brazil’s principal jurists as equivalent to predicting the own constitutional order’s breakdown (G1, 2020, June 2). In reality, the article deals with the organization and duties of the Armed Forces and not the relationship or the separation of the government powers.

In terms of question 1.b (Do they suggest a need for antidemocratic measures, such as canceling elections, violating or suspending the Constitution, banning certain organizations, or restricting basic civil or political rights?), the response is equally affirmative, specifically concerning the mitigation of the fundamental rights of expression of thought and the ability to meet in locations open to the general public, as enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution⁴.

In recent popular pro-democracy and anti-government demonstrations, Bolsonaro called such demonstrators “addicts,” “thugs” and “terrorists” (Público, 2020, June 5), in addition to threatening to use the National Public Security Force – consisting of police officers subordinate to the Ministry of Justice – against activities that could be identified as anti-fascist (Deutsche Welle, 2020, June 5).

Item 1.c (Do they seek to use [or endorse the use of] extra-constitutional means to change the government, such as military coups, violent insurrections or mass protests aimed at forcing a change in the government?), which also has an affirmative response, illustrates Bolsonaro’s endorsement and admiration to the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964–1985), something recurring throughout his parliamentary career.

³ Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (CFRB), Article 142, *caput*: “The Armed Forces, comprised of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, are permanent and regular national institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic, and are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order” (Senado Federal, 2013, p. 85).

⁴ CFRB, Article 5: “All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever, Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: (...) IV – the expression of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden; (...) XVI – all persons may hold peaceful meetings, without weapons, in places open to the public, regardless of authorization provided that they do not frustrate another meeting previously called for the same place, subject only to prior notice to the competent authority; (...)” (Senado Federal, 2013, p. 13).

In a symptomatic manner, amid popular protests in his support, banners and posters have been raised exalting Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5), a decree from 1968 that inaugurated the darkest and most violent decade of the dictatorship, which repealed mandates served by members of the opposition, suspended constitutional guarantees, and led to the institutionalized torture of opponents to the system, plus having other harmful consequences. Such protests and demonstrations stemmed from tensions between Bolsonaro and the then President of the House of Representatives, Rodrigo Maia, with the most prominent of these taking place in front of the Army Headquarters in Brasilia, with Bolsonaro being present himself in an address to demonstrators (Exame, 2020, April 19). At no moment in time did he rebuke the praise of AI-5.

Ultimately, the response to question 1.d (Do they attempt to undermine the legitimacy of elections, for example, by refusing to accept credible electoral results?) is also affirmative. The Brazilian electoral system, although it could still be improved, is internationally recognized for its efficiency, safety, and transparency in the way that it promotes elections and discloses its results. There are no records of any fraud linked to the use of electronic ballot boxes, implemented more than two decades ago and having been used on an interrupted basis since then. This was pointed out, for example, by the Electoral Observation Mission of the Organization of American States (EOM/OAS) during the 2018 presidential elections (OAS, 2018).

Bolsonaro, however, fielded the theory – which was vastly disseminated across the Brazilian extreme right – that the electronic voting system used throughout Brazil is not reliable or trustworthy. On that occasion, in a speech to Brazilian supporters in Miami (USA), he stated that he had proof that electronic ballot boxes were frauded during the 2018 presidential election and that he apparently would have received enough votes to be elected during the first round of voting (the election was effectively decided after the second round of voting) (BBC, 2020, March 10). Despite this serious and hard-hitting declaration, he never presented any form of proof.

It is indeed symptomatic that Bolsonaro remained faithful to the false allegations of fraud made by Donald Trump during the presidential elections of the United States, having been the last president of the countries that comprise G20 – the forum that brings together the world's most important economies – to congratulate Joe Biden on his election victory. He only did so a day after the Electoral College endorsed the election result (El País, 2020, December 15).

Such examples satisfactorily demonstrate Bolsonaro's lack of compromise to the rules of democracy. This type of public stance has occurred when being pressured by public opinion or other political actors, which is natural in democratic systems but has resulted in clashes and even institutional crises, making the Brazilian president's authoritarian penchants even more evident.

Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents

At this point, although less frequently, Bolsonaro's behavioral patterns are consistent with indicators of authoritarianism.

The affirmative response to item 2.a (Do they describe their rivals as subversive or opposed to the existing constitutional order?) reemphasizes the manner in which the president of Brazil treats his political rivals, such as the governor of the State of Maranhão, Flávio Dino, a member the Brazilian Communist Party (PCdoB). During a recent inauguration of federal government infrastructure works in this state, Bolsonaro, in addition to not inviting the state governor himself – contrary to institutional practice – affirmed during the event that communism would soon be eradicated from Brazil. That very same week, he had stated to supporters in Brasília: “We have to remove the PCdoB from there, man, for God’s sake. It’s only here in Brazil that communists declare that they are democrats” (Congresso em Foco, 2020, October 29). This last statement, incidentally, reveals the strategy of leveling an accusation of being undemocratic on political opponents, a tactic that he started to use as an attempt to distance himself from the same image.

In terms of question 2.b (Do they claim that their rivals constitute an existential threat, either to national security or to the prevailing way of life?), the authoritarian behavior of Bolsonaro is emphasized through the use of the National Security Law (Planalto, 1983) in relation to critical speeches directed at the government. This type of law dates back to the military dictatorship but remains in force, either because no other law has expressly revoked it or because the STF has never judged its compliance with the new constitutional order initiated in 1988. Making the most of the legal nature of this fact, Bolsonaro used this law to threaten ex-President Lula (Deutsche Welle, 2019, November 21), as well as ministers of his government have been using it as the legal basis to legally sue journalists and even one of the STF Ministers, Gilmar Mendes (Carta Capital, 2020, July 24).

Toleration or encouragement of violence

Here, as in the previous subsections, the behavior of the Brazilian president once again fits into the indicators proposed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018).

In terms of item 3.a (Do they have any ties to armed gangs, paramilitary forces, militias, guerrillas or other organizations that engage in illicit violence?), Bolsonaro and his sons (one of these being a Federal Senator who is under criminal investigation for such a crime), in addition to having intimate connections with members of armed militias (El País, 2020, June 20), adopts a form of discourse that actually supports the actions of these criminals⁵.

⁵ In terms of the current situation in Brazil, militias are criminal organizations that mostly consist of members or ex-members of security forces (police, firefighters, and members of the Armed Forces) that dominate territories in poor communities and also commit assassinations,

The political scientist Bruno Paes Manso – a scholar on the subject – reveals glimpses of this ideological connection to Bolsonaro’s rhetoric, which embodies “the concept of breakdown imposed by force, of reinventing politics by means of an authority that will impose itself and restore traditional values through violence, even if the law is disregarded during the process” (Deutsche Welle, 2020, October 7).

In relation to question 1.b (Have they or their partisan allies sponsored or encouraged mob attacks on opponents?), Bolsonaro, from a context of rhetorical clashes with state governors over the accuracy of the statistics on the sick and dead caused by COVID-19, encouraged his supporters to enter public hospitals to physically check the usage of beds (IstoÉ, 2020, June 12). As a result, there were incidences of invasion and depredation of hospitals that very same day, even in wards restricted to doctors and patients (Exame, 2020, June 12).

The analysis of the item 1.d (Have they praised [or refused to condemn] other significant acts of political violence, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?) once again emphasizes Bolsonaro’s predilection for dictatorial systems and their methods. In response to criticism from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, whose father was imprisoned, tortured, and killed at the beginning of the Chilean dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973 to 1990), the Brazilian president made a post on the internet declaring that Chile “failed to turn into another Cuba thanks to those who had the courage to put a stop to the left in 1973, with her father, a brigadier at the time, being one of these communists” (Veja, 2019, September 4).

A month beforehand, Bolsonaro had extolled the deceased colonel Brilhante Ustra, ex-leader of the Detachment of Information Operations – Center for Internal Defense Operations (DOI-CODI), a political repression organization of the Brazilian military dictatorship, as a “national hero.” According to the National Truth Commission (2011–2014), Ustra was directly or indirectly responsible for the torture and murder of dozens of political prisoners when he was in charge of this organization from 1970 to 1974 (G1, 2019, August 8).

Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media

Additionally, mitigation of civil liberties was highly evident during the first two years of Bolsonaro’s rule, thus responding in the affirmative to the three questions set out in this subsection.

In line with the rhetoric of the president of Brazil against protests in the street, there has been a significant increase in bills made by the National Con-

extortions and carry out other illicit activities under the pretense of helping to combat drug trafficking or other types of offenses, with concentrated activity in the Brazilian state of Rio de Janeiro (Congresso em Foco, 2019, December 23).

gress aimed at restricting fundamental constitutional rights of expression of thought and the ability to meet in places open to the public. This fact brings about question 4.a (Have they supported laws or policies that restrict civil liberties, such as expanded libel or defamation laws or laws restricting protest, criticism of the government, or certain civic or political organizations?).

One of these legislative proposals, initiated by the Bolsonaro government, amplifies cases of exclusion of illegality for the potential coming into force of a decree for the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO), i.e., assignments of the Armed Forces over a limited period, exclusively determined by express order of the Presidency of the Republic, in cases where traditional public security forces are insufficient. Under the pretext of curbing violent popular demonstrations, this bill increases the likelihood that security services (police, firefighters, or military personnel in the Armed Forces) could be exempt from criminal punishment if their conduct is considered to be in self-defense (Agência Brasil, 2019, November 25).

Among the other proposals aimed at mitigating popular demonstrations (it is estimated that of the 70 passed so far through the National Congress, 21 were presented in 2019 alone), the most prominent are as follows: criminalizing the use of masks and the blocking of streets; increasing penalties for crimes of being in contempt of the police; permission by the police – with no judicial authorization – to monitor people through genetic mapping and private messages on social networks, in addition to infiltrating agents and intercepting telephone calls; and, classifying acts of violence based on political and ideological motivation as crimes of terrorism (Folha de S. Paulo, 2020, January 10).

Relative to point 4.b (Have they threatened to take legal or other punitive action against critics in rival parties, civil society, or the media?), Bolsonaro has directed numerous threats at the press, with which he has regular skirmishes.

On more than one occasion, the Brazilian president declared that television broadcasters who convey the news to supposedly destabilize him would have difficulties when it comes to the renewal process of respective public concessions for broadcasting services for sound and images. One of his preferred targets is *Rede Globo* (Globo Network), the leading private television broadcaster in Brazil, to whom Bolsonaro has referred to as the “gutter press, garbage,” and whose concession is required to be renewed in 2022, the final year of his presidential mandate. Non-renewal of the Globo Network concession is a banner frequently seen at demonstrations held by the president’s supporters (Congresso em Foco, 2020, April 30; IstoÉ, 2019, October 29).

Ultimately, in the same way as the two previous passages in this subsection, the response to item 4.c (Have they praised repressive measures taken by other governments, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?) is also affirmative. To provide yet another example of Bolsonaro’s devotion to the Brazilian dictatorship, in his first year in office, the anniversary of the 1964 military coup

was “commemorated” via a bulk message campaign on WhatsApp through an electronic account of the Communication Secretariat of the Presidency, consisting of a two-minute-long video in which the presenter recounted his own version of Brazilian history, where the military saved Brazil from a supposedly communist dominion. The account from which this information was disseminated is intended to be used for federal government public utility, news, and service-based messages (UOL, 2019, March 31).

A young democracy facing the authoritarian threat

After the result of the 2018 presidential elections in Brazil, there was hope among politicians and opposition voters alike that Bolsonaro’s aggressive and undemocratic attitude would not be put into practice after taking office. As such, the required liturgy of the role would naturally moderate the future president’s potential authoritarian outbursts. It can be affirmed that any such expectation did not come to fruition.

Relying on popular approval that – minus a few exceptions – had oscillated between 30 and 40 percent (CNI-IBOPE, 2020; Datafolha, 2021), involving the backing of relevant private initiative sectors (e.g., the financial market), a strong link with personnel from the Armed Forces, the solid support of conservative evangelicals and a divided and weakened opposition, instead of slacking his authoritarian behavior, Bolsonaro went on to exacerbate it.

Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) emphasize in their body of work that a powerful politician’s fulfillment of even one of the indicators discussed above would be enough to inspire concern over the integrity of democracy. Thus, we can determine that Bolsonaro’s attitudes are affirmative to nearly all of the tested items, emphasizing the danger faced by Brazilian democracy under his rule. In addition to the obvious risks of democratic backsliding through his direct activities, there is also the collateral effect on other spheres of power, including an increase in politicians with similar or even greater authoritarian tendencies.

Based on the aforementioned indicators and in response to the original question of whether the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, can be formally classified as a political leader with authoritarian behavior, the answer is certainly affirmative. The qualitative approach used in this article makes it difficult to provide a precise estimate of the degree of regression experienced by Brazilian democracy since the election of Bolsonaro, but it does confirm that there has been a move in this direction. However, according to the concepts described in the second section of this article, it cannot be upheld that Brazil is effectively under an authoritarian regime.

In spite of imperfections, Brazilian democracy retains certain attributes that underline its resilience. Important sectors of civil society remain organized, the Judiciary branch of power is independent, there is a robust institutional apparatus for the protection of rights – with emphasis on the Public

Ministry – and the press retains a good measure of freedom (Daly, 2019). Resilient democratic institutions are pointed out as one of the major defenses of Western societies against the recently emerging authoritarian forces and the democratic backsliding (Norris, 2017). The capacity of these multiple elements to successfully operate is decisive for the vitality of the Brazilian democracy in the future.

Conclusions

This article constitutes an effort to understand the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism on the basis of the framework of authoritarian behavioral indicators of political leaders, as established by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), having been applied in a clear and systematic manner for the case in question: the first two years of the rule of Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil.

Taking the core question into account, it has been empirically verified that the Brazilian president adopts political discourse, stances, and attitudes of an authoritarian nature, emphasizing a tendency for democratic regression in Brazil, but it is still not technically accurate to affirm that the situation has degenerated into an authoritarian regime.

Through a qualitative analysis of the democratic regression observed in Brazil or through the impacts of the revisionist and obscurantist stance of the president of Brazil during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is definitely more room for further in-depth investigations into the central topic of this article, plus further analysis of the subject matter that surrounds it.

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The Quest for Status: Brazil's Activism in the UN Human Rights Council 2006–2020

La búsqueda de estatus: el activismo de Brasil en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU 2006–2020

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ABSTRACT

The paper seeks to investigate changes in Brazil's activism within the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) between 2006 and 2020 and addresses the modifications of status-seeking strategies (of social mobility, creativity, and competition) applied by the state within this international body. My claim is that Brazil under the Bolsonaro administration chose the role of the defender of the faith advocating for a recreation of the global human rights protection system over being a good international citizen committed to the maintenance and development of this system. This role was selected in conformity with a populist political agenda based on a conservative set of values that the state's diplomacy had to promote. The changes, exemplified by Brazil's conduct within the HRC since 2019, undermined the state's prestige and moral authority that led to status losses.

KEYWORDS: *Brazil, Human Rights Council, status-seeking, moral authority.*

RESUMEN

El trabajo busca investigar los cambios en el activismo de Brasil dentro del Consejo de Derechos Humanos (CDH) de la ONU entre 2006 y 2020 y aborda las modificaciones de las estrategias de búsqueda de estatus (de movilidad, creatividad y competencia social) aplicadas por el Estado dentro de este organismo internacional. Mi argumento es que Brasil, bajo el gobierno de Bolsonaro, eligió el papel de defensor de la fe que aboga por una recreación del sistema global de protección de los derechos humanos en

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lugar de ser un buen ciudadano internacional comprometido con el mantenimiento y desarrollo de este sistema. Este papel fue seleccionado en conformidad con una agenda política populista basada en un conjunto de valores conservadores que la diplomacia del Estado debía promover. Los cambios, ejemplificados por la conducta de Brasil en el CDH desde 2019, socavaron el prestigio y la autoridad moral del Estado, lo que condujo a pérdidas de estatus.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Brasil, Consejo de Derechos Humanos, búsqueda de estatus, autoridad moral.*

Introduction

While the legacy that Ernesto Araújo left behind after stepping down from his post of head of the Itamaraty¹ will certainly be assessed in the upcoming months, one point remains already undisputed. As announced in January 2019, the administration of the ultraconservative Jair M. Bolsonaro has engaged in the creation of a new and unprecedented external activism for Brazil. Coined as nationalist and fundamentalist (Casarões, 2020), conservative (Medeiros, Vilas-Boas and Andrade, 2019, March 21), anti-globalist (Rodrigues, 2019), submissive (based on an automatic and unconditional alignment with the state's core ally) (Fuser, 2019), chaotic (Lima and Albuquerque, 2019) or even messianic (Gabatz & Angelin, 2021, p. 123), the foreign policy underwent a process of profound redefinition. Core values and principles which served as guidelines for Brazilian diplomats since the beginning of the 20th century have been at best questioned and at worst, refuted. Such was the case of multilateralism: one of the drivers of the state's initiatives at international fora ever since the creation of the Republic, it has been vilified by Ernesto Araújo (2019, November 21). The redefinition of the guiding principles was followed by a reformulation of Brazil's key allies as well as the themes and niches that the South American actor wanted to shape.

Human rights protection has been identified by academics as one of the main areas affected by foreign policy reformulations of the current administration (Spektor, 2019). To scrutinize the scope of these changes, this paper aims to compare Brazil's standing in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) since 2019 with the causes promoted by the Lula da Silva (2006²–2010), Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), and Michel Temer (2016–2018) administrations within this international body. Focus is put on a global rather than

¹ As the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is commonly called.

² The first three years of Lula da Silva's first term in office have not been included in the analysis as the Human Rights Council held its first session in June 2006, substituting the former Human Rights Commission.

a regional institution as Brazil in the past three decades has been recognized as a global player using supraregional fora as leverage to gain visibility and construct its image of a norm entrepreneur and promoter of human rights (Stolte, 2015; Nogueira, 2017; Carvalho, 2020; Sá e Silva, 2020). Also, the global forum permits to capture the Brazilian realignment of partnerships into new coalitions with European, African, and Asian states. The paper is driven by the following research questions: how did the state's engagement within the HRC change (in terms of resolutions and decisions introduced and/or sponsored, as well as voting patterns)? What were the new coalitions Brazil engaged in at the HRC? How did these adjustments translate into shifts in status-seeking strategies? What is the impact of these realignments on the state's international status?

My study is aided by the conceptual contributions on the status and status-seeking strategies (Wohlforth *et al.* 2018; Hurrell, 2006; Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; 2014) and recent research on the Brazilian far-right populist foreign policy (Verbeeck & Zaslove, 2017; Chryssogelos, 2017; Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva, 2021). My claim is that Brazil under the Bolsonaro administration neglected the role of a good international citizen and engaged in performing the role of the defender of the faith. This role was selected in conformity with the populist political agenda, especially the conservative set of values that the state's diplomacy had to promote. The changes, exemplified by Brazil's conduct within the HRC since 2019, led to the abandonment of status enhancement through increasing prestige and moral authority causing status losses.

The empirical part of the study is based on document analysis which allowed to identify and categorize causes promoted by Brazil and the country's positions towards human rights violations in several states addressed at the HRC. It also discerns between resolutions and decisions introduced by/on behalf of Brazil, (co-)sponsored by the state, and Brazil's voting patterns, including the actor's vote on amendments to resolutions. In addition to resolutions and decisions, the primary sources used in the research include the reports of 45 regular sessions³ and 28 special sessions of the HRC, as well as the Brazilian statements explaining its vote and other comments available on the HRC Extranet website. To capture discursive practices handling the matter of international human rights promotion the paper also includes data obtained from content analysis of official speeches made by Brazilian presidents and foreign affairs ministers.

The article starts from a brief presentation of the understanding of status and status-seeking strategies. The following section reflects on the notion of populism as applied to foreign policy research and its applicability to the case of Brazil's external activism. The next part briefly elaborates on references to human rights protection made by Brazilian decision-makers and continues

³ By the time of writing, the report of the 46th session was not available.

with an overview of major changes in the state's activities within the HRC since 2019. The last part presents concluding remarks.

Status and status seeking

Status is considered as an analytical category appropriate for scrutinizing the place of states in the international system (Holsti, 1970). The notion of status allows to refer to the location of a state in the global stratified structure. Frameworks conceptualizing status as a club good also highlight the hierarchical aspect of status (Larson *et al.*, 2014, p. 15). The presence, admission, or exclusion of the state from groupings such as the club of permanent UN Security Council, the G7 of the largest advanced economies, and nuclear powers impacts the country's international standing. Despite a focus on material capabilities such as military strength and economic performance as status markers determining an actor's place in the global hierarchy, the past decade experienced a surge in research capturing an extended reading of status (Volgy *et al.*, 2011; Paul *et al.*, 2014; Renshon, 2017; Wohlforth *et al.*, 2018). This alternative angle does recognize the material aspect of status, yet it goes beyond such understanding by exploring status as a cognitive category. Such is the approach to research on status proposed by Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth (2014, p. 7) who define it as "collective beliefs about a ranked ordering of valued attributes". This outline acknowledges the hierarchical nature of status; however, it emphasizes first and foremost that an actor's positioning in the international structure is socially constructed and perceptual. Kalevi Holsti, writing in 1970 about states' roles, linked them with statuses, which were determined by policymakers' impressions. According to him, status identification was determined by the perceptions shared by decision-makers: "it seems reasonable to assume that those responsible for making decisions and taking actions for the state are aware of international status distinctions and that their policies reflect this awareness" (Holsti 1970, p. 242). Later works coped with the question of whose collective beliefs mattered in assessing the state's status and discerned between self-attributed status (by the country's political and intellectual elites and the rest of the society) and recognition received by the actor from other members of the international system (Hurrell, 2006, p. 4). The latter was indicated as crucial to determine the actor's positioning on the global stage. Furthermore, this distinction allowed to capture tensions arising when the status ascribed to the state by its elites differed from the perceptions held by other countries, leading to status inconsistencies (Volgy *et al.*, 2011).

Discrepancies in the ways status is assessed are among the factors triggering efforts made by state actors to influence the perceptions of other members of the international system. Through the declaration and performance of international roles, understood as functions states assume in the international

system based on role conceptions⁴, states strive to align the internal and external understandings of one's place in the world. These endeavors have been referred to in the literature as status-seeking. Status-seeking, closely-knit with the desire for recognition and prestige,⁵ and fueled by the intrinsic quest to strengthen one's standing within a hierarchy, relates to the state's self-esteem identified among its core needs and foreign policy objectives (Murray, 2019, p. 13). Status enhancement efforts can be identified in the behavior of all sovereign states, including small states (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015), although certain players attract more attention from researchers. Be it due to their high asset levels, significant historical shifts of their international standing or current increased activism which ensure that their efforts are not going unnoticed, status-seeking strategies of global players such as Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Brazil constitute an extensive body of literature focused on state's international mobility (Deng, 2008; Volgy *et al.*, 2011; Hurrell 2006; Wohlforth, 2009; Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; Stolte, 2015; Renshon, 2017; Basrur & Estrada, 2017; Esteves *et al.*, 2020; Curanović, 2020).

Researchers, adopting varied approaches, proposed several, partially overlapping, conceptualizations of status-enhancement strategies, i.a. initiating and engaging in conflicts, arms race, and other hard-balancing options, soft-balancing, bandwagoning, recognitive discursive and material practices (such as gaining a great-power voice, increasing military power, and assuring spheres of influence), and social mobility, competition, and creativity strategies (Hurrell, 2006; Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; 2014; Renshon, 2017; Murray, 2019). It is important to note that, rather than opting for one particular strategy, states apply a blend of several approaches to gain visibility, recognition, and prestige leading to status increase.

In the case of Brazil, a country that can be considered as an archetypical aspirational power, unsatisfied with its status and committed to increasing it (Mares & Trinkunas, 2016), hard-balancing strategies are not considered as options by policymakers. Emphasizing the commitment to principles of non-intervention and peaceful resolution of conflicts, Brazil gave priority to soft approaches (Sotero & Armijo, 2007). Faced with limited material capacities, policymakers on numerous occasions turned to ideational resources such as the promotion of norms, values, and causes as means to acquire status. Endeavors to increase its global standing focused on moral authority – “proper⁶ behavior as judged within the specific framework laid down histori-

⁴ National role conceptions are defined as “policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions, suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems” (Holsti, 1970, p. 246).

⁵ For a definition of prestige, honor and respect see Larson *et al.* (2014, pp. 7–17) and Curanović (2020, p. 84).

⁶ The definition of *proper* conduct which distinguishes the *moral* subject is – as the definition suggests – contextual. The social context at the beginning of the 21st century is determined

cally by the leading powers of the system” (Wohlforth *et al.*, 2018, p. 533) – and prestige (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014, pp. 49–52; Stolte, 2015; Esteves *et al.*, 2020). They were to be exposed and further strengthened, ensuring the state recognition via the existing global organizational setup. The international human rights protection system offered institutional space for smaller states and middle powers like Brazil to perform the roles of good international citizens and, therefore, maintain or increase its standing as moral powers. This niche permitted the state to act as a normative entrepreneur to raise awareness and contribute to solutions to global problems. What is particularly interesting in the case of Brazil is that the area of human rights protection exposed the actor’s commitment to normative underpinnings traditionally associated with Western values and priorities, on one hand, and causes raised by developing nations, members of the Global South, on the other (Carvalho, 2020, p. 25).

Placing varying emphasis on several values and topics, the administrations of Lula da Silva, Rousseff, Temer, and Bolsonaro all claimed that human rights protection was a crucial part of Brazil’s foreign policy.⁷ Applying the conceptual framework proposed by Larson and Shevchenko (2010; 2014) of social mobility⁸, creativity⁹, and competition¹⁰, it is possible to identify a blend of these strategies applied by Brazilian policymakers to promote Brazil’s image as a moral authority in the endeavor to increase its status through human rights advocacy. States employing mobility strategies are expected to voice their commitment to the protection of human rights listed in international conventions and other normative acts, seek membership in international core organizations promoting them, and align with actors perceived as exemplary in protecting these rights to promote commonly acknowledged causes, e.g., fundamental political and civil rights. The posture would be followed by declarations coming from the decision-makers about their full commitment to protecting human rights. Social creativity strategies envisage discursive prac-

primarily by norms and values promoted by developed capitalist Western countries under the leadership of the world hegemon, the U.S. These states identify proper conduct with world system maintenance, respect for international law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, human rights promotion. Authors referring to the moral authority of the state draw from classic works of Émile Durkheim (*Sociology and Philosophy* and *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*), see Hall, 1997; Neumann, 2014; Wohlforth *et al.*, 2018.

⁷ For more details, see section 5.

⁸ Social mobility assumes behavior emulating higher-ranking powers as the lower-ranked actor accepts and follows the rules of the international game. Social mobility applies to states that adhere to international regimes and promote norms and values supported by relevant actors (the world’s great powers and/or actors with a recognized high position within a particular cooperation area).

⁹ Social creativity consists of the promotion of new and alternative attributes which give the status aspiring state competitive advantage over the higher-ranked.

¹⁰ Social competition, of a more conflictive nature, takes place when the status aspiring state identifies areas in which it could outstrip the higher-ranked actors and engages in activities challenging the existing stratifications.

tices also emphasizing such obligation, yet indicting gaps and deficiencies in the institutional setup which need to be overcome. A state using this approach offers to bring in new perspectives into the debate, due to its distinctive profile and experiences – for instance, affiliation with the developing world leading to increased interest and authority to promote social and economic rights. Social competition can be identified as postures defying acknowledged understandings of fundamental rights and freedoms and opposing them to alternative sets of values or unconventional interpretations of certain norms and standards. Such an approach can be manifested by abstaining from voting on resolutions condemning human rights abuses. Criticized by Western liberal democracies, the posture is frequently adopted by developing countries and explained by a Southern point of view which places the value of dialogue maintenance at all costs and non-interference in domestic matters over more assertive ways of protecting human rights. Contrary to social creativity behavior, social competition entails more confrontational attitudes, at times based on dichotomist and conflictive assessments of the subject matter in question. Actors using this strategy perceive the set of human rights norms they defend as threatened; their promotion becomes a moral imperative. Discursively social competition would be manifested by statements undermining the existing human rights protection architecture and claims of a deep value crisis which the status aspirant could handle due to its moral superiority.

Between 2006 and 2018¹¹ Brazil applied all three approaches in its conduct within the HRC, whereas in 2019 and 2020 Brazilian policymakers resorted to mobility and competition strategies. The differences in Brazil's activism derive from distinct roles played by Brazil in both periods, stemming from diverse identities and objectives. If until the end of 2018 Brazil identified its function of a good state sustaining a normative order as an appropriate way to manifest its moral authority, since 2019 the state, as a defender of the faith¹², adopted a confrontational approach. It was based on the claim that the human rights protection system – corrupted and decaying – required reconstruction. If in the first decade of the HRC Brazil, within the mobility strategy, introduced and sponsored documents on topics important to Western liberal democracies, it neglected this approach after 2019, proving its affinity with the West by a more critical standing towards selected human rights offenders identified as Brazil's foes. In regard to the state's creativity in human rights promotion, Brazil during the Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations aimed at raising awareness and supporting initiatives of other members of the Global South on subjects related to such rights as just access to medicines and the

¹¹ Although shifts leading to a partial alignment with standings applied since 2019 became noticeable during the Temer administration and will be highlighted in the fifth section.

¹² This role is not limited to strong commitments to religious values, but generally to causes, norms and ideas deemed crucial by policymakers and “those who espouse the defender of the faith national role conception presumably undertake special responsibilities to guarantee ideological purity for a group of other states” (Holsti, 1970, p. 264).

highest healthcare standards as well as the elimination of hunger and poverty. Country delegates also voted in favor of documents introduced by Cuba and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); a posture mostly abandoned by the Bolsonaro government. A striking change occurred also in the way Brazil employed social competition within the HRC: before 2019 tensions between Western states and the Latin American player arose mainly due to its restraint in votings on human rights abuses in such states as North Korea, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. The Bolsonaro government, persistently asserting its distinctiveness from liberal democracies, assumed competitive postures by promoting a conservative normative agenda on such matters as the protection of the family, women's rights, and persecution of religions.

Before moving to a more detailed analysis of changing narratives and practices reflecting Brazil's human rights record within the HRC and for a deeper understanding of the changes in the state's participation in the body, a brief overview of the new features of the Brazilian foreign policy is required.

A populist foreign policy¹³

The claim that the Bolsonaro administration provides yet another example of a populist political style should not raise objections. What enabled the far-right statesman to come to power was a deep national crisis of political representation and economic performance. Political parties in power for over two decades have been to varying degrees discredited by a corruption scandal of an unprecedented scale which had dire consequences for the country's economic output. Jair Bolsonaro and his supporters used this opportunity to position the former army captain as a figure rejecting the rules of conventional policymaking, a political steadfast outsider who was not engaged in corrupt practices (Casarões, 2019). He was thus not a member of the elites (although these claims can surprise coming from a person who served seven consecutive terms in the Brazilian Congress) but a true patriot representing the people, tired of traditional politics. Already in office, the Brazilian head of state adopted an antagonistic and Manichean discourse starkly juxtaposing virtuous Brazilian citizens with corrupt elites and bandits (Bolsonaro, 2019, January 1). Bolsonaro's most ardent supporters – former foreign affairs minister Ernesto Araújo, federal deputy and member of the commission of foreign affairs and defense in the lower house of the Brazilian Congress Eduardo Bolsonaro, Filipe Martins, special foreign policy advisor to President Bolsonaro, and Damares Alves, minister of human rights – constitute the ideological axis of his administration. Araújo, Bolsonaro, and Martins are admirers and followers of Olavo de Carvalho, a self-proclaimed philosopher and the ideologi-

¹³ For a detailed conceptual clarification see Verbeek and Zaslove (2017) and Chryssogelos (2017).

cal mentor of the Bolsonaro family, described as “the intellectual founder of the Brazilian far-right” (Duarte, 2019, December 28) known for his radicalism and propensity for conspiracy theories. The conservative values of Damareo Alves reflect the moral and social agenda of evangelical churches, a stakeholder that in the past two decades gained significant influence over Brazil’s political life (Zilla, 2020). Minister Alves, an evangelical pastor herself, represents therefore the interests of a powerful political actor committed to curtailing liberal family and lifestyle visions. Olavists and evangelicals are seen by other segments of the government – the military and neoliberals – as the ideological fraction as they place a set of identified principles and values over pragmatic postures focused on the state’s material interests.

If on the domestic level the Bolsonaro administration uses the fear of loss of one’s material and social status (which millions of Brazilians saw compromised by the economic crisis) – therefore strengthening and exploiting status anxiety¹⁴ – a similar logic underpins the perception of the international system. Its consequence is a rupture with traditional ways of policymaking not only internally but also externally. Ernesto Araújo made numerous references to the exogenous threats the state is facing: globalism, socialism, cultural Marxism, and communism.¹⁵ The worldview of the first foreign affairs minister in the Bolsonaro cabinet was clearly an antagonistic one: Brazil was presented as a member of a conservative informal avant-garde coalition that needs to resist rogue globalist forces (Araújo, 2019, January 2; 2019 September 11). As observed by Sá Guimarães and Oliveira e Silva (2021, p. 350), within this logic Brazil was morally obliged to engage in a civilizational struggle which required combating liberal institutionalism, for global institutions constituted the framework that legitimized international groups of elites against the will of the people in sovereign states. If criticism of globalism and the architecture of international institutions along with a strong attachment to sovereignty were not new in Brazil’s external affairs and can be found in the narratives on the foreign policy of the Lula da Silva, Rousseff, and Temer administrations, the radicalism permeating the new policymakers’ discourse was unprecedented. An explicit classification of states into friends and foes was a novelty and went against past efforts to promote Brazil as a country able to maintain good relations with all international actors (Interview with Brazil’s President Lula on his legacy, 2010, September 30). What distinguished the foreign policy discourse of the Bolsonaro administration were references to international conspiracies and complots that could harm Brazil’s interests and values (Casarões, 2020, p. 83).

¹⁴ This logic was indicated as a hallmark of populist policies already by Seymour M. Lipset (1955).

¹⁵ They can be found in most of his speeches and posts published on his blog *Metapolítica* 17 (<https://www.metapoliticabrasil.com>).

The traditional principles which members of the ideological fraction usually referred to were that of God, homeland, and family. Deus, Pátria, Família is not a new catchphrase, it reminds us of the slogans of large-scale protests organized by conservative social movements against the government of João Goulart in 1964 as well as of the military regime that followed shortly after (Cordeiro, 2021). Yet, contrary to the administration of Jair Bolsonaro, the junta's foreign policy was more restrained in applying these values on the international level, guided by pragmatism (Cervo & Bueno, 2008). What distinguished the administration of Jair Bolsonaro is the fact that far-right populism as a style of governance was not limited to the domestic sphere, as had been the case of, for instance, the Getúlio Vargas era, but became ingrained in the country's foreign policy (Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva, 2021, p. 352). Therefore, since 2019 and for the first time in the history of Brazilian diplomacy, one of the driving forces of the Brazilian external engagement was the belief that the state is morally obliged to defend Christianity and traditional family values, as they were threatened by leftist forces in the global cultural struggle. The international human rights architecture with the HRC at its center became an important arena for Brazil's performance as a defender of the faith.

Human rights in the political discourse

With the adoption of the Constitution in 1988 (Title I, Article 4, Point II) human rights gained explicit recognition as one of the core principles guiding the country's foreign policy. Their protection was thus seen as both a moral obligation for the Brazilian diplomatic corps and a niche enabling the country to build up prestige and international recognition. Between 2006 and 2020 all Brazilian heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs referred to human rights protection in speeches addressed to both domestic and international audiences. Nevertheless, significant changes in the way Brazil's international commitment to human rights protection is perceived are discernible in the last two years.

Presidents Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff, and Michel Temer as well as their heads of diplomacy all emphasized their strong commitment to human rights protection. They reminded that Brazil was party to international treaties constituting the legal-normative human rights protection framework of binding nature. The state's political elites, therefore, acknowledged the fundamental human rights norms and assured of their obligation to implement them internally, assuming thus a posture that fitted within a social mobility strategy. Given the institution in question – modern liberal democracies bound by the rule of law do not contest the human rights principle – such standing was expected. Signs of Brazil's efforts to strengthen the normative system can also be distinguished in declarations about the state's aspirations to be not only a norm-taker but also a norm-maker. President Lula da Silva and Minister

Amorim stressed that Brazil contributed to the institutional setup of the HRC by promoting the universal periodic review of countries' mechanisms and voluntary human rights goals (Amorim, 2009, p. 432). Brazil further aimed at gaining visibility by advocating for economic, social, and cultural rights. Among the main promoted causes were the right to development, including the fight against hunger and poverty, universal access to medication, and the impact of the global economic crisis on human rights. Another important issue area the country engaged in was the combat of racism. Brazilian policymakers were also using this opportunity to highlight Brazil's internal successes to eliminate hunger and poverty, and willingness to engage in technical cooperation projects to share its own success stories with other nations. President Lula da Silva (2007, September 25) was particularly vocal in addressing the world's obligation to fight hunger, poverty, and inequalities as well as advertising Brazilian homemade, tried-and-tested solutions to these problems. A focus on topics exposing Brazilian achievements coupled with an insistence on the handling global challenges at times overlooked by the most developed economies can therefore be considered a social creativity strategy.

Despite the administration's efforts to perform the role of a good international citizen guided by the principle of human rights protection, the state also attracted attention due to its ambivalent standing towards regimes notorious for human rights abuses, especially between 2006 and 2010. Policymakers faced with accusations of disregard for fundamental human rights were trying to defend the country's posture. According to Celso Amorim (2009, pp. 432–433), Brazil was choosing constructive cooperation and dialogue over conflict and condemnation, which would only lead to the isolation of the accused country. The head of the diplomacy expressed his frustration over criticism faced by Brazil at the 65th session of the UN General Assembly, calling such posture arrogant and criticizing the “moral superiority” which some members of the international community conferred upon themselves (Amorim, 2010, p. 147). The palpable irritation reflected a deeper disappointment over the outcomes of Brazil's efforts to strengthen its status through social competition. The approach of holding to the non-intervention principle, dear to Brazil as a member of the Global South, did not bring the expected gains and diverted the international audience's attention from the state's successes to controversial postures. Dilma Rousseff, aware of the critique, decided to introduce adjustments to Brazil's policy and made sure to advertise the modification. In an interview for the Washington Post after her election in 2010, asked about Brazil's lenient posture towards women's rights in Iran, Ms. Rousseff replied that her government would assume a more explicit standing towards the violators within the UN body (Weymouth, 2010, December 3). She made this also clear when speaking for the first time at the UN General Assembly in September 2011: “There are violations in all countries, without exception. Let us recognize this reality and accept, all of us, the criticism. We should benefit from it and criticize,

without mincing words, the flagrant cases of violation, wherever they occur” (Rousseff, 2011, September 21). On the other hand, what stayed unchanged was the policymakers’ posture of avoiding critical comments about human rights records in Cuba and Venezuela. Questioned about this matter, Rousseff’s first foreign affairs minister Antonio Patriota gave answers in line with the argumentation used by his predecessor – human rights protection had to be less selective and politically motivated (Rossi, 2011, January 29). Slight changes in the way Brazil addressed the issue of human rights violations in other states were introduced by the Temer government. The main change referred to the fact that Brazil, mainly through the discourse of minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, voiced criticism of the human rights record of the Venezuelan regime (Ferreira, 2019, March 7).

Between 2006 and 2018, human rights were depicted as an important area of Brazilian international activism – the country’s commitment to their promotion and protection remained an unquestioned guiding principle of its external activism. The main differences consisted in the postures towards practices of condemning human rights violators. The changes notable in the administration’s discourse after January 2019 were of a different nature.

The assessment of the approach adopted by the current government in the international debate on human rights is complex and controversy prone as Jair Bolsonaro made over the past twenty years numerous comments depreciating and criticizing the rights of i.a. women, indigenous people, members of the LGBTQ+ community, victims of the military rule, and the poor. These statements came again to the limelight during the presidential campaign and his electoral victory, making international headlines (Londoño & Darlington, 2018, October 28; Phillips, 2018 October 29). The critical approach towards human rights was maintained after January 2019, although in official declarations this was (compared to past statements) tempered and expressed in a more moderate manner. In his inaugural speech, President Bolsonaro referred to “the distortion of human rights”. They have been presented as an ideology that “protects the bandits and criminalizes police officers” (Bolsonaro, 2019, January 1). Speaking for the first time as head of state in front of an international audience, President Bolsonaro (2019, January 22) also referred to “true human rights” the country would defend. These were clear signals of a new goal: rather than sustaining the global human rights protection system, Brazil challenged its normative underpinnings aiming at a reconstruction of this system. In his first speech at the UN General Assembly, President Bolsonaro assured of Brazil’s “uncompromising commitment to the highest standards in human rights”, yet a focus on family and God along with the obligation to defend the society from criminals suggested that Brazil had a very narrow and ultraconservative understanding of human rights. This vision would be defended in international organizations including the UN bodies as, according to the new administration, “The UN can help defeat the materialistic and ideological climate that puts in check some of the basic principles of human

dignity” (Bolsonaro 2019, September 24). Similar views were expressed by the head of Itamaraty. A cause particularly promoted by Araújo at the UN (2019, September 27) was religious freedom: the diplomat made references to the increase in persecutions of Christians, which did not resonate with topics promoted by Brazil earlier.

As the Bolsonaro government has been criticized for neglecting or even violating human rights in Brazil, using this issue area to strengthen the country’s status would not seem plausible. Yet, efforts to use global fora, including the HRC, to promote conservative values of God, the protection of the family and the “innocence of children” have been indicated by members of the Brazilian administration as a core element of Brazil’s international positioning. The basis for Brazil’s moral authority was its membership in the club of a new conservative avant-garde of the West, along with the US (under Donald Trump), Israel, Hungary, and Poland (Araújo, 2019, January 2). Equipped with such moral authority, making it fit for a renewal of the international system, the state engaged in a cultural crusade to combat “nihilism disguised as multilateralism”, communism and Marxism, which were destroying humanity (Araújo, 2019, June 10). Therefore, the Brazilian administration, rather than promoting the image of Brazil as a good international citizen, conceptualized Brazil as a defender of the faith. Seen from this angle, the discourse of the administration can be classified as a somewhat distorted effort of status enhancement through social competition. The next section shows whether and how political declarations were followed by Brazil’s engagement in the HRC.

Brazil in the HRC: constants and variables

To verify the changes in Brazil’s activism within the HRC I analyzed the subject matters of resolutions and decisions introduced by the country (or on behalf of it), sponsored and co-sponsored by Brazil, the state’s vote on amendments to documents, and on resolutions/decisions which were not adopted without a vote. Noteworthy shifts between 2006 and 2020 concern the Brazilian vote on resolutions addressing human rights violations in several countries, including the country’s stance towards the regimes in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua; the support for initiatives promoted by developing countries; and several causes traditionally supported by Brazil, in particular religious freedom, the rights of sexual minorities, the protection of the family as well as women’ and girls’ rights.

Resolutions on human rights violations

Although Brazil during the Lula da Silva administration was praised for its efforts to increase human rights protection levels, especially those related to

social and economic rights (Costa da Silva, 2020; Sá e Silva, 2020), the country also faced criticism because of its resistance to condemn human rights violations in a number of undemocratic regimes (Ricupero, 2010, August 29). In 2006 Brazil, along with Cuba and Mexico, voted in favor of a decision addressing the issue of human rights violations in Darfur introduced by African states, which was considered by European countries as too restrained. Brazil was the only Latin American country to abstain from voting on the amendments proposed by European states (Cuba voted against, other Latin American states – in favor). In 2009, Brazil abstained from voting on a resolution on the People’s Republic of Korea, explaining that this way it was giving the Kim regime a chance to maintain dialogue with the Council. At the 11th special session, also in 2009, convened to discuss the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, Brazil co-sponsored a resolution introduced by the Sri Lankan representative and did not support European efforts to amend the text. These were clear manifestations of a social competition strategy that brought negative outcomes as Brazil was criticized for such postures, as mentioned earlier.

Despite Brazil’s complaints about the selective and political nature of human rights monitoring and protection in the Human Rights Commission, spotted by state officials also within the HRC (Amorim, 2010, p. 147), Brazil’s neutrality was also questionable. Between 2006 and 2010 the Latin American actor voted in favor of resolutions condemning human rights violations in Palestine. The Council’s focus on abuses committed by Israel, as evidenced by the number of resolutions addressing the issue adopted in regular as well as special sessions¹⁶, was considered politically motivated as numerous violations in other parts of the world never received similar attention (Asano & Nader, 2011, p. 128).

During Dilma Rousseff’s first term in office from 2011 to 2014, Brazil’s vote on resolutions condemning human rights abuses in specific countries was less controversial. Brazil supported the resolutions on Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Sri Lanka. In 2011 Brazil also co-sponsored a resolution on the human rights situation in Libya, adopted at the 15th special session. The country’s posture changed in March 2015 with the Brazilian abstention in the case of both Iran and Syria. The Temer administration maintained such a posture towards Iran. In the case of Syria, Brazil voted in favor of the resolutions, however, country representatives expressed concerns also raised by the previous government. They referred to the interference of external actors into the conflict, including arms supply, which was aggravating the situation. Further, at all three sessions in 2018 Brazil supported several amendments submitted by Russia. The amendments called upon states and non-state actors to render support to the parties engaged in the Syrian conflict, referred more explicitly to the engagement of several terrorist groups in the conflict, and criticized

¹⁶ Until 2020, out of 28 sessions 7 were held to discuss the situation in Palestine and 1, the situation in Lebanon.

“unilateral coercive measures” applied against the Assad regime as leading to a deterioration of the human rights situation within the war-thorn country. Such a position once again voiced the concerns of Brazil as a member of the Global South driven by the non-intervention principle and thus ready to provide competitive standing in the international body.

The main modifications notable in Brazil's standing towards the debate on human rights violations since 2019 relate to Israel. For the first time since 2006 Brazil voted against the resolution on human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan and abstained from voting on the issue of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Explaining such posture, Brazilian representatives pointed to an excessive number of resolutions referring to Israel within the HRC (Brazil, 2019b) and the selective nature of the draft tackling the situation in the Golan Heights as it omitted abuses in Syria (Brazil, 2019c). The shift was a consequence of a major recalibration of Brazil's strategic partnerships. In an effort to align with the position of the United States in international organizations, Brazil followed the direction of its partner, who complained of the anti-Israeli bias within the HRC. Additionally, as already signaled by Ernesto Araújo in his inauguration speech, the Latin American state perceived Israel as a crucial ally. In the diplomat's view, both countries, bound by the Judeo-Christian tradition, were members of the coalition of virtuous states in the global cultural war to save humanity.

Another alteration visible in 2019 referred to the state's antagonistic posture towards the regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua. In the case of Nicaragua, Brazil was one of the main sponsors of the initiatives in 2019 and 2020. In the Venezuelan case, the country sponsored in 2019 and introduced in 2020, at the request of the Trump administration (Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva, 2021, p. 355), a draft proposal condemning human rights abuses committed by the Maduro regime. This was unprecedented as Brazil's leftist presidents firmly avoided referring to this issue, including when explicitly questioned in interviews (Vivanco, 2015, June 29). The Temer administration in September 2018 voted in favor of a resolution on Venezuela introduced by Peru, although the country did not sponsor it. Temer's successor went further, leaving aside the non-interference principle, which was emphasized since the beginning of the 20th century in Brazil's relations with regional partners. These modifications, reflecting an alignment with Western democracies on the matter of human rights violations, represent a shift from social competition to social mobility. Yet, this posture was not fully consistent.

A much softer stance was shown by Brazil on the situation in Iran and the Philippines. The state abstained from voting in both cases. Particularly surprising was the state's posture towards Iran as it was inconsistent with the current administration's support for a tough stand on the Islamic Republic.¹⁷ The

¹⁷ Brazil participated in the US-led Middle East conference in Warsaw in February 2019 considered anti-Iranian and even offered to host another similar event (Desideri, 2020, January 8).

Brazilian delegate in an explanation of the vote expressed the state's "understanding that Iran will undertake additional measures on the protection and promotion of human rights" (Brazil, 2019a), which reminded the approach assumed by Brazil between 2015 and 2018. In the case of the Philippines, the decision raised criticism as it was perceived as ideologically motivated. President Bolsonaro, oftentimes compared with President Rodrigo Duterte, did not want to point fingers at another far-right and conservative regime (Brasil se abstém em votação na ONU sobre violações de direitos humanos nas Filipinas, 2019, July 12; Duchiae, 2019, July 11).

Causes promoted by the Global South

Between 2006 and March 2016, Brazil voted in favor or even co-sponsored resolutions referring to topics promoted by developing countries, thus expressing its affiliation to the Global South. This affinity was mostly manifested in a less confrontational manner than was the case of human rights abuses and it can be classified as an example of a social creativity approach. The promoted causes focused on economic, social, and cultural rights as well as national sovereignty, such as the right to food; the right to development; international solidarity; the right to peace; promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights; the effects of foreign debt on economic, social, and cultural rights; the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights. The initiatives were promoted by Cuba and other members of the NAM – Venezuela, Egypt, and Iran – on behalf of the group. Adjustments in Brazil's vote were made after the impeachment of President Rousseff. The administration of Michel Temer decided to vote against a Cuban-sponsored resolution on foreign debt and it abstained from supporting documents referring to the democratic and equitable international order and unilateral coercive measures (the latter sponsored by Venezuela on behalf of NAM). Since 2019 Brazil voted against the resolution on the impact of unilateral coercive measures on human rights and the effects of foreign debt on human rights. Also, by abstention, the state no longer supported the resolutions on the democratic international order and the use of mercenaries. The only Cuban-sponsored drafts still backed by Brazil were resolutions on the promotion of the right to peace and international solidarity. What stood out making a stark contrast with past practices was an extremely critical assessment of the Cuban and Venezuelan regime when explaining its vote on documents introduced by the Caribbean countries. For instance, at the 42nd session in September 2019 the Brazilian delegate explained that despite the state's support for a democratic and equitable international order, principles of self-determination and sovereignty, Brazil would abstain in the voting as "the Government of Cuba lacks the necessary legitimacy to lead the initiative" (Brazil, 2019f). When commenting

on a resolution regarding Venezuela, sponsored by Brazil at the same session, the state's representative complained about the criticism faced "at the HRC corridors" by the country due to the initiative. Emphasizing the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis and the Brazilian support for refugees from the Bolivarian Republic, the representative mentioned twice: "We are not the bad guys." (Brazil, 2019e). The statement was another example of Brazil's black and white perception of the international system, torn by the clash between forces of good and evil. Yet, the necessity to remind the UN audience about who the "good guys" were, albeit undoubtedly sarcastic, can be read as a signal that Brazil's moral superiority lacks recognition and representatives of the government are aware of it. The strong inclination towards ideologically motivated initiatives not only exposed a much more critical posture towards regional neighbors. The changes, visible since the Temer government and continued in the last two years, signal changes in the Brazilian commitment to causes close to members of the Global South, thus questioning the state's adherence to this group. In line with the declarations made by Ernesto Araújo who promoted Brazil's profile as a member of the Western civilization, Brazil continues to distance itself from developing countries, a shift clearly noticeable in the HRC. Yet, a deepening cleavage between Brazil and other developing nations was not the only novelty, as it was followed by several unprecedented decisions which distanced Brazil also from Western democracies.

Topics introduced and supported by Brazil

Despite criticism faced by Brazil on several occasions due to abstentions in votings on human rights violations in several countries, the state also managed to gain recognition and prestige as a promoter of human rights causes. Brazilian diplomats proudly emphasized the state's efforts to raise awareness on the incompatibility between democracy and racism, access to medication for developing countries, the rights of people with HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, rights of people struggling with mental illnesses, older persons, and journalists. At the initiative of Brazil, the HRC held special sessions to discuss the impact of the global economic crisis on human rights in 2009 and the situation in Haiti in 2010. Celso Amorim in 2009 stressed that although Brazil led in sponsoring documents referring to economic, social, and cultural rights – initiatives developed within the social creativity strategy through which Brazil was gaining visibility as a member of the Global South, able to provide innovative solutions and raise awareness on causes particularly important for the South – the state also paid attention to political and civic rights traditionally promoted by members of the North. By giving the example of the incompatibility between democracy and racism, a cause first introduced by Brazil in 2006 at the 2nd HRC session, the diplomat reassured that Brazil was also identifying itself as a member of the block of Western liberal democra-

cies, thus, willing to take on mobility strategies.¹⁸ In addition, Brazil advocated for the adoption of human rights voluntary goals as well as resolutions on the enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity building in the field of human rights. Another topic raised by Brazil regarded human rights and the Internet as well as the right to privacy in the digital age.

Many of these initiatives were continued by the administrations of Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. Access to medication and the right to physical and mental health continues to be a cause the Brazilian delegation in Geneva advocates for. Other issues include the rights of older persons, the safety of journalists¹⁹, the negative impact of corruption on human rights, technical cooperation in the field of human rights, and the right to privacy in the digital age. In 2016 and 2017 Brazil also introduced documents aimed at addressing the issue of racial discrimination, however, the attention given to this topic decreased after January 2019 as the state did not introduce any draft referring to this issue since then.

Other causes which Brazil supported between 2006 and 2018, most commonly by co-sponsoring them, were i.a. the rights of indigenous peoples, migrants, freedom of religion, prevention of genocide, human trafficking, the question of the death penalty, enforced voluntary disappearances, the right to peaceful protests, and combating torture. After 2019 Brazil showed signs of continuity, backing many of these initiatives as a co-sponsor. Causes that were no longer supported by the Latin American state included the rights of indigenous people and migrants.²⁰ A novelty since 2019 was the state's increased commitment to combat discrimination based on religion. On numerous occasions leading members of the Brazilian administration, including President Bolsonaro, ministers Araújo and Alves raised the issue of persecuted Christians. Brazil along with Poland and Iraq organized an event to discuss the matter of religious persecutions at the 41st HRC session in 2019. During the event, the Brazilian representative claimed that Christians were the most persecuted religious group in the world (Chade, 2019, July 9). What gained even more attention, however, was Brazil's unprecedented standing on women's rights and gender identity. These initiatives were clear manifestations of social

¹⁸ At later sessions Brazil also introduced resolutions on education as a tool to eliminate racism (in 2013), addressing the impact of racism on women's rights (in 2016) and advocated for the elaboration of a declaration promoting the rights of African descendants (in 2017). Brazil's commitment to combating racism was also expressed by co-sponsoring resolutions urging to eliminate racism, other forms of racial discrimination and xenophobia, an initiative promoted by African states.

¹⁹ President Bolsonaro was accused of inciting violence against journalists (Medeiros, 2010, January 16).

²⁰ In January 2019, the Bolsonaro administration decided to withdraw from the UN Global Compact for Migration initiative despite the state's engagement in negotiating the international non-binding deal in 2018.

competition, through which Brazil was to exert and further increase its moral authority.

Brazil was the first country to introduce a resolution proposal on the topic of sexual orientation and gender identity at a UN human rights protection body in 2003 (Nogueira, 2017, p. 550). After several attempts and adjustments of its content, finally, in 2011 the document passed and was reintroduced in 2014 and 2016²¹ granting Brazil visibility as a promoter of a progressive human rights agenda. Although in 2019 the country together with Argentina introduced a document on the mandate of the independent expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, its standing on the rights of sexual minorities underwent a significant change. At the 41st session in July 2019, the Brazilian representative emphasized that the term “gender” lacked a clear definition in HRC documents and therefore explained that for the Brazilian delegation it was synonymous with “sex”, understood as a biological category (Brazil, 2019d). This new caveat to the term “gender” came in line with the instruction received by the Brazilian diplomats from Ernesto Araújo to exclude the term “gender” from their vocabulary and use solely the word “sex” (Valadares, 2019, August 7). It also stood in stark contrast with previous practices as Brazil actively supported documents using this expression. For instance, in September 2017, Brazil introduced a resolution addressing the importance of “mainstreaming a gender perspective” into the human rights protection system.²²

Efforts to present Brazil as a country engaged in the protection of sexual minorities were also limited since 2019. In 2020 at the 44th session, a debate was held after the presentation of a report on the global practice of “conversion therapies” for members of the LGBT community. The report stated that such practices were taking place in Brazil, provided by religious institutions, and pointed out that national legislation prohibiting them did not address the problem of “therapies” by “religious interventions”. The Brazilian delegate in response after the presentation (Brazil, 2020) tried to clarify the state’s official position towards these “therapies”. Although it was emphasized that such practices were illegal, the influence of religious groups on the rights of sexual minorities was not addressed.

Jair Bolsonaro and Ernesto Araújo on numerous occasions emphasized the strong commitment to defending the value of the family, making references to the traditional understanding of the family as based on the bond between a man and a woman (Bolsonaro, 2019, August 10; Araújo, 2019, October 22). These statements contrasted with Brazil’s position on the matter before 2019,

²¹ In 2016 Chile introduced the proposal on behalf of Brazil who was not a member of the Council at the 32nd session.

²² Resolution 36/8 *The full enjoyment of human rights by all women and girls and the systematic mainstreaming of a gender perspective into the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.*

also expressed within the HRC. At the 21st session in September 2012, when human rights protection in Brazil was under scrutiny within the universal periodic review mechanism, Brazil refuted a recommendation made by the Holy See to protect the “natural family”. The state’s delegate reminded the audience that Brazilian institutions “recognized other family arrangements as also being eligible for protection” (HRC, 2015, November 11, p. 169). In 2014, 2015, and 2017 Brazil abstained from voting on resolutions on the protection of the family sponsored by African and Arab states. The country did not support the proposal as amendments extending the definition of the family (by adding that “various forms of the family exist”), introduced in 2014 by Uruguay and in 2015 by Brazil, were refuted. Although in 2019 and 2020 the topic was not raised within the HRC, it is highly improbable that Brazil would back an extended understanding of the family including same-sex couples.

Another area that witnessed unparalleled adjustments referred to women’s rights. Since 2009 Brazil sponsored resolutions on women’s rights (on accelerating the efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women – a Canadian initiative – and on the elimination of discrimination against women, promoted by Mexico and Colombia) and voted against amendments proposed to these documents by Arab states and Russia. This was the case still in 2018 when Brazil was against amendment proposals aiming at deleting references to the right to evidence-based comprehensive sexual education as well as the acknowledgement of violence caused by intimate partners. In the same year at the September session, Brazil also rejected an amendment sponsored by Egypt and Russia to the resolution on preventable maternal mortality and morbidity in humanitarian settlements. The changes once again aimed at deleting references to the right to sexual education. One year later, at the 41st session in June, Brazil not only ceased to sponsor drafts introduced by Canada, Mexico, and Colombia but also voted in favor of amendments intended to erase references to the right to sexual education. Brazil was the only Latin American country that backed the Pakistani and Russian proposals, joining the club of such countries as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, China, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bangladesh. The Brazilian neighbors, along with European states, were against the amendments. At the same session, Brazil voted in a similar vein on the European resolution addressing the consequences of child, early, and forced marriage. The Latin American state supported a controversial amendment introduced by Bahrain. The proposal suggested binding the right to a comprehensive education for women and girls aimed at gender equality and women empowerment with “appropriate direction and guidance from parents and legal guardians”, thus introducing a reference to the girl’s family’s consent. Brazil’s new alignment with states associated with ultraconservative postures and poor human rights records came as a surprise to Brazil’s partners within the HRC as well as the domestic audience. Latin American diplomats, for years coordinating initiatives with their Brazilian counterparts, were stunned by the drastic shift and new Brazilian vocabulary, questioning established human

rights protection standards (Chade, 2019, June 20). The topic was also thrust into the national spotlight: main news outlets decried Brazil's new controversial alliances within the HRC (Duchiade, 2019, July 11; Queiroz, 2019, July 29; Senra, 2019, July 17; Chade, 2020, July 3; Maneo, 2020, July 7). In 2020 at the 44th session, Brazil tried to take a less controversial stand by abstaining from the vote on five amendments sponsored by Russia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, yet it did not sponsor the Mexican resolution (on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and girls).

It remains highly questionable whether under the Bolsonaro administration Brazil will manage to overcome associations with a group of countries opposed to strengthening human rights. It remains also an open question if the state's decision-makers are interested in overcoming such associations. For the past two years, Brazil within the HRC presented an ultraconservative posture in the debate over the protection of sexual minorities, the family, the rights of women and girls, and by advocating for the protection of persecuted Christians rather than focusing on such challenges as discrimination based on gender identity and domestic violence that Brazil itself is also facing. The state's decision-makers preferred alignments with countries criticized for human rights abuses such as Saudi Arabia and Russia over alliances with Western democracies. The described changes can be classified as a move to challenge the existing agenda on human rights protection and promote alternative understandings of rights, within the civilizational war over morality in which Brazil is supposedly "the good guy". If this move is an effort to purge the international system by bringing back fundamental values through competing with positions defending their established understandings, it is a failed one. For Brazil instead of recognition as a member of the global avant-garde gained visibility as a state that is losing its credentials as a human rights promoter and responsible member of the international community.

Conclusion

Perhaps the most surprising declaration made by a foreign affairs minister of a country traditionally recognized for its strive for greatness, the desire of *grandeza*, was the affirmation of Ernesto Araújo in October 2020 that Brazil preferred to be an international pariah rather than a "guest at the banquet of self-interested cynicism of the globalists". For the head of Brazilian diplomacy, being a pariah was a virtue (Araújo, 2020, October 22). These assertions starkly contrasted with past moments when Brazil was in the spotlight as an example in the fight against inequality and poverty, a credible actor able to convince the international community of its willingness to assume increased responsibility for world affairs.

Human rights protection is not an area associated with great power politics, contrary to mediation in high profile conflicts, acquisition of nuclear

power, and other increases in strategic material capabilities. States seeking status without resorting to hard measures select other areas and non-material resources which could increase their standing. International human rights promotion is one of them. Actors who aim at proving their international responsibility and commitment adhere to a set of rules and standards acknowledged by the dominant powers: the United States and, in the niche of human rights protection, Western modern liberal democracies having uncompromised human rights standards. Yet, for states with a long tradition of allegiance to human rights as a fundamental principle orienting foreign policy, this niche of international cooperation remains even more indispensable. Brazil did not procure a strengthened global standing through increases in hard power but, since the 20th century, remained committed to the notion of constructing prestige through other means. Mediation and diplomatic dialogue, peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for national sovereignty as well as the promotion of human rights, were typical instruments used by Brazilian diplomats until recently. If advocating for human rights solely cannot be considered a sufficient condition for status enhancement, in the case of soft powers, it is a necessary one as moral authority becomes an important way to gain visibility and recognition. The commitment to human rights protection is a baseline which must be fulfilled for the country to be taken seriously and considered as a responsible global player.

The paper presented two alternative ways of Brazilian status-seeking focused on the state's moral authority which brought differing results. Between 2006 and 2018 Brazil, expressing its profile as both Western liberal democracy and a member of the Global South (the latter identity promoted less vigorously by the Temer administration), identified opportunities for status gains by engaging in efforts to sustain and develop the international human rights system. Performing the role of a good international citizen, the state applied a blend of social mobility, creativity, and competition strategies. Although the last approach, manifested in reticence towards condemning human rights abuses within the HRC, cost Brazil image losses, applying social mobility and creativity strategies brought positive outcomes. Brazil was recognized as an actor contributing both to causes supported by Western liberal states as well as topics important for developing countries.

The changes palpable within the HRC since 2019 resonated with major policy shifts and ideological convictions of key figures responsible for the foreign policy design. The populist foreign policy adopted by the government was a nod towards President Bolsonaro's most radical followers and evangelicals, the religious community whose representatives were increasing their influence over political life in Brazil. The state since 2019 was no longer interested in sustaining the human rights protection system. As a defender of the faith and endowed with moral superiority, Brazil wished for its thorough redefinition. As frequently repeated by President Bolsonaro and Ernesto Araújo in an obvious reference to Evangelist John, it was necessary to bring

“the truth back in[to]” the international system. To this end, Brazil engaged in a range of activities adopting approaches of social mobility and competition. Country representatives aligned their votes with Western states on matters of human rights abuses in Venezuela and changed the state’s position on some resolutions regarding Israel. Yet, the determination to raise awareness over the situation in Cuba and Venezuela seemed to be first and foremost triggered by a Manichean vision of the global reality in which those countries, due to their ideological affiliations, were classified as foes. This also explains the reticent posture towards Duterte’s rule in the Philippines. The most visible shift in the past two years refers to Brazil’s posture on matters of religious freedom, the protection of the family, sexual minorities, and women. Putting itself in the same row alongside countries such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, known for their ultraconservative normative agenda and compromised human rights protection standards, took a heavy toll on Brazil’s prestige and authority as a human rights promoter.

The international alignments of Brazil were clearly exposed in January 2019, when the head of the Brazilian diplomacy stressed the country’s admiration for the U.S., Israel, and Hungary. Nevertheless, entitlement to moral authority requires recognition from a broader number of states, including members of the clubs recognized for high human rights protection standards. Should policymakers stop seeking such recognition, Brazil might fail not only to prove who “the good guys” are but also face accusations of “not being a serious state”.²³

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²³ An expression incorrectly attributed to President Charles de Gaulle in the context of the Lobster War (a diplomatic dispute in 1961–1963 between Brazil and France) became a saying in Brazil.

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**The Quest for Status: Brazil's
Activism in the UN Human
Rights Council 2006-2020**

Monika Sawicka

Artículos y ensayos

Harm Reduction Model in Mexico's Drug Policy

Modelo de reducción de daños en la política de drogas de México

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ABSTRACT

Harm reduction is an approach in drug policy based on health issues and human rights. The aim of this article is to present the essence of the harm reduction model, as well as its implementation in Mexico after the year 2006. The study is an attempt to answer the following research questions: firstly, what is the scale of psychoactive drugs consumption in Mexico – and what goes with it – its negative health implications; secondly, to what extent does the Mexican drug policy takes account of aspects related to public health? This analysis proves that Mexico lacks a comprehensive harm reduction strategy and the main role in implementing this model is played by civil society organizations.

KEYWORDS: *harm reduction, drug policy, Mexico, drugs, public health.*

RESUMEN

La reducción de daños es un enfoque de la política de drogas basado en cuestiones de salud y derechos humanos. El objetivo de este artículo es presentar la idea principal del modelo de reducción de daños, así como su implementación en México a partir del año 2006. El estudio intenta responder a las siguientes preguntas de investigación: en primer lugar, cuál es la magnitud del consumo de drogas psicoactivas en México y sus implicaciones negativas para la salud; en segundo lugar, en qué medida la política de drogas de México tiene en cuenta los aspectos relacionados con la salud pública. Este análisis demuestra que México carece de una estrategia integral de reducción de daños y que el papel principal en la aplicación de este modelo lo desempeñan las organizaciones de la sociedad civil.

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Introduction

Psychoactive drugs¹ represent a social construct meaning that in various time periods they were defined and valued differently by sundry social groups. Over the years, influenced by the Age of Discovery and the development of science, they have been desacralized, i.e., drugs have been moved from the *sacrum* sphere, in which access to them was restricted and controlled by certain social groups, to the *profanum* realm, where drugs are used for the so-called recreational purposes (Motyka & Marcinkowski, 2014). Greater drugs availability on the market, the emergence of new psychoactive substances and the lack of proper legal regulations pertaining to them caused health and social issues to mount. Most countries all over the world implemented the policy of drug prohibition as a response to these problems. Internationally, this policy is realised within international drug control regime. Nevertheless, global war on drugs has not yielded the expected results, it has not reduced demand and supply for psychoactive drugs. This fact is testified by the data from the report compiled in 2020 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime which says that over the last twenty years there has been an increase in drugs consumption, as well as their number and types on the market. In 2018, 269 million people took psychoactive drugs, which constitutes a 30% growth in comparison to 2009. Approximately 35.6 million people suffer from disorders resulting from drug-taking and only 1 in 8 people in need receives medical treatment, while among 11 million people taking psychoactive drugs by injection, 50% are reported to be suffering from type C hepatitis (HCV) and 1.4 million are carriers of HIV (UN, 2020, p. 1). Therefore, experts point out that the presence of drugs in culture and social space is inevitable and, therefore, more measures and resources need to be committed to the elimination of negative health and social impacts connected with their consumption, such as: addictions, overdose, the spread of contagious diseases, or marginalisation and discrimination towards people taking drugs. Schemes aiming to curb such processes are realised within the so-called harm reduction².

The main objective of this article is to present the essence of harm reduction model and to outline its implementation in Mexico after the year 2006. In the global drug market, Mexico performs the functions of psychoactive drugs

¹ For the purposes of this article, expressions „drugs”, „psychoactive drugs”, “psychoactive substances” will be used interchangeably. These expressions denote illegal substances.

² Harm reduction may also concern alcohol abuse issues.

producer³ and a transit country for drugs smuggling⁴, which is reflected in the organised crime groups activity, who profit by distributing and selling drugs (Nieto, 2018), thus generating violence which raises a serious issue for the country's security. It needs to be noted that since 2006 Mexico's drug policy has been mainly directed towards the militarisation in combating drug cartels (Jargiełło, 2018). Taking all the above issues into account, this article is an attempt to answer the following questions: firstly, what is the scale of psychoactive drug consumption and its negative health impacts?; secondly, to what extent does the Mexican drug policy allow for aspects related to public health? The following hypothesis has been put forward in this paper – Mexico lacks appropriate harm reduction strategy. To verify this claim, various methods and techniques of research have been used, for instance: institutional and legal analysis, analysis of literature and research, analysis of statistical data.

The essence of harm reduction model

Drug policy is one of the public policies pursued by a government or its representatives providing for a system of laws, regulations, courses of action, as well as budget priorities regarding psychoactive drugs. It encompasses a range of strategies involving issues such as: education, treatment, drug legislation, the police activities and control of borders⁵. Since the scope of drug policy is rather broad, three basic models may be distinguished. This article primarily centres around the harm reduction model, however, to fully understand its core, one must scratch beneath the surface and take a closer look at the other two.

The most common approach is supply reduction with its underlying conviction that drugs are bad, and drug-taking affects health and societies in a negative way, thus the need to curb the amount of drugs on the market and hinder access to them, which can be achieved by inhibiting illegal production of drugs and their distribution (Zamecka, 2018, pp. 112–115). The production may also be constrained by crop eradication or by implementing the alternative development programmes. Moreover, this policy also entails the liquidation of illegal laboratories and controlling the chemical precursors. In addition, drug distribution is hindered by both police and border guards' activities, for example – drug seizure (UN ODCCP, 2000, p. 69) Supply reduction involves legal control which makes use of harsh penalties or repressive measures. This essentially constitutes the policy of combating criminality by penal measures oriented on drug control and fighting drug crime. The model in question may take extreme forms such as: prohibition, capital punishment

³ Heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine.

⁴ Cocaine.

⁵ Author's own definition based on: EMCDDA, 2017, p. 3; UN ODCCP, 2000, p. 23.

for drug-related offences or the militarisation of activities against drug crime, which is often figuratively called war on drugs.

Demand reduction model constitutes a crucial component of drug policy in many countries. It refers to policies and schemes orientated on limiting psychoactive drugs consumption. Contrary to the former model, one of the assumptions of demand reduction model is the fact that the existence of a drug-free society is an unreal concept. Yet, the risk of reaching out for drugs needs to be reduced by taking preventative and therapeutic measures⁶. This model involves strategies regarding prevention and education i.e., raising social awareness and compounding knowledge of threats related to drug consumption, especially among adolescents. The key factor seems to be enabling easy access to high quality services falling within therapy and treatment of people addicted to psychoactive drugs, however the mandatory requirement to receive such help is to stop using drugs and stay sober (Zamecka, 2018, pp. 115–117).

The model which addresses the drug issue in the most humanitarian and health-promoting way is harm reduction. According to the definition provided by a non-governmental organization Harm Reduction International:

Harm reduction refers to policies, programmes and practises that aim to minimise negative health, social and legal impacts associated with drug use, drug policies and drug laws. Harm reduction is grounded in justice and human rights. It focuses on positive change and on working with people without judgement, coercion, discrimination (...). (Harm Reduction International, 2021)

It does not stigmatise drug users, claiming that drug consumption and addiction stems from various factors: social, environmental, cultural, and personal. As in the case of demand reduction, drug-addicted people should be treated as people suffering from an illness who ought to be offered treatment. Contrary to the previous model, it is not mandatory for a person to stop using psychoactive substances and keep drug-abstinence. At the bottom of this model lies the concern for the well-being of a person who takes and is addicted to psychoactive drugs and the concern for public health which manifests itself in hindering the “harm” resulting from taking drugs such as, for example, the spread of HIV across the population or other diseases or viruses, which may be the result of some “risky behaviour” – for instance – taking drugs by injection, using non-sterile injection equipment which had been used before.

⁶ This model mainly involves using the social policy measures. It must be borne in mind that the demand might also be curbed using criminal law. The so-called “deterrence mechanism” is supposed to prevent people from drug consumption in the fear for penal responsibility (Krajewski, 2001, pp. 69–70).

Harm reduction entails a comprehensive set of services recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) (UNAIDS, 2019, p. 17).

These activities include:

1. Needle and syringes exchange programmes⁷.
2. Drug dependence treatment, including opioid substitution therapy⁸.
3. Testing for HIV services.
4. Anti-retrovirus therapy⁹.
5. Prevention and treatment of sexually transmissible diseases.
6. Condom distribution programmes for people injecting drugs and their sexual partners.
7. Directed information, education, and communication.
8. Prevention, vaccination, diagnostics and treatment of type B and C hepatitis.
9. Prophylaxis, diagnostics, and treatment of tuberculosis.
10. Distribution of naloxone¹⁰.

Apart from the above-mentioned components, harm reduction might also involve such aspects as: the existence of the so-called consumption rooms, in which drugs may be taken under the supervision of qualified staff and in hygienic conditions; giving out dressings and disinfection materials; housing initiatives for the addicted homeless; psychosocial support and providing information about drugs and their safe use (Harm Reduction International, 2021).

Despite the obvious differences between the above-mentioned models, they should be treated complementarily, which means that they can co-exist and complement one another. In effect, however, most countries base their drug policy on supply reduction, which is expensive, and often does not yield the desired results. Therefore, research-based attitude change towards drug issue is necessary. According to UNAIDS report from 2019, implementing com-

⁷ The exchange involves giving out sterile materials to people taking drugs by injection with the intention to lower the risk of them getting infected with HIV and HCV and to collect used equipment from them which is intended to prevent random people from being exposed to it (Michalewski, 2021, p. 26).

⁸ It involves giving people addicted to heroin and other opiates its synthetic equivalent – mainly methadone. This action aims to combat withdrawal syndrome and to prevent the rejection effect thanks to which a patient will be able to function in a society. Methadone therapy leads to a decrease in or a complete withdrawal from drug-taking (Michalewski, 2021, p. 26).

⁹ It involves treating people infected with HIV aiming to improve their health condition, restore their immune system, lower the risk of AIDS progression and the risk of other people getting infected.

¹⁰ Distribution of naloxone is recommended by WHO. Naloxone is a substance which blocks opiates. If given at the right moment to a person who overdosed drugs, it will prevent death and save the person's life. Typically, other addicted people are witnesses to overdose, that is why, it is recommended that they have naloxone so that they could react in time (Michalewski, 2021, p. 27).

prehensive harm reduction services reduces “the incidence of blood-borne infections, problem drug use, overdose deaths and other harms. Countries that have successfully scaled up harm reduction have experienced steep declines in HIV infections among people who inject drugs” (UNAIDS, 2019, p. 2). Harm reduction arouses some controversy, but it appears to be of the most humanitarian, pragmatic and health-promoting nature. Its main goal is to improve the quality of life of people taking drugs without imposing abstinence upon them. This, though, should not be associated with promoting the use of psychoactive substances, but rather the care for an individual and the whole society.

Drug use in Mexico and its negative health implications

The key study on the tendencies of psychoactive drugs use is National Trends in Alcohol, Tobacco and Drugs Consumption in 2016–2017 (*Encuesta Nacional de Consumo de Drogas, Alcohol y Tabaco*, ENCODAT 2016–2017), which was conducted in 2016 when 56,877 people were interviewed, 12,440 of whom were adolescents aged 12–17 and the other 44,437 were adults aged 18–65. According to this research, there has been an increase in consumption of “any drug”¹¹ taken by a person at a certain stage of their lives. In 2011, 7.8% of interviewees admitted to having used such drugs, while in 2016 the number rose to 10.3%. Between 2011–2016 the consumption of illegal drugs used at a certain stage of a person’s life rose from 7.2% to 9.9% with cannabis being the most popular drug (used by 8.6% of people surveyed) followed by cocaine with 3.5% of people admitting to its consumption. Moreover, 0.6% of people who took part in this study exhibited a possible consumption dependency on drug use in the last year and 20.3% of them signed on for treatment. Interestingly, in recent years the average age of people who start using drugs decreased from 20.6 in 2002, 18.7 in 2008, 18.8 in 2011 to 17.8 in 2016 (*Encuesta Nacional...*, 2017; CONADIC, 2017, pp. 50, 56, 115).

In Mexico, a staggering 164,157 people take drugs by injection, and bearing in mind the whole population of the country, it is the highest number in Latin America. For comparison, in Argentina the number of people who inject drugs amounts to 8,144, in Colombia to 14,893. Harm Reduction International report from 2020 provides a percentage number of HIV, type C (anti-HCV) and type B (anti-HBsAg) carriers among people who inject drugs. The prevalence rate of HIV looks the following: in Mexico 4.4% of people, in Argentina 3.5% and in Colombia 5.5%. Nevertheless, the most worrying

¹¹ The expression “any drug” refers to the use of medical substances (opioids, sedatives, barbiturates, or amphetamine) without prescription or their consumption exceeding a doctor’s recommendation over a longer period of time or the use of illegal drugs such as: marijuana, cocaine, cocaine paste, crack, hallucinogens, intoxicative inhalants, heroine, and stimulants of methamphetamine type and other substances such as ketamine or GHB etc.

data concern the prevalence of type C hepatitis. In Mexico, 96% people who use injected drugs are carriers of this disease, which constitutes the highest number in the region, and one of the highest in the world. As a comparison, in Argentina this rate comes to 4.8% and in Columbia it totals 31.6%, whereas in the case of hepatitis B, this rate only amounts to 0.2% in Mexico, 1.6% in Argentina and there are no data available for Colombia (Harm Reduction International, 2020, p. 100).

Territorial data show that it is in the northern areas of the country that the issue of drug consumption and addictions is most apparent. This fact is reflected in the research conducted in 2017–2018 by the National Institute of Psychiatry Ramón de la Fuente Muñiz (*Instituto Nacional de Psiquiatría Ramón de la Fuente Muñiz*, INPRM) in association with the Ministry of Health and with the participation of three non-governmental organisations¹². This study concerns the use of heroin in three major, cross-border cities in Mexico, namely: Tijuana (Lower California), San Luis Rio Colorado (Sonora) and Ciudad Juarez (Chihuahua), and it was conducted in addiction treatment centres on a group of 600 people and at consumption sites on a group of 391 people. Based on the results, it has been concluded that in the population of people taking heroin, the majority were male, migrants who tried to cross the border and/or were deported from the USA. These individuals also had had experimentation phases with other psychoactive drugs – as many as 96.5% had used marijuana at least once in their lifetime, and 91.3% used cocaine. In addition, the research indicates that 66.8% of surveyed people experienced overdose at some point in their lives, which represents a total of 401 cases. The data regarding risky practices connected with taking drugs also need to be taken into consideration. As many as 75.1% of interviewees admitted having lent a used syringe to other people, while 69.8% admitted having used a syringe which had been used before. Thereupon, a high rate of reactive hepatitis C cases has been reported in treatment centres. It amounts to 76.9%, which represents 455 cases. In the context of negative social implications such as discrimination or marginalisation, as many as 58.6% of the population surveyed claimed to have been treated with contempt and to have been rejected or offended by a family member, while 49.5% have been rejected by potential employers during the job-seeking process (Fleiz-Bautista & Domínguez-García ..., 2019, pp. 61, 68, 90, 93, 162).

The problem of drug consumption and the number of addictions surge in northern states stems from the specific character of these areas, namely, the fact that they border the southern states of the USA. These are territories of both geographical and goods and services mobility, where people cross the border both for touristic and earning purposes. Moreover, these are key points of smuggling drugs into the USA. For these reasons, in some parts of the cities drug trafficking and consumption, prostitution and crime have simmered.

¹² *Prevencasa, Integración Social Verter and Programa Compañeros.*

Increasing the number of border patrols, combined with the endeavours to seal the border, resulted in people – who did not manage to cross the border or have been deported from the USA – having to settle in cross-border cities. Consequently, no prospects and source of income made them resort to psychoactive drugs. It must be stated that due to the opioid crisis¹³ in the USA, in northern Mexican states an increase in heroin and fentanyl consumption, resulting from the change in drug demand, and thus, the heroin price reduction, has been noted. Additionally, as a result of security police operations, a share of drugs produced in Mexico does not make it across the border and reach its American consumers. Therefore, to make up for the financial loss, drug cartels try to stimulate and meet the local drug demand (Bonello, November 1, 2019), which results in the increase in psychoactive drug consumption in the country.

The implementation of harm reduction model in Mexico

In the context of public health, Mexican drug policy is regulated by several legal acts. The fourth article of the Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico (*Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*) states that every person has the right to health (Diario Oficial de la Federación, May 28, 2021). The control and supervision over particular psychoactive drugs have been defined in the General Health Law (*Ley General de Salud*), which provides a definition of the so-called “therapeutic values” of psychotropic substances¹⁴, and determines whether they pose a threat to public health (Diario Oficial de la Federación, August 20, 2009). Another important piece of legislation concerning drugs which took effect on 21st of August 2009 is the decree known as Small-Scale Drug Law (*Ley de narcomenudeo*) which decriminalises psychoactive drugs and determines the maximum number of dosages allowed for personal and direct use without facing criminal charges¹⁵. Any individual taking more drugs than stated in statutory law, caught by the police for the third time, will have to attend compulsory rehab treatment. Moreover, the law determines the kinds of crime committed against health in the context of drug dealing, and more importantly, designates the following terms: “user”, “addicted person” and “retailer” (Hernández, 2010).

¹³ By the term “opioid crisis” we refer to the epidemic of prescribed opioid medication addiction (mainly fentanyl) which goes back to 1990s. Since 2017 a steep increase in opioid addictions and overdose deaths has been observed. See: National Institute..., March 11, 2021.

¹⁴ The term “psychotropic substances” refers to substances affecting central nervous system. It is synonymous to “psychoactive drugs” frequently used in legal parlance.

¹⁵ The 2009 reform eliminates legal sanctions for the possession of the following drugs: 0.5 g of cocaine, 50 mg of heroin, 0.015 mg of LSD, 40 mg of methamphetamine, 5 g of marijuana (Mackey & Werb..., 2014).

The most important legal instrument regulating issues regarding drug use in terms of health is the Official Mexican Standard 028 (*Norma Oficial Mexicana, NOM-028-SSA2-2009*) which pertains to the prevention, treatment, and control of addictions. The standard provides a definition of harm reduction which, in a nutshell, says that it is a complex of activities aiming to avoid completely or limit the risk and curb harms caused by psychoactive drugs consumption. Thus, it is imperative to provide treatment and prophylaxis. This does not necessarily mean abstinence. In the case of HIV/AIDS, it is a strategy which involves providing information about HIV/AIDS to drug users; instructing them how to properly clean syringes and how to use sterile needles and syringes; distributing condoms, chlorine, gauze bandages, as well as giving medical advice, conducting HIV tests; community service for people who inject drugs, creating interdisciplinary advice groups regarding drug consumption. Such activities are the safest and most effective method of limiting the HIV transmission among individuals who inject drugs (CNDH, 2009). This definition corresponds to the UN-promoted definitions, nongovernmental organisations, and academic centres.

There are two methods of treating people addicted to psychoactive substances available in Mexico, namely: ambulatory and stationary. The former is represented by 341 governmental Primary Health Care Centres for Addictions (*Centros de Atención Primaria en Adicciones, CAPA*), 104 external consulting units of the Centres for Youth Integration (*Centros de Integración Juvenil*) and medical services provided by an unspecified number of private clinics. As far as the stationary care goes, it consists of 11 hospital wards of the Centres for Youth Integration, the so-called public housing units (45) and 2,108 private care facilities for the addicted, many of which were set up over a dozen years ago. All this constitutes the civil society's response to the fact that such facilities are extremely scarce in the country. Almost half of these facilities are registered, and 348 entities are officially approved, which means that medical services provided there comply with the rules of law (CONADIC, 2019, p. 44).

Within the framework of harm reduction, needle exchange schemes (NSP) are realised. However, according to the data obtained from the Harm Reduction International report from 2020, less than 5% of people injecting drugs have access to such programmes. Heroin addicts may use opioid agonist therapy (OAT), which primarily involves methadone therapy. Nonetheless, neither NSP nor OAT are accessible for the inmates. In Mexico, naloxone is distributed with the intention to prevent deaths resulting from opioids¹⁶ overdose. People who take drugs do not have the possibility to use the so-called drug consumption rooms (DCR), with only the city of Mexicali having this type of facility available. Yet, this place is not officially supervised

¹⁶ Opioids are a group of substances including opiates (among others opium, morphine, and heroin) and synthetic opioids (for instance fentanyl) and pharmaceutical opioids (prescribed medicine).

by the public service administration organs (Harm Reduction International, 2020, p. 100).

Detailed data showing precise information regarding the realisation and financing of harm reduction schemes are missing. It is known that in the last 10 years public health expenditure fluctuated between 2.5% and 2.9% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (Méndez, 2020). It needs to be stressed that during the presidential term of Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), who declared a “war on drug cartels”, as much as 97.07% (790 billion pesos) of overall drug policy expenditure was channelled to law enforcement activities, and as little as 2.91% (23 billion pesos) was used for prophylaxis and treatment including human rights programmes (Zedillo Ponce de León, Pérez Correa González..., 2019, p. 42). The public institution coordinating and financing harm reduction is the National Centre for the Prevention and Control of HIV and AIDS (*Centro Nacional para la Prevención y el Control del VIH y el Sida*, CENSIDA). It subsidises projects realised by private sector – only to a small extent, though. Between 2011–2017 CENSIDA financed 31 social and research programmes, 19 of which were realised in conjunction with nongovernmental organisations. A 23 million pesos investment went directly to 44,444 and indirectly to 22,468 participants (Magis-Rodríguez & García-Sánchez..., 2018, p. 155). Nongovernmental organisation Global Fund was an important entity financing harm reduction operations. From January 2011 until December 2013, it aided the HIV struggle in Mexico appropriating 34,680,258 US dollars (Global Fund, 2021) for the cause. However, due to the country's increasing GDP, financial support was terminated, which translated to the limitation of harm reduction services by decreasing the number of civil society organisations which, at the time, did not receive enough funding from the Mexican government.

Essentially, it is the civil society organisations that play a major role in implementing harm reduction. This funding has been in effect since 1988 with the support of international organisations and academic centres (Ospina-Escobar, September 23, 2019). Thanks to their interventions, people with a drug abuse problem living in extreme poverty on the fringes of society may gain access to health services. These organisations centre around Mexican Harm Reduction Network (*Red Mexicana de Reducción de Daños*, REDUMEX), whose members include people taking drugs, former drug users, activists, and scientists. According to the CENSIDA data, in 2014 there existed 38 registered organisations in the north of the country. However, by 2017 this number had dropped to 8. The number of facilities offering replacement therapy also decreased significantly. In 2013, CENSIDA recorded 21 such facilities nationwide, but in 2017 there were just 10. These facilities were shut down also because of the medication deficit. The depletion of financial backing also resulted in the reduction of syringes distribution to people who inject drugs. The biggest number of syringes was given out during the realisation of the Global Fund programme in 2013 when the number of syringes per person amounted

to 19.7 while in 2017 it dropped by 30% and came to 6.2 syringes per person annually (Ospina-Escobar, June 11, 2019). Considering WHO recommendations, these numbers were low¹⁷.

Although civil society organisations are the key entity providing harm reduction services, in 2019, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador announced that they would not be subsidised by the state. This decision was legitimised by the government's fight against corruption, financial abuse, and fraud. According to Angélica Ospina Escobar from REDUMEX, the lack of governmental support is going to hit smaller organisations, which do not have international backing and are more of a communal nature, the hardest, meaning that frequently they are the only service provider in terms of harm reduction among local communities (Ospina-Escobar, June 11, 2019). It must be borne in mind that the lack of funds is going to hinder the process of helping people in need. Consequently, it may increase the chances of HIV epidemic occurring in the future. The data regarding the efficiency of harm reduction schemes in terms of reducing the number of infections were published in 2019 in *Salud Mental* scientific journal. It has been calculated that in Mexico, between 2015–2018, among 66,973 people who inject drugs, 869 HIV infections were successfully prevented. The total CENSIDA's investment spent on harm reduction came to 13,206,323.20 pesos, which meant that the average cost of preventing 1 HIV infection amounted to 15,197 pesos, whereas an annual anti-retrovirus treatment of an infected person came to 31,344 pesos (Valenzuela-Lara, Ponce-Ramos *et al.*, 2019, pp. 160–161). It may be concluded that prevention is more cost-effective than treatment since the cost of preventing a single infection is 50% lower than an annual treatment cost of an infected person whose survival rate may reach 20 years.

Presidential decree concerning funding restrictions for civil society organisations proves that the government continues their predecessors' drug policy which, above all, relies on supply reduction, with little regard given to the issue of public health. Even though The National Development Programme for years 2019–2024 (*Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019–2024*) (Diario Oficial de la Federación, July 12, 2019) highlighted the necessity to reformulate drug policy, put an end to drug war and adopt the prevention strategy treatment of addictions, in effect, the government did not devise any strategy in this respect. Mexico lacks the proper system which would be able to monitor the efficacy of such programmes, and the one which would include data coming both from state institutions and private entities, which in turn, would make it possible to coordinate activities in a better way and to provide more effective health care for patients, thus curbing drug-related social and health harms.

¹⁷ WHO recommends distributing 200 syringes per person annually.

Conclusions

Mexico is among the states most severely affected by the negative impacts of drug prohibition related to combating organised crime groups. What is more, in recent years the use and abuse of psychoactive drugs has posed a serious health and social issue in the country – the fact which is related to the increase in HIV and HCV infections, as well as the marginalisation and discrimination of drug addicts. It can be noticed that drug problem affects different parts of the country to a varying degree, which is mainly caused by an array of socio-economic factors and the proximity of the USA.

Mexico lacks an integrated approach to drug policy which would rely on harm reduction to a greater extent and whose purpose would be to contain the negative health, social and economic implications of taking drugs. Despite the existing legal mechanisms regulating this model, in effect, they do not translate into any particular strategy. There is no public institution being solely responsible for the coordination of harm reduction programmes. These activities rest with CENSIDA, whose goal is to prevent the spread of HIV and AIDS or HCV across society. However, it must be borne in mind that harm reduction should also encompass other aspects aiming to improve the general well-being and quality of life of people taking psychoactive drugs. In Mexico, it primarily concerns the needle and syringe exchange scheme and substitutional programmes. These activities are essentially performed by the civil society organisations, which are not sufficiently subsidised by the government.

In recent years, in Mexico there has been the liberalisation of drug law¹⁸. Still, there are no projects aiming to protect public health which would observe human rights, while experts emphasise the fact that positive effects of decriminalisation or legalisation of psychoactive substances depend on the degree to which the harm reduction model or preventative schemes have been implemented. Ensuring the appropriate harm reduction services for people taking drugs is crucial, especially now, during COVID-19 pandemic, when access to health is restricted – the consequences of which most deeply affect the addicted living in extreme poverty. It needs to be stressed that by signing The Sustainable Development Goals, Mexico declared that AIDS epidemic should be contained by 2030. In 2020, the Ministry of Health announced the launch of the national programme whose purpose is to eliminate type C hepatitis, viewed as a public health issue, by 2030. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned goals will not be realised without implementing a proper harm reduction stra-

¹⁸ Since 2017, medical use of marijuana has been legal in Mexico. In 2018, the Supreme Court pronounced that the ban on possessing and cultivating marijuana is non-constitutional and it ordered that the appropriate law be changed in that respect. According to the stand ready legislative bill, adults will be allowed to possess up to 28 grams of marijuana for personal use and cultivate up to 6 plants. The bill is meant to regulate issues concerning the rules of the operation of commercial market and the system of granting licenses (Lopez, July 14, 2021).

tegy which should allow for the diversity of the society including aspects, such as: sex, LGBT+ or the indigenous people.

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La vigencia del pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi en el contexto latinoamericano: el rol del empresario¹

The Validity of the Thought of Juan Bautista Alberdi in the Latin American Context. The Role of the Businessman²

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RESUMEN

El objetivo de este artículo es presentar, en el actual contexto latinoamericano, la vigencia del pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi (JBA) respecto de las condiciones necesarias para superar el estado de pobreza, así como revelar las condiciones institucionales y el rol de los emprendedores sobre las dinámicas de generación de valor. La metodología utilizada se basa en el análisis documental de la obra y de fuentes secundarias relevantes al estudio de su pensamiento. Presentar el pensamiento de Alberdi da cuenta de la relevancia de sus diagnósticos sobre la pobreza y las limitaciones de oportunidades del conjunto de países latinoamericanos.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Juan Bautista Alberdi, emprendedor, valor, pobreza, crisis, instituciones.*

ABSTRACT

The objective of this article is to present, in the current Latin American context, the validity of the thought of Juan Bautista Alberdi (JBA) regarding the necessary conditions to overcome the state of poverty as well as to reveal the institutional conditions and the role of entrepreneurs over the dynamics of value generation. The methodology used is based on the documentary analysis of his work and secondary

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² This document reveals part of the research conclusions of the author's doctoral studies in Economic Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires.

sources relevant to the study of his thought. The presentation of Alberdi's thought shows the relevance of his diagnoses on poverty and the limitations of opportunities in all Latin American countries.

KEYWORDS: *Juan Bautista Alberdi, entrepreneur, value, poverty, crisis, institutions.*

Introducción

El objetivo de este artículo es presentar el análisis de la relación entre las condiciones institucionales, el rol de los emprendedores y las crisis sobre las dinámicas de generación de valor en la Argentina del siglo XIX en el pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi (JBA). Se presentan aquí parcialmente los resultados de la investigación doctoral respecto del pensamiento de Alberdi para dar cuenta de la relevancia de sus diagnósticos sobre la pobreza y las limitaciones de oportunidades del conjunto de países latinoamericanos.

La investigación se planteó contrastar el aporte del pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi a las ciencias económicas identificando los condicionantes del crecimiento basado en las características institucionales, el rol de los empresarios/emprendedores y la estructura productiva de la Argentina del siglo XIX. Su pensamiento representa la base del estudio de las condiciones institucionales necesarias para lograr incentivos favorables a la organización del trabajo productivo como articulador social.

El estudio pormenorizado del pensamiento de Alberdi desde las ciencias económicas es una tarea pendiente.³ Por lo tanto, llevar a cabo el estudio del sistema institucional que Alberdi considera necesario para superar la condición de pobreza que caracteriza a la economía argentina será un aporte novedoso para el estudio del pensamiento de las ciencias económicas. El análisis de las crisis económicas como expresión de las condiciones de pobreza depende del orden institucional y del papel de la iniciativa privada en la organización social (North, 2014).

El pensamiento de Alberdi está influenciado por su formación en la literatura económica clásica (Adam Smith, David Ricardo y Jean-Baptiste Say) y por la filosofía política liberal romántica (Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Friedrich Karl von Savigny y Pierre Leroux, principalmente) (Tarcus, 2016, p. 119). Estas dos influencias caracterizaron sus propuestas en temas económico-institucionales de una forma particular. Sus aportes se inscriben en la matriz de

³ *La contribución de Juan Bautista Alberdi a la teoría de las crisis es un capítulo indebidamente omitido en la historia del pensamiento económico. La causa de tal omisión reside en que Alberdi no hizo nunca una exposición compacta y coherente de sus ideas sobre las crisis. Los elementos esenciales de lo que (sin exageración) puede llamarse la teoría alberdiana de las crisis se hallan dispersos en forma desordenada a lo largo de sus reflexiones acerca de este asunto. Se requiere un trabajo de análisis para identificar esos elementos y para amalgamarlos en una estructura teórica apropiada.* (Olivera, 1977, p. 76)

la Modernidad, entendida como una época caracterizada por la racionalidad científica como medio de transformación social, por un cambio epistémico que transita de la religión a la ciencia, de la fe a la razón, desde el conocimiento revelado al conocimiento empírico y objetivo y al dominio de la naturaleza. Este abordaje moderno y liberal será el mismo que impulse el estudio de la eficiencia productiva como espacio científico de las ciencias económicas.

Este movimiento moderno se concibe liberal y universal como proceso; no obstante, la particularidad en Alberdi es que está presente la influencia romántica (Tarcus, 2016). Así, su característica diferencial como pensador de las ciencias económicas alimenta un imaginario político secularizado y teleológico que inventa la historia como progreso y que tiene como utopía final una república soberana, idealizada y feliz (Halperín Donghi, 2007).

La pregunta de investigación en la que se basa el presente trabajo se refiere a identificar ¿Cuál es la relación entre las “crisis de empobrecimiento”, el rol de los “empresarios/emprendedores” y las “instituciones” en el pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi?

Metodología utilizada

La metodología cualitativa fue utilizada en el presente artículo: técnicas de análisis documental, revisión bibliográfica y entrevistas abiertas en profundidad (análisis del discurso) a especialistas en la obra de Alberdi, historiadores, licenciados en Administración y economistas.

La historia de las ciencias económicas presenta algunas características particulares que la describen y diferencian tanto de la ciencia económica como de la historia. Entre sus principales especificidades se encuentra la de deber remitirse a un número mayor de variables de análisis de los procesos bajo estudio. En la ciencia económica, el estudio se encuentra enfocado en la prospectiva de los resultados, mientras que en la historia los objetivos están en la descripción de los hechos. En la historia económica, el foco está en la descripción de los procesos con un número mayor de datos, variables y procesos.

Este es el foco de la presente investigación: el pensamiento de JBA en materia económico-administrativa y en cuanto al rol de los empresarios/emprendedores en los procesos de generación de valor y distribución del ingreso. Su estudio nos remitirá a indagar en las influencias, las lecturas y finalmente las formulaciones que haya realizado Alberdi a lo largo de su producción intelectual.

Resultados alcanzados

A lo largo del presente artículo hemos recuperado el análisis del pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi respecto de las condiciones necesarias para consolidar la independencia argentina. El empresario/emprendedor será el actor representati-

vo de este proceso mediante las decisiones de ahorro e inversión. Los emprendedores/empresarios realizan su progreso material, potenciado por y dependiente de las condiciones institucionales de paz, seguridad, estabilidad y propiedad. Las instituciones representan el resultado de este proceso y se constituyen como los instrumentos de cambio (medios) que JBA articuló en su teoría del valor.

JBA planteó una reforma de las instituciones heredadas de la Colonia, que basaban su esquema de distribución de la renta en estructuras económicas de alta concentración, donde los monopolios eran una de las estrategias de control y de apropiación del excedente (el puerto único en Buenos Aires). También centró sus propuestas en la necesidad de lograr un régimen institucional estable que redujera el nivel de conflicto y garantizara seguridad y previsión, para establecer procesos de largo plazo de inversión y trabajo que produjeran un crecimiento económico estable y continuo.

La escasez de recursos, la pobre dinámica de acumulación y crecimiento y el alto nivel de violencia (guerra civil) imperante en la sociedad llevaron a JBA a concentrar sus críticas sobre el uso de recursos públicos en gastos militares, el endeudamiento, la pérdida del valor de la moneda y la falta de un federalismo representativo efectivo.

Los aportes analizados desde la economía institucional nos invitan a reflexionar sobre el pensamiento de Alberdi respecto de la necesidad de establecer mecanismos de regulación que impulsen instituciones inclusivas (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Mediante estrategias de desarrollo en que los sectores dinámicos de acumulación sean generadores de conocimiento y permitan la diversificación productiva necesaria, se logrará un nuevo sistema de valores para alcanzar la independencia.

El aporte de este artículo cuenta con un límite temporal, dado que analiza el pensamiento de un intelectual que integró y correlacionó conocimientos de diversos campos para indagar en las condiciones necesarias, desde la regulación de la vida social y económica, para construir un país próspero y una sociedad libre. El momento histórico, que coincide con el nacimiento de la ciencia de la administración (comienzos del siglo XX), representa nuevos desafíos institucionales y asociativos de un mercado en crecimiento y en el uso especializado de los factores de producción.

Las instituciones y el rol del “empresario/emprendedor”

Los incentivos son estímulos que despiertan nuestra motivación y, consecuentemente, nos mueven a alcanzar nuestros objetivos. Alberdi adhiere a una aproximación a este fenómeno desde un enfoque individual: “No es por la benevolencia del carnicero, del cervecero y del panadero que podemos contar con nuestra cena, sino por su propio interés” (Smith, 2011, p. 25).

El análisis de la relación entre incentivos e instituciones republicanas ha llevado al estudio de comportamientos regulatorios basados en la maximiza-

ción política. James Buchanan, premio nobel de Economía en 1989, analiza, mediante la teoría de la elección pública, como los dirigentes intentan maximizar la posibilidad de ser reelegidos.

Podría argumentarse que los ciudadanos han llegado a esperar pan y circo de sus políticos. Si sus políticos no ofrecen tales cosas, elegirán a otros políticos en su lugar. En vista de estas perspectivas, hay pocos políticos dispuestos a negarse a ofrecer pan y circo. Después de todo, ¿no es más agradable cumplir que rechazar los deseos de su electorado? (Buchanan et al., 2000)

Alberdi condiciona el comportamiento del actor individual al ordenamiento institucional vigente. En este sentido, la herencia colonial de instituciones que no centraban los incentivos en el uso intensivo de los factores de producción en la búsqueda de incrementar la generación de valor y el producto (PBI) representa una limitación al progreso. La visión de JBA del emprendedor/empresario se manifiesta en el siguiente fragmento.

Con nociones menos españolas y más exactas sobre la naturaleza verdadera de la riqueza, se daría a la tierra en Sud-América otro valor. No menos que su valor real, sino su verdadero valor. La América antes española no perdería en ello, porque realmente ocupa la tierra más capaz de ser rica, con otro orden de cosas que el actual, en que no es sino mero instrumento de riqueza, pero instrumento sin instrumentista.

Ese instrumentista, es decir, el trabajador inteligente, activo, enérgico, económico y juicioso, bien entendido; en una palabra, el trabajador de la Europa actual, inmigrado y establecido en el suelo americano. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 72)

Es relevante la comparación del enfoque de Alberdi respecto de las condiciones necesarias para el incremento de la riqueza en el territorio, en relación con las motivaciones o incentivos que determinaron las instituciones coloniales. La extracción de valor de los territorios y la limitación de la generación de capacidades locales representó la base del modelo de extracción que heredaron nuestras instituciones de la colonia (Gutiérrez, 2019). En este sentido, para Alberdi, los perfiles de los actores de la conquista americana expresan, al igual que para Acemoğlu y Robinson (2014), la búsqueda de rentas y la formación de instituciones políticas y económicas que limitan el desarrollo de capacidades e independencia de los territorios.

La riqueza fácil, ya formada, descubierta, que se obtiene sin la doble pena del trabajo y el ahorro, es la riqueza apetecida por el aventurero, por el noble, por el soldado, por el soberano...

La riqueza, así nacida, no era hija de las virtudes del trabajo y el ahorro. Como la riqueza griega y romana primitiva, era hija de la fuerza y de la

injusticia: un robo hecho al suelo por un trabajo robado al hombre. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 107)

Este argumento se analiza en el trabajo de Graeber (2012) en relación con estudio de la evolución de las instituciones. En los períodos históricos de inestabilidad institucional (guerra) se incrementa el uso del dinero-mercancía con relación a los períodos de paz. En tiempos de estabilidad y previsibilidad el dinero adquiere una conformación de convención (de cooperación en el tiempo) y los intercambios se fortalecen en relaciones de largo plazo ancladas en el trabajo y la confianza.

El inmigrado europeo pudo arrancar a la tierra sus metales preciosos por el trabajo del esclavo, pero no fue libre de ejercer su propio trabajo, para hacerle producir el cáñamo, la uva, la morera, el algodón, el trigo, el azúcar, el índigo; ni trabajar estas materias primas, para producir vinos, tejidos, muebles, comestibles ni otro objeto esencial a la vida social.

Prohibido el trabajo, no había producción ni riqueza. Faltando la producción, no había comercio. Es lo que necesitaba España para asegurar sus colonias. En su idea, el comercio era un peligro en emancipación, tanto de América consigo misma como con el extranjero.

Desde que la producción industrial estaba prohibida por la ley, el comercio no tenía razón de ser, ni podía existir.

El poblamiento de tales países debía ser lento. Como España misma no abundaba de población, la emigración para América estaba restringida.

La España, pueblo militar y religioso, colonizando el nuevo mundo, no cedió a mira alguna económica, ni comercial, ni industrial. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 108)

Esta caracterización expone el tipo de instituciones heredadas de la Colonia y los esquemas de incentivos presentes en el territorio de la independencia. Por eso señala Alberdi la necesidad de transformación de las condiciones institucionales para gobernar las condiciones económicas. Para avanzar en la transformación de las instituciones, su aporte más conocido es evidentemente su propuesta de Constitución. Es mediante el avance de las transformaciones regulatorias que se modificarán los incentivos, las preferencias adaptativas de los agentes y, en último lugar, sus comportamientos.

Se trata únicamente de hacer de la Constitución una verdad de hecho, en los cuatro o seis artículos que forman toda su originalidad de Constitución Argentina, es decir, de la ley que responde a las cuatro necesidades que ese país tiene, y son: un gobierno estable, población, capital, riqueza, seguridad.

Todo lo demás vendrá a su vez, como derivación lógica de esas causas.

Estabilidad significa paz.

Seguridad significa libertad.

Población significa trabajo.

Trabajo y capital significan riqueza, bienestar, poder o independencia, progreso y civilización. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 434)

Estos hechos son para Alberdi el punto de mira hacia la construcción de un futuro de libertad, en que las capacidades se sustenten en el hacer, en el trabajo humano orientado al mercado. Este futuro imaginado contrasta con los tres siglos del pasado colonial, en que el despotismo era la base de la organización institucional, en que el mercado no existía en libertad; en suma, un orden institucional organizado para eliminar la libertad y la iniciativa privada de todo tipo (Acemoğlu y Robinson, 2012). Estudiar, rezar y legislar eran las acciones más honorables del período anterior, carentes de valor de progreso y de promoción de las riquezas de los bienes necesarios para un país civilizado.

En este contexto, el desarrollo de la institución “mercado” depende del fortalecimiento del Estado. Sin él, no es posible concebir los mercados competitivos modernos a los que Alberdi hace referencia.

De hecho, el Estado y sus poderes coercitivos fueron los que tuvieron que ver con la creación de lo que ahora conocemos como “el mercado”, ya que se basa en instituciones como la propiedad privada, las monedas nacionales, los contratos legales, los mercados de crédito. Todo tuvo que ser creado y mantenido por políticas gubernamentales. El mercado fue una creación del gobierno y así ha permanecido siempre. Si reflexionamos sobre los presupuestos de los economistas respecto del comportamiento humano, veremos que tiene sentido que fuera así: después de todo, el principio de maximización da por sentado que la gente intentará extraer todo lo que pueda de aquellos con quienes está tratando, sin considerar en absoluto los intereses de los otros; pero al mismo tiempo supone que jamás, bajo ninguna circunstancia, recurrirá a ninguno de los modos más obvios de extraer riqueza de aquellos cuyo destino le resulta indiferente, tal como tomar la riqueza por la fuerza. El “comportamiento de mercado” sería imposible sin policía. (Graeber, 2018, p. 49)

Son las instituciones las que viabilizan las posibilidades de funcionamiento de los mercados como espacios de producción y realización del valor. Este sistema institucional de incentivos incluso promueve las posibilidades de desarrollar capacidades individuales y los incentivos necesarios para fomentar procesos de ahorro e inversión (procesos de generación de capital). Esto depende de las instituciones, en sentido amplio, como esquema de regulación social y económico.

La necesidad de crear instituciones tiene una clara conexión con el papel de los códigos de conducta, ya que las instituciones basadas en mecanismos interpersonales y entendimientos compartidos funcionan a partir de pautas de conducta comunes, de la confianza mutua y de la confianza en la ética

del otro. La utilización de reglas de conducta normalmente está implícita más que explícita; de hecho, tan implícita que su importancia puede pasarse por alto con facilidad en las situaciones en las que esa confianza no plantea problemas. Pero siempre que plantea problemas, puede ser desastroso pasar por alto la necesidad de que exista confianza. (Sen, 2000, p. 318)

No obstante lo anterior, es relevante señalar el rol del Estado en la nueva configuración del mercado y de las relaciones mercantiles y sociales. Estas nuevas funciones y regulaciones son compartidas por Alberdi como condiciones necesarias para establecer incentivos correctos que promuevan la toma de decisiones relativas al ahorro y la inversión. Este cambio institucional del rol del Estado se consolida con la revolución liberal de fines del siglo XVIII, expresada en la Revolución francesa.

Pues es un error elemental (y no compartido por los lógicos protagonistas del capitalismo, los “filósofos radicales” benthamitas) el de creer que el liberalismo era hostil a la burocracia. Era hostil solamente a la burocracia ineficaz, a la intromisión pública en cuestiones que debían dejarse a la iniciativa privada, y a las contribuciones excesivas. El vulgar tópico liberal de un Estado reducido a las atrofiadas funciones de un vigilante nocturno oscurece el hecho de que el Estado libre de sus funciones ineficaces e inadecuadas era un Estado mucho más poderoso y ambicioso que antes. (Hobsbawm, 2015, p. 185)

Esta nueva organización institucional representa una necesaria disponibilidad de recursos y una modernización del Estado y de sus sistemas de control, recaudación y servicios. El Estado liberal comprende nuevas funciones relativas a garantizar las condiciones para el desarrollo del sistema de intercambios por precios: promueve funciones relativas a la estabilidad de un sistema monetario y de recaudación de impuestos que valide sus funciones y su soberanía (en presencia y prestación de funciones).

De esta forma, el Estado, en el conjunto institucional del siglo XIX, incrementa sus capacidades, funciones y complejidad. Esta reflexión también está presente en Alberdi respecto de los desafíos necesarios para superar el estado de pobreza natural del territorio argentino. Las instituciones deben superar sus funciones extractivas y proveer garantías de seguridad, propiedad, estabilidad y paz de largo plazo que promuevan el marco regulatorio necesario para el desarrollo del mercado.

La riqueza depende del emprendedor

El estudio del trabajo, el ahorro y la inversión como características morales que describen a las sociedades civilizadas en el pensamiento de Alberdi corresponde al análisis del valor y la riqueza, relevante para esta investigación.

Analizaremos a continuación las características de estas categorías en el pensamiento de Alberdi y la articulación entre los diferentes procesos que describen la generación de valor y el progreso social en su visión. Así pues, en el análisis del emprendedor/empresario como agente de transformación social, nos centraremos en las condiciones necesarias y suficientes para la generación de valor, para la generación de ciclos de riqueza y para la transformación de los incentivos

El trabajo sud-americano carece todavía de las condiciones que hacen del trabajo europeo una verdadera fuente de riqueza. El ahorro es desconocido.

Dada esta situación en el suelo más capaz de ser un instrumento poderoso de producción, en manos de un trabajo inteligente y capaz, todo el problema de su transformación económica se reduce a buscar el medio de poner ese suelo en manos del trabajo y del trabajador de la Europa más adelantada, haciéndolo inmigrar en grande escala en el suelo que le reclama, sin perjuicio del mantenimiento íntegro de su nacionalismo y de su independencia. (Alberdi, 1895a, p. 715)

Alberdi analiza la teoría smithiana referida a la formación de capital como proceso de generación de riqueza. En Smith, los factores de los que depende la formación de capital —y en consecuencia el crecimiento— se encuentran en la extensión del mercado y en la proporción de la fuerza de trabajo productiva en relación con la fuerza de trabajo improductiva (2011, p. 52). La riqueza de una nación depende en última instancia de la acumulación de capital, y es esta visión la que adopta Alberdi.

Los factores estructurales del crecimiento económico están para Alberdi en la proporción de trabajadores productivos (no en la importación de capital) y en las condiciones institucionales (regulación). Estos dos elementos determinan la tendencia del crecimiento económico en el largo plazo. El trabajo productivo, por su parte, será el que establezca las posibilidades de acumulación de capital de largo plazo y transforme las acciones (incentivos) de los emprendedores mediante un incremento del ahorro. La importancia está centrada en la capacidad de los emprendedores de establecer procesos de generación de capital basados en el trabajo productivo y local (Alberdi, 1895a).

Las condiciones institucionales serán centrales para establecer incentivos de ahorro e inversión de largo plazo. Las características heredadas de la Colonia atentan contra este proceso, ya que limitan las oportunidades de inversión. La transformación de esta regulación requiere modificar las estrategias de apropiación de valor. Las continuas disputas territoriales y la consecuente inestabilidad en la gestión monetaria, impositiva y de endeudamiento condicionan las oportunidades de inversión y ahorro (Alberdi, 2008).

Respecto a las características cíclicas de los procesos de crecimiento, Alberdi centró su propuesta en la necesidad de estimular el crecimiento y la ve-

locidad de las acciones como forma de contrarrestar las “crisis de pobreza”. JBA adhiere a la teoría de ventajas absolutas como estrategia de crecimiento.

Lo que constituye la grande industria en Europa es el resultado de la evolución natural, porque pasa el poder productor de las sociedades civilizadas, a medida que su desarrollo toca sus más grandes consecuencias [...].

Tal desarrollo supone siglos de acumulación gradual de capitales y fuerzas y trabajo productor. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 125)

Así, el trabajo productivo determina las posibilidades de generación de valor, el cual mediante el ahorro y la inversión produce capital. Este capital, a lo largo del tiempo y gracias a la especialización del uso de los factores productivos, genera condiciones de competitividad relativa al territorio.

La crisis de pobreza se relaciona con la falta de capital suficiente y la consolidación de procesos de bajo valor y competitividad. La escasez de trabajo productivo es la causa de la condición natural de pobreza de la Argentina del siglo XIX, en un contexto institucional inestable (revoluciones), con una política de crédito y emisión que empobrece y limita las posibilidades de planificar ahorro e inversión.

El trabajo debe contener características que representen su posibilidad de materializar procesos de ahorro e inversión, como parte de lo que Alberdi define como trabajo inteligente.

Pero el trabajo mismo no es causa de riqueza sino cuando reúne estas condiciones morales, a que debe su poder productivo:

1. *Debe ser constante y persistente, es decir, un hábito, una educación.*
2. *Deber ser estudioso de su objeto y no meramente rutinario.*
3. *Debe ser libre y estar exento de toda traba colonial o restrictiva y monopolista.*
4. *Debe estar armado de capitales, de vías de comunicación y transporte, de telégrafos, puertos, muelles, postas.*
5. *Seguro en sus funciones, establecimientos y resultados.*
6. *Ha de ser desempeñado con gusto, con amor del estado u oficio o profesión o carrera.*
7. *Ennoblecido y glorificado, si es posible, como el primer título de recomendación al aprecio y consideración del país.*
8. *Hacer de él la virtud democrática y republicana por excelencia y el arma predilecta de la libertad del hombre, como causa de riqueza, es decir, de poder, es decir, de autoridad y de independencia personal.*
9. *Debe tener el rango y honor que en las monarquías y aristocracias se da a la sociedad elegante y dispendiosa.*
10. *Habitado a la amistad inseparable e indispensable del agente que le da valor y honor, quiero hablar del hábito del ahorro, del juicio y del buen*

gusto, simple en los gastos, sin lo cual el trabajo es una vana y estéril tarea. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 625)

Encontramos aquí una clara relación entre las características institucionales, la construcción moral de valores sociales y la relación con el mercado competitivo de las actividades del trabajo. Son las regulaciones de las relaciones sociales las que determinan el conjunto de condiciones que Alberdi expresa como necesarias para que el trabajo se convierta en valor (trabajo productivo) (Smith, 2011). Las expresiones verdaderas y últimas de este proceso son el ahorro y la inversión, mediante los cuales el trabajo adquiere la forma del emprendimiento. El emprendedor es el actor social de transformación en la teoría de Alberdi del crecimiento.

Para concluir el análisis del tipo de trabajo productivo que genera valor, es necesario definir el ahorro en el pensamiento de Alberdi para entender su vínculo con la inversión como causa y origen del valor. Son el ahorro y su consecuente inversión —y no el ahorro como atesoramiento— las expresiones del ahorro productivo.

Lejos de confundirse con los vicios de la avaricia y de la codicia, el ahorro es una virtud moral, la más bella cualidad de un hombre de buena educación y de buen gusto. Es una virtud que se compone de muchas otras: de previsión, de moderación, de dominio de sí mismo, de sobriedad, de orden. Es imposible llegar a la riqueza, sin la posesión de estas cualidades morales [...].

No hay más que ver cómo gasta un hombre su fortuna, para saber cuál es su educación, su moral, su inteligencia.

En una palabra, saber gastar es saber enriquecer sin empobrecer a nadie. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 628)

En este esquema ideal, el emprendedor/empresario es el actor de transformación y de resultado de los procesos de regulación institucional. El emprendedor adquiere las virtudes del hombre liberal en la igualdad, la libertad y la simpatía. El proceso de competencia y de mercado promueve las iniciativas de ahorro e inversión que potencian la riqueza territorial y el desarrollo de capacidades. El emprendedor, mediante sus capacidades de previsión, de gestión y de perseverancia, promueve la transformación de los valores morales y transforma las relaciones sociales hacia una comunidad con mayor libertad y capacidades.

El emprendedor como agente de transformación

Es probable que JBA haya tomado la categoría de emprendedor que estableció Jean-Baptiste Say: la figura de un tomador de riesgos en la búsqueda de ganancias: *“The entrepreneur shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and*

into an area of higher productivity and greater yield” [El empresario traslada los recursos económicos de una zona de menor productividad a otra de mayor productividad y rendimiento.] (Hindle, 2008, p. 77). Esta figura del emprendedor como un gestor del riesgo y la innovación, acuñada por Say a comienzos del siglo XIX en su *Tratado de economía política* (Say, 2001), es fundamental para la teoría económica y de la administración: la expresión de un individuo libre que representa las posibilidades de transformación social por medio de la innovación.

El desarrollo de la empresa, la innovación, la propensión a la toma de riesgos, la constancia en el trabajo y la búsqueda de riqueza son los valores necesarios para la transformación de la cultura argentina heredada. Estos se expresan en la figura de William Wheelwright, quien participó en el desarrollo de diversos proyectos y empresas en América del Sur durante el siglo XIX, y quien representaba para Alberdi el modelo de inmigrante necesario para la prosperidad regional.

La seguridad, la libertad y la igualdad son necesarias para el crecimiento del sector mercantil y de la burguesía nacional como clase. La transformación cultural depende en primera instancia de la reforma institucional que garantizan las libertades negativas como medios para el desarrollo de incentivos mercantiles. El crecimiento de la clase empresarial precisa los incentivos adecuados, y estos, las garantías institucionales de propiedad privada, paz y libertad.

Si bien Alberdi vivió en un período previo al desarrollo de la ciencia de la administración, comparte con ella preocupaciones teóricas en cuanto al objetivo final. Tanto JBA como los padres de la ciencia de la administración (Taylor, Fayol, Mayo) estudian mejoras en los métodos para el incremento de la riqueza.

Se puede ubicar el desarrollo de la ciencia de la administración en un momento del desarrollo del mercado en que el uso de los factores de producción necesita ser más intensivo y homogéneo para la estandarización de los procesos. Este objetivo de reducción de costos representa la profesionalización de la actividad empresarial: el emprendedor incorpora investigación sobre los procesos y sobre la organización como medio de estudio del negocio, y da paso al surgimiento de la administración como disciplina de estudio en sí misma.

Como resultado de los esfuerzos pragmáticos de la administración científica y el razonamiento administrativo, cambió el enfoque de “siempre-lo-hemos-hecho-de-esta-manera” al enfoque de “cuál-es-la-mejor-manera-de-hacerlo”. Debemos enfatizar que estos administradores rompieron con la toma de decisiones tradicional, abogando por un enfoque administrativo basado en hechos y en el razonamiento científico. (George et al., 2005, p. 118)

Para Frederick Winslow Taylor, “el objetivo principal de la administración ha de ser asegurar la máxima prosperidad para el patrón, junto con la máxima prosperidad para cada uno de los empleados” (Taylor, 1969, p. 19). El impacto

económico de la ineficiencia humana a nivel macro es el objetivo principal del estudio de la administración; el remedio para la ineficiencia se origina en una cuestión administrativa, y no en habilidades extraordinarias que deberían tener los hombres (Taylor, 1969, pp. 16-17).

Henri Fayol realizará, para la misma época, un análisis de los problemas relacionados con la dirección, por lo que centrará su estudio en los niveles medios y gerenciales de la empresa. Fayol considera a la planificación como la principal capacidad, dada su complejidad e influencia para el éxito de la organización en el tiempo. “La previsión, la organización, la coordinación y el control forman parte, sin lugar a dudas, de la administración, de acuerdo con el concepto corriente de este término” (Fayol & Taylor, 1994, p. 9).

JBA, por su parte, centró su interés en las condiciones institucionales necesarias para fomentar los incentivos al ahorro y a la inversión con fines comerciales. Producir es crear riqueza, y esta será parte de un proceso que requiere ciertos contextos “ambientales”. Los valores liberales configuran las capacidades empresariales —la constancia (tolerancia a la frustración), la toma de riesgos y la búsqueda de beneficios— como una condición necesaria para la existencia de este proceso (Alberdi, 1887). Estas capacidades, relativas a la gestión administrativa, tienen en Alberdi una expresión cultural y moral, en que los comportamientos del pasado condicionan las preferencias adaptativas y las expectativas de los actores.

Alberdi comparte la idea de superar la tradición (antiguo régimen) como una necesidad, y demuestra su preocupación por la mejora en las condiciones y el desarrollo del mercado como espacio de realización social. Los incentivos liberales empresariales están en formación en Argentina durante este período, a partir de estructuras mixtas. Madurar como país es para Alberdi recorrer un camino hacia el liberalismo mediante estrategias institucionales que tomen en cuenta las características locales (territoriales).

En suma, el emprendedor representa la figura del agente de transformación de los valores morales y de las capacidades locales. Las posibilidades de consolidación de una burguesía argentina dependen para Alberdi de las regulaciones institucionales de las libertades negativas. El mercado es el espacio natural de regulación de las relaciones sociales para una sociedad liberal y, según Alberdi, es la expresión del progreso como institución.

Esta es la expresión que caracteriza el análisis de Alberdi sobre la necesidad de limitar las acciones del Estado como actor de consumos improductivos basados principalmente en gastos militares y de patronazgo. La función central del Estado es garantizar, como proveedor de bienes públicos, los principios liberales —el desarrollo de las iniciativas privadas de libertad social y crecimiento de mercado— que permiten que el mercado exista como institución.

La acción del emprendedor/empresario es resultado de este proceso, así como el medio para la consolidación del empresariado como actor político de representación. JBA reconoce a este actor de transformación en los productores agropecuarios y en los comerciantes, por ser los sectores dinámicos de

crecimiento en la estructura productiva argentina. Garantizar el crecimiento económico basado en la especialización primaria es la estrategia que Alberdi adopta (ventajas comparativas) como medio de integración internacional. Las características particulares del territorio son las condiciones universales de producción de mercancías, de gestión de los procesos productivos y de administración empresarial (Ricardo, 2007).

William Wheelwright: El modelo de empresario de Alberdi

El monumento de William Wheelwright que se encuentra en Valparaíso es en parte un homenaje al pensamiento de Alberdi respecto de la necesidad de reemplazar las figuras heroicas de la independencia, vinculadas a valores relativos al honor, la gloria y la guerra, por un modelo nuevo de hombre, ligado a las condiciones necesarias para el logro genuino de la libertad (Alberdi, 1887, pp. 316-317). Estos valores modernos y liberales, vinculados al trabajo, la propiedad y la libertad, están emparentados, en el ideario alberdiano, a las posibilidades de alcanzar un estado de independencia efectivo (material).

Alberdi considera que es imprescindible que haya un cambio de actitud hacia el rol del empresario, quien debía ser visto como un héroe promotor del progreso. El nuevo paradigma debía ser el emprendedor que desarrolle industrias, abra nuevos mercados y comunique regiones que hasta ese momento permanecían improductivas con todo su potencial desaprovechado. (Newland & Gómez, 2013, p. 32)

Los empresarios desarrollan capacidades que les permiten asumir tres tipos específicos de comportamiento: en primer lugar, aceptar los costos de cometer más errores y de mayor magnitud que los que cometerían si continuarán de la manera habitual; segundo, el comportamiento peculiar del hombre de negocios, la disposición a hacer las cosas de una forma diferente, a enfrentar las dificultades en las primeras etapas de su emprendimiento; y tercero, la superación al rechazo social, que se manifiesta en contra de quienes impulsan nuevos métodos de actuar (Schumpeter & Backhaus, 2003, pp. 85-87). Estas características particulares del hacer colocan a los empresarios como promotores de un cambio posible en los valores relativos a la construcción de las relaciones sociales. Esta transformación se da mediante la realización de las actividades comerciales, que en la magnitud de los proyectos propuestos por Wheelwright transformarían el sistema productivo, las relaciones sociales y hasta el paisaje.

Los derechos individuales estaban muy protegidos en la Constitución de 1853. Para Alberdi, el motor primario del crecimiento económico era el hombre. No solo era el hombre la base del trabajo, sino que la acumulación de capital, producto del trabajo previo, era imposible sin él. La tierra era improductiva si faltaba el hombre o el capital. Por lo tanto, pensaba Alberdi, la organización política debía extender la protección a las actividades económicas de todos los hombres en la Argentina —y aun ampliar sus privilegios—. (Brown, 1993, p. 70)

Esta transformación silenciosa tiene una base moral en la evolución de los valores: desde la gloria, el honor y la guerra, hacia la libertad, el trabajo y la paz. Expresa la importancia de la actividad productiva, científica, rutinaria, sistematizada, como consolidación de la independencia de un territorio que se vuelve capaz de bastarse a sí mismo por medio de su trabajo productivo e integración al mercado internacional. Es a través de la organización productiva y el uso intensivo de los factores de producción que la libertad será un hecho en la Argentina del siglo XIX.

La nueva política debe tender a glorificar los triunfos industriales, a ennoblecere el trabajo, a rodear de honor las empresas de colonización, de navegación y de industria, a reemplazar en las costumbres del pueblo, como estímulo moral, la vanagloria militar por el honor del trabajo, el entusiasmo guerrero por el entusiasmo industrial que distingue a los países libres de la raza inglesa, el patriotismo belicoso por el patriotismo de las empresas industriales que cambian la faz estéril de nuestros desiertos en lugares poblados y animados. (Alberdi, 1887, p. 535)

Alberdi se encuentra entre los intelectuales que considera a los empresarios agentes estratégicos y fundamentales para la evolución social. Solo mediante su trabajo será posible avanzar en un proceso de acumulación genuino y contar con un aumento sistemático y continuo de la riqueza. En este sentido, el uso intensivo de los factores de producción es lo que hizo posible desde el siglo XVIII la revolución de las innovaciones y un crecimiento económico constante como nunca en la historia (Huntington *et al.*, 2014).

Es importante señalar el interés intelectual de Alberdi por el estudio de los factores que promueven el crecimiento económico, sin avanzar en el análisis de la distribución del ingreso. Tal como señala Tulio Halperín Donghi (2007, p. 32), JBA se interesó en la creación de los beneficios materiales.

...los capitales extranjeros, atraídos y establecidos por el estímulo de una legislación de libertad, son el medio previsto por la Constitución para fomento de las empresas de ferrocarriles, de colonización, de líneas de vapores, bancos de circulación, seguros, etc. Pero los capitales no tienen el poder de llevar a cabo esas grandes empresas, sino por medio de la asociación. Los

ferrocarriles, los canales, los bancos, las líneas de vapores, en ningún país del mundo son empresas que se acometan por un solo capitalista. Así, pues, la omnipotencia del capital, las maravillas de transformación y progreso que la América desierta espera de ese agente soberano de producción, residen y dependen de la asociación o compañía, que es la unión industrial de muchos para obtener un beneficio común. Este medio de acción del capital es igualmente aplicable a la producción agrícola, fabril y comercial. En todos los terrenos de la industria, la asociación es la fuerza que da al capital el poder de obrar resultados en grande escala. (Alberdi, 1853, p. 240)

Es necesario garantizar la paz, la estabilidad y la seguridad para brindar incentivos de inversión. Sin embargo, estas condiciones de base no aseguran por sí solas la acumulación de capital, para la cual se requieren incentivos económicos de mercado. Las condiciones particulares condicionan los incentivos para la generación de valor; el trabajo, el ahorro y la inversión son los procesos por los cuales se alcanzan la riqueza y la prosperidad efectivas del territorio. Garantizando un proceso de crecimiento sostenido en incentivos de mercado de largo plazo se superan las “crisis de pobreza” en la Argentina del siglo XIX. Este conjunto de condiciones universales (sobre las características de los procesos de generación de valor) y particulares (sistema productivo e institucional heredado) configura los límites y las oportunidades de crecimiento según JBA (Alberdi, 1853). La relación entre endeudamiento, guerra y crisis conforma un sistema correlacionado de causas que Alberdi señala como procesos constitutivos de crisis.

Como el poblador por excelencia es el capital, como no hay agente de inmigración de trabajadores igual al capital, que paga salarios atractivos y estimulantes al trabajo importando, es evidente que disminuir el capital del país, arruinarlo, exponerlo, es despoblar al país de su población más fecunda, que es la población obrera. Pues bien, acometer empresas de guerra o de mejoramiento material, superiores a los medios pecuniarios e inteligentes del país, es exponer el capital, disminuirlo, arruinarlo, perderlo y producir la crisis, que no es otra cosa que una gran destrucción de capital, es decir, un grande empobrecimiento general del país. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 541; con énfasis en el original)

En síntesis, las garantías particulares sobre el sistema institucional hacen posible, según Alberdi, un proceso de crecimiento sostenido de acumulación de capital, donde las crisis pasan a ser de riqueza. La construcción de este proceso de crecimiento depende del emprendedor/empresario como agente de transformación económico y social (Gutiérrez, 2019). Las características institucionales heredadas del período colonial representan de este modo una limitación para el conjunto de países de América Latina. La organización extractiva de la producción sumada al escaso desarrollo del mecanismo de com-

petencia de mercado limitó los incentivos de los emprendedores. Así pues, este sistema institucional promueve actividades rentísticas, reduciendo las dinámicas de crecimiento en la región. Superar el estado natural de pobreza en los territorios latinoamericanos depende entonces de refundar el orden institucional para establecer incentivos basados en la paz, el orden y los mecanismos de mercado como principal proceso de generación de valor.

La vigencia del pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi en el contexto latinoamericano: el rol del empresario

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Reseñas e informes

Pablo Piccato (2020). *Historia nacional de la infamia: Crimen, verdad y justicia en México*, México: CIDE-Grano de Sal, pp. 414, ISBN: 978-607-8508-73-0

Pablo Piccato (2020). *National History of Infamy: Crime, Truth and Justice in Mexico*, México: CIDE-Grano de Sal, pp. 414, ISBN: 978-607-8508-73-0

Recientemente, el Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), de la mano con la editorial Grano de Sal, han editado, para el público hispanohablante, *Historia nacional de la infamia: Crimen, verdad y justicia en México*, investigación del Doctor Pablo Piccato, publicada en 2017 por la Universidad de California. Hasta ahora, que la barrera del idioma ha sido solventada gracias a la traducción de Claudia Itzkowich, su consulta había estado circunscrita al público angloparlante; hecho lamentable ya que este libro, al suscribirse en el marco de la realidad mexicana, particularmente en el siglo XX, resulta sumamente atrayente para todo aquel interesado en comprender las expresiones criminales en el país suscitadas durante el siglo pasado, las cuales dan forma a manifestaciones presentes hasta hoy.

Violencia y delincuencia están cada vez más presentes en la vida contemporánea, especialmente en América Latina, la cual se ha convertido en la región más violenta del mundo. México no es una excepción, pues en el país se manifiestan de altos índices delictivos. Ante tal escenario, ha surgido la necesidad de analizar y dar respuesta a la problemática criminal, al mismo tiempo que la búsqueda de verdad y justicia ha sido una de las principales demandas de la sociedad mexicana durante los últimos años. No obstante, estas falencias en el sistema judicial y la desvinculación entre crimen, verdad y justicia no son una novedad en el panorama político mexicano. Como historiador, Piccato escudriña las raíces de esta problemática, actual, hacia la primera mitad del siglo XX, particularmente después de la reconfiguración política y social que devino posterior a la Revolución Mexicana.

Así pues, en *Historia nacional de la infamia*, Pablo Piccato registra estas prácticas de impunidad y explora cómo la sociedad dio respuesta a la frágil relación entre crimen, verdad y justicia. En este estudio, el autor analiza las

instituciones, como los juicios con jurado (abolidos en 1929), la policía y los detectives; la prensa, con la importancia social y política que representó la nota roja y sus narrativas en México; la literatura, con la novela negra y policiaca y las prácticas sociales en torno a la criminalidad, la verdad y justicia, tanto de perpetuadores como de la sociedad que coexistía con dichas prácticas. Elementos, todos, interrelacionados entre sí, que dan un paisaje de la sociedad mexicana de la primera mitad del siglo pasado.

Un elemento importante en la construcción narrativa del libro es la relación que tiene el autor con la literatura. Más allá de los apartados dedicados exclusivamente a la novela negra y la comedia policiaca, el libro está plagado de intertextualidades, sobre todo referencias literarias que se anuncian desde el título mismo, el cual es un guiño a Jorge Luis Borges, en específico al libro de relatos *Historia universal de la infamia* del escritor argentino; así como el epígrafe que le da entrada al texto de Piccato, el cual proviene de *La Universidad Desconocida*, último poemario de Roberto Bolaño, publicado póstumamente, y constantes referencias a la vida literaria mexicana, desde Federico Gamboa, pasando por Max Aub¹, Jorge Ibargüengoitia, hasta el premio nobel, Octavio Paz, exhibiendo la erudición que supera el área de especialización académica del autor.

Otra cuestión por subrayar es la construcción conceptual que Piccato hace de lo que denomina “alfabetismo criminal”; es decir, una serie de conocimientos que la sociedad mexicana adquirió acerca del mundo del crimen y el derecho penal, que le fue útil al afrontar el desgastado vínculo entre los hechos y la procuración de justicia. Este alfabetismo fue adquirido de manera histórica, social, mediante los diversos elementos que pertenecían a asuntos relacionados con el crimen, y se manifiesta en todos los apartados que conforman el libro, desde las instancias institucionales, como el juicio con jurado (y con público que los presenciaba casi como una puesta en escena) que aglutinaba a la sociedad mexicana, de toda clase social, en los recintos donde los juicios se llevaban a cabo; en especial en aquellos que ponían en tela de juicio el sistema legal, las instituciones, la moral y los valores con los cuales se erigía el Estado mexicano. También, el alfabetismo criminal se adquiría a través de las publicaciones periódicas de la nota roja, con producciones radiofónicas de la época, con la efervescencia de la novela policiaca; situación que de alguna manera ha tenido continuidad y se manifiesta hoy en día con el consumo masivo y cotidiano de noticias relacionadas con crímenes atroces exhibidos y disertados por la colectividad en charlas de sobre mesa, como si de alguna manera la sociedad mexicana, sobreexpuesta a situaciones violentas, desarrollara en su interior la narrativa que la versión oficial e institucional calla.

¹ En particular, se menciona *Crímenes Ejemplares, libro de micro relatos*, una especie de aforismos del crimen, que coquetean con los encabezados de la nota roja y la parodia.

En ese sentido, cabe destacar la historicidad que el autor realiza de los periódicos de nota roja, los de mayor tiraje y consumo, los cuales jugaron una suerte de crítica política a las instituciones creadas por el régimen, con sus versiones oficiales que fueron replicadas por los medios que comulgaban con él. En su momento, esas publicaciones periódicas eran las que ponían en entredicho el actuar de las instituciones y revelaban una forma social de concebir actos delictivos, muchas veces justificados por la misma sociedad que reclamaba justicia. Una de las publicaciones de nota roja que hacían frente a la versión oficial, más allá de enunciar la corrupción policiaca, fue la revista *Por Qué?*, de Mario Méndez Rodríguez, la única en poner en sus portadas los hechos del 2 de octubre de 1968 y denunciar la masacre de estudiantes acontecida en Tlatelolco, ejecutada por el Ejército mexicano. El papel que desempeñan hoy en día las publicaciones de nota roja se encuentra lejos de ser una crítica al Estado, sirviendo incluso como distractor de los asuntos políticos del país, con sus encabezados que más bien parecen un chiste oscuro del humor más negro de la sociedad. Precisamente esa transformación es la que se muestra en las páginas de *Historia universal de la infamia*. Resulta más que interesante ver cómo las publicaciones de nota roja, siendo un elemento presente en la realidad mexicana, fueron cooptadas por los mecanismos que responden más a una idea de mercado que de ejercicio periodístico.

En *Historia universal de la infamia* es posible advertir incluso la evolución de la criminología en México, desde una perspectiva positivista de tesis biológicas de la antropología criminal, cuya influencia se tornaría hegemónica hacia finales del siglo XIX, hasta una concepción posrevolucionaria, la cual, en vez de buscar el fenotipo criminal en concepciones cargadas de racismo y clasismo, “recuperaba las ideas clásicas acerca del crimen como un acto voluntario y del castigo en proporción con la gravedad del delito” (p. 159), siendo el acto criminal la expresión más auténtica de la individualidad. Así, a través de un estudio que guiña a los estudios culturales, se manifiesta la construcción jurídica, política, criminológica y social del México que surgió después de la revuelta civil de 1910 y da forma a lo que es el país hoy en día.

En cuanto a su estructura interna, el libro está organizado en tres partes: *Espacios*, *Actores* y *Ficciones*. En la primera parte, Piccato estudia los juicios con jurado en la Ciudad de México, como escenarios ejemplares donde se desarrollaron públicamente debates, que construían el mencionado alfabetismo criminal, sobre actos delictivos y la impartición de justicia. En este apartado se destaca el papel de las mujeres en la conformación del sistema judicial y de las transformaciones políticas y sociales en el país. Sin embargo, aquellos procesos judiciales que se libraron un siglo atrás no formaron parte de un empoderamiento de la mujer o de cuestiones relacionadas con la igualdad de género, discusión presente hoy en día cada vez con mayor potencia, sino que fueron casos excepcionales que sirvie-

ron de ejemplo moral que cuestionaron el poder del Estado y sus instituciones, pero que, al final, sirvieron para sedimentar el orden masculino que excluía a las mujeres, que superara las barreras de una parábola moral de la corrupción del sistema, dentro del sistema penal, político y judicial. Asimismo, esta primera sección, en su segundo capítulo, estudia los antes mencionados casos paradigmáticos de la nota roja.-

El segundo apartado, capítulos 3, 4 y 5, se orienta a la presentación de los actores que personificaron en su ser las discusiones cardinales en torno a la criminalidad. En esta sección vemos, por un lado, a detectives y policías; por el otro, a los propios perpetradores de crímenes, e incluso al arquetipo del pistolero, que ayudaron a configurar el alfabetismo criminal y encarnaron la forma en que fue concebida la violencia y la delincuencia. También, se manifiesta la idea de verdad y justicia, que muchas veces no era representada en quienes se suponía que la debían representar (instituciones y/o policías), sino que se exteriorizaba en situaciones ajenas a lo institucional. Ejemplo de ello es la *ley fuga*, entendida como la aplicación justa del castigo correspondiente al crimen cometido; que, en otras instancias oficiales, como la corte o la misma cárcel, no resultaba suficiente ante el delito cometido, y que se suscitaba de manera extraoficial por los elementos encargados de hacer valer el Estado de derecho. Otro ejemplo es el uso de la fuerza, de la violencia, ante hechos que no habían sido castigados por la justicia mexicana y se resolvían con la ejecución o linchamiento, también de forma extraoficial.

La tercera y última parte, titulada *Ficciones*, se enfoca en los textos criminales de corte ficcional para destacar el papel que jugó la narrativa en la alfabetización criminal, donde los autores construyeron una versión más precisa y detallada de la realidad que las instituciones y los propios periodistas de la época. Si bien todos los capítulos del libro se basan en casos concretos, actores materiales de crímenes específicos o autores literarios, y sus obras, en particular, no son un *corpus* de anecdóticos, sino que sirven de ejemplos prístinos para dar un panorama general de la historia nacional de la infamia, donde la relación entre verdad y justicia se encuentra fracturada y donde el alfabetismo criminal de la sociedad jugó un papel importante para darle respuesta.

Una reseña crítica debería omitir, en la medida de lo posible, adjetivos que mancillen o alaben a la obra referida; sin embargo, rompiendo los códigos que el formato demanda, se puede decir que esta obra es una joya que dialoga tanto con expertos en la materia, criminólogos, sociólogos, historiadores y literatos, como con el público no especializado, pero que, de una manera intuitiva o empírica, conoce la infamia nacional y tiene opiniones críticas hacia el Estado, su sistema judicial y su impartición de justicia. Es brillante en su exposición y relevante en su contenido. Da nota de la contemporaneidad, haciendo un estudio del pasado. El uso de fuentes es múltiple y experimentado, cumpliendo las exigencias de un estudio aca-

démico, y, al mismo tiempo, resulta atrayente para el lector ajeno a la academia. Es una lectura imprescindible para comprender el México actual y conocer lo que le dio forma, la relación entre impunidad y modernidad del Estado mexicano.

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Anna Clayfield, *The Guerrilla Legacy of the Cuban Revolution*, University of Florida Press, 2019, Gainesville, pp. 218, ISBN 9781683400899

Anna Clayfield, *El legado guerrillero de la Revolución cubana*, University of Florida Press, 2019, Gainesville, pp. 218, ISBN 9781683400899

Más allá de la Sierra: la guerrilla y la construcción del *ethos* revolucionario cubano en “The Guerrilla Legacy of the Cuban Revolution”

La imagen del guerrillero marcó el imaginario político latinoamericano contemporáneo y su aura, mítica o heroica, se asocia a valores como el sacrificio, el deber y el honor movilizados a favor de la transformación social o la revolución, retomando la imagen de luchadores sociales o anticoloniales, del periodo colonial, o de los justicieros que vivieron entre el siglo XIX y principios del XX en toda América Latina.

Aunque presente en toda la región, el epicentro de este imaginario fue la Revolución cubana y su narrativa histórica, que, convirtiéndose en el horizonte normativo y modelo de los procesos revolucionarios en los países del tercer mundo, elevó la guerrilla y el guerrillero a una condición heroica, al servicio de las transformaciones sociales, y encontró en el Che Guevara, tanto por su obra como por su sacrificio, la personificación ejemplar de un Quijote contemporáneo, capaz de fomentar la dedicación incondicional a las luchas y proyectos revolucionarios en todo el planeta.

En el caso de Cuba, ese proyecto revolucionario tiene una dinámica compleja y sugerente, asociada al contexto internacional, marcada por numerosas acciones e iniciativas, nacionales o internacionales, que se han ido ajustando a las condiciones y desafíos enfrentados a lo largo de los años hasta la actualidad. En este sentido, es posible observar que, desde fines del siglo pasado, el colapso del bloque soviético y el endurecimiento del embargo comercial estadounidense han llevado a Cuba a su más grave crisis económica y social (el periodo especial), con efectos que persisten hasta el día de hoy, afectando la economía y la vida cotidiana de los cubanos, y llevó el proyecto revolucionario

a una serie de transformaciones y reformas (la actualización del modelo) que, hoy, se combinan con una transición política, de un corte generacional, lo que afecta su continuidad y futuro.

Entonces, ¿cómo entender la legitimidad y resiliencia (y adecuación) de este proyecto y la concreción de transformaciones estructurales, ante los enormes desafíos y en condiciones tan adversas, en diferentes momentos de la historia cubana contemporánea?

Si bien la respuesta es compleja y tiene muchos factores, la lectura de este libro permite un indicio instigador que indica que el *ethos* y el legado guerrillero, que atraviesa toda la sociedad cubana de forma multidimensional, pueden ser considerados un elemento fundamental para la comprensión de la historia y de la política cubana contemporánea, principalmente de su adaptabilidad y capacidad de cambios estructurales, en diferentes contextos y orientaciones, y del apoyo y legitimidad del régimen cubano y su liderazgo.

Así, este trabajo, elaborado por Anna Clayfield, de la Universidad de Chester (Inglaterra), nos presenta como la guerrilla y sus legados (con valores y prácticas asociados al honor, sacrificio, luchas, obediencia, etc.) son fundamentales para la comprensión de la Revolución cubana y su dinámica contemporánea y, a partir de ella, demuestra cómo el legado guerrillero permitió la construcción de una narrativa y su convergencia con el pasado (como continuación de las luchas independentistas) y el futuro del país (como proyecto revolucionario), a través de la construcción del *ethos* revolucionario que sirve como referente fundamental de la cultura política y de la sociedad cubana contemporánea, aportando legitimidad y capacidad de adaptación a este proyecto y su liderazgo.

De esta manera, el trabajo busca comprender cómo se construyó tal legado a partir del análisis del lenguaje verbal y visual presente en innumerables medios y fuentes cubanas como los escritos y discursos de la dirección revolucionaria (Fidel Castro y Che Guevara, especialmente), las consignas e imágenes de libros, periódicos, revistas y manuales revolucionarios sobre la guerrilla o utilizados por las fuerzas armadas cubanas que sirvieron para dar forma a la cultura política del país asociándola con el legado de guerrillas y guerrillero, haciendo uso de una investigación profunda y bien fundada.

Para ello, la obra se organiza en seis capítulos que acompañan la construcción y reproducción de dicho legado de forma cronológica, siguiendo su dinámica reciente y los principales hechos que marcaron la Revolución y la historia cubana contemporánea.

El primer capítulo ('Perpetuar un espíritu de lucha: la guerra de guerrillas y el guerrillero en Cuba') presenta un panorama de toda la lucha armada (desde el ataque al cuartel Moncada hasta la victoria de la Revolución, pasando por acción guerrillera) y un análisis, a partir de la teorización de la guerra de guerrillas de Che Guevara (teoría del enfoque, condiciones subjetivas, sacrificio, etc.), los orígenes y grandes rasgos del mito guerrillero, su vinculación con las luchas independentistas y su legado en Cuba.

En el siguiente capítulo ('Consolidando la Revolución, 1959-1968') busca -a partir de Foucault y otros estudiosos del análisis del discurso y su comprensión de cómo se produce la verdad- analizar cómo el lenguaje y la imagen oficial fueron incorporando, en la década de 1960, los temas y valores de la guerrilla, promoviendo una nueva cultura política asociada a la concepción e intereses de la Revolución y de su visión de la historia cubana.

El tercer capítulo ('La vanguardia será el movimiento guerrillero, 1968-1979') analiza cómo, a pesar de la expansión de la presencia soviética y sus efectos en toda la sociedad cubana (sovietización), el *ethos* guerrillero continuó siendo promovido, incluso como reacción a burocratización, analizando publicaciones como la Revista Verde Olivo, Moncada y otras publicaciones de las FAR o de órganos oficiales y como siguieron exaltando a la guerrilla y su *ethos*.

En el siguiente capítulo ('Guerrillerismo en las sombras, 1980-1989'), ofrece un cuadro más complejo de la década de 1980 en el país, con la tensión entre las reformas y la reanudación de los valores fundamentales de la Revolución (el proceso de "rectificación de errores"), en buena parte asociados a la guerrilla, en el que se destaca una revalorización del Che Guevara (vida y obra) y los ideales de lucha, servicio y sacrificio, que se acentuarán en las próximas décadas.

El quinto capítulo ('Sobreviviendo al Periodo Especial: Aprendiendo lecciones del pasado, 1989-2003'), busca presentar cómo, en el periodo especial, el *ethos* guerrillero fue fundamental para superar la crisis económica y los desafíos que el país enfrentó y guiaron tácticas o iniciativas típicas de una guerrilla, como la conocida como "Batalla de las ideas" en un escenario de profunda crisis económica y social.

Finalmente, en el último capítulo ('La revolución bajo Raúl: La vieja guardia en un nuevo siglo, 2006-2018') analiza el periodo de Raúl Castro y sus iniciativas para actualizar el modelo cubano, indicando cómo el legado guerrillero estuvo presente en su actuación política, más pragmática, y en los cambios que lideró, presentando las reformas que ha desarrollado en diversos campos, como una forma de actualizar los ideales de la Revolución y mantener sus logros.

Esto da como resultado un trabajo bien fundado, con una extensa investigación en diversos medios cubanos, que brinda una visión integral y multidimensional del legado guerrillero y su importancia fundamental, como un "arsenal simbólico" como se refiere la conclusión, para la supervivencia, adaptaciones y transformaciones de la Revolución cubana, además de contribuir a la comprensión de su singularidad en relación al socialismo soviético y superar los estereotipos relacionados con el debate sobre el papel del militarismo en la sociedad cubana, aportando elementos importantes para un análisis más equilibrado de su naturaleza y papel efectivo en la isla caribeña.

En suma, si bien nos permite entender cómo se legitimó y llevó a cabo este revolucionario proyecto, permitiendo comprender cómo se consolidó el apo-

Reseñas e informes

yo fundamental al régimen en las últimas décadas, el trabajo demuestra que este proyecto se enfrenta hoy a su mayor desafío relacionado con la necesidad de reformas y de una transición política, de un corte generacional, que derivó en una nueva dirección que, por no haber participado en la lucha guerrillera, debe demostrar ser capaz de mantener el *ethos* y el legado guerrillero, garantizando la legitimidad y la continuidad de reformas que puedan reconciliar los ideales de la Revolución cubana con la nueva realidad contemporánea y el nuevo orden global.

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Marta Osuchowska, *Rozwój pozycji prawnej Kościoła katolickiego w Argentynie (The Development of the Legal Position of the Catholic Church in Argentina)*. Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT – Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe, Wrocław 2019, pp. 270, ISBN 978-83-7977-413-5

Marta Osuchowska, *La evolución de la posición jurídica de la Iglesia católica en Argentina*. Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT - Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe, Wrocław 2019, pp. 270, ISBN 978-83-7977-413-5

Professor Marta Osuchowska is a recognized representative of the young generation of Latin Americanists in Poland. In 2007, she received a master's degree in law and canon law, and in 2013, she was awarded a doctoral degree based on her dissertation entitled "Legal Protection of Religious Freedom in Colombia" (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw). In 2011, she completed her postgraduate studies on Latin America at the Centre for Latin-American Studies at the University of Warsaw. Since 2008, she has worked as an academic teacher and researcher at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University. Her main area of interest is religious law in Latin America.

The book (habilitation thesis), which was the basis for awarding the postdoctoral degree, concerns the development of legal norms relating to the Catholic Church in Argentina. This development is traced from the May Revolution of 1810 to the present day. The book consists of four chapters. The first chapter "Relations between the state and the Catholic Church since the May Revolution of 1810 until the termination of the Constitutional Congress provisions in 1827" deals with the issue of religion in constitutional bills, the right of patronage, relations with the Holy See, the Church reform by Marina Rodriguez, and the treaty with Great Britain. Chapter II "The Argentine Confederation and the Catholic Church" examines the document *Memorial Ajustado*, attempts to form the national church in Argentina, attitudes of conservatives and liberals to religion, religious issues addressed during *Congreso Constituyente* in 1853, the Constitution of 1853, and the reform of

patronage. In Chapter III entitled “Towards a dialogue with the Holy See”, the Author focuses on the attempts to reach an agreement between the state and Church authorities, the place of religion in the Argentinian law and society, confrontation between *fuera política* and the Catholic tradition, and the concordat. The last chapter entitled “The principle of cooperation in religious freedom” deals with international agreements in the Argentinian legal system, the reform of Art. 2 of the Constitution and other confessional norms, *sostener* of the Catholic culture, the legal status of the Church and changing relations between the state and the Church.

The book is a scholarly work and as such, it complies with all the requirements for academic publications. The research problem is well-defined, and the methods, sources and subject literature are appropriately selected. The Author presents the research results in a thoughtful and competent manner, meeting all the standards of scientific thinking. She provides a comprehensive and clear analysis of a variety of issues, taking into account the complexity of religious law in Argentina, not only in relation to the legal position of the Catholic Church, but also of other denominations and religions in this country. The analysis is in-depth and detailed, written in logical and coherent language that shows the Author’s originality and autonomy of thinking. The book is richly documented, containing 350 bibliographic references (mainly to Argentinian sources) and 789 footnotes. Osuchowska focuses on the legal acts of the Federation and Province of Buenos Aires, as they play a key role in the legal system and international relations of Argentina.

I recommend the book to all those interested in law and the history of law, religious law, political science, and the role of religion in the life of individuals and societies. This is an erudite, competent, and critical synthesis of the history of religious law in Argentina. It offers an innovative approach of looking at the relations between the state and the Church, which overcomes the binary and often mutually exclusive concepts of the secular state and religious state.

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De acuerdo con la política editorial de *Anuario Latinoamericano – Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales*, en la revista se publicarán artículos científicos en español, portugués e inglés.

La aceptación de los textos para su publicación depende de la positiva evaluación por dos expertos externos según el sistema de doble anonimato.

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3. El título del artículo en el idioma del artículo y en inglés, el nombre y el apellido del autor, la afiliación institucional y su dirección postal, la dirección del correo electrónico institucional, una breve información sobre el autor, el número de identificación del autor ORCID.
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Mainwaring, S. & Pérez-Liñán, A. (2013). *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America. Emergence, Survival, and Fall*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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